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General medical wards deliver the majority of inpatient care. Despite technological and thera-
peutic advances, these wards expose 10% of patients to preventable adverse events, and dispro-
portionately contribute to preventable hospital deaths. Improving ward team performance is
often proposed as a mechanism to improve patient outcomes.
The overarching goal of this thesis is to identify e￿ective strategies to improve interdiscip-
linary team care on the medical ward. Chapter 1 introduces key concepts in healthcare quality,
and speci￿c issues in the delivery and measurement of interdisciplinary ward care. The exist-
ing literature for ward improvement strategies is then described. A narrative review identi￿es
common targets for ward interventions [chapter 2], and a systematic review evaluates inter-
disciplinary team care interventions, ￿nding little evidence of signi￿cant impact on objective
patient outcomes [chapter 3].
The development and evaluation of prospective clinical team surveillance (PCTS) is then
reported. PCTS is a novel interdisciplinary team care intervention, engaging sta￿ to identify
barriers to care delivery,with facilitation and feedback. A programme theory andmixedmethods
evaluation are presented, using a stepped wedge, cluster controlled trial [chapter 4]. Mixed-
e￿ects models show a signi￿cant reduction in excess length of stay with high ￿delity PCTS
[chapter 5]. Surveys, focus groups and auto-ethnography identify PCTS’ mechanisms of action,
and its impact on incident reporting, safety and teamwork climates [chapter 6]. Implementation
outcomes, facilitators and barriers are described in chapter 7.
Other perspectives on improvement are also explored. A model of organisational alignment
iv Abstract
is developed [chapter 8], and an interview study with patients and carers elicits their priorities
[chapter 9]. Finally, chapter 10 summarises the ￿ndings, highlighting opportunities to develop
medical ward outcome sets and construct a model of interdisciplinary team e￿ectiveness. These
can be used to support improvements in interdisciplinary care, through changes in policy and
practice.
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Delivery and measurement of
interdisciplinary team care in the
medical ward microsystem
1.1 Introduction
The ward is the fundamental delivery unit of medical care for most hospitalised patients. It is a
place of treatment, where patients receive their therapy; a temporary home, where they take
their meals and receive their visitors; and - for many patients - a resting place, where they are
comforted in their ￿nal days. Despite enormous advances in medical understanding, these basic
premises of ward care have changed little.
The concept of how the ward environment might contribute to - or detract from - patients’
health and healing has undergone several revolutions. In the 19th century, Florence Nightingale
observed the advantages of natural light, ventilation and cleanliness in ward design (Hurst, 2008).
Her prescription for a ward that could improve patients’ outcomes was adopted globally. With
few speci￿c interventions that could actually help patients, the environment of care became
disproportionately important. In the late 20th century, this primacy was largely reversed, with
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increasingly e￿ective therapies for a range of medical conditions. Clinical practice focused
on the selection of evidence-based treatments for speci￿c diseases, paying less attention to
the systems of care delivering those treatments. Similarly, academic funding prioritised the
identi￿cation of novel biomedical therapies, with less investment in health services research to
evaluate how they were used in the real world (UK Clinical Research Collaboration, 2015).
With rapid, ongoing, therapeutic and technological advances, the sheer complexity of mod-
ern healthcare now itself poses amajor challenge. It is beyond any individual healthcare provider
to guarantee that her patients receive all the therapies from which they are likely to bene￿t, or
to keep those patients entirely safe from iatrogenic harm. To remedy this, we are turning our
attention once again - much as Nightingale did - to the local systems in whichwe work. Whereas
she focused on the physical characteristics of the hospital environment, we are increasingly
attuned to its processes, personalities, and communities - as well as its bricks and mortar.
This thesis focuses on the work of general medical wards. These hospital units care for
adult patients whose medical treatment primarily requires drug therapy and limited procedural
interventions, rather than surgery. Patients on medical wards are increasingly elderly and frail,
with multiple chronic illnesses, and typically require community support from both formal and
informal carers. Rapid physiological deterioration is common. Caring for these medical patients
requires large interdisciplinary teams; highly individualised care planning; and di￿cult choices
between pursuing curative treatment or palliation. This type of care represents the majority of
inpatient work, accruing signi￿cant healthcare costs. Approximately £5 billion is spent on ward
care each year in the National Health Service (NHS), a quarter of NHS inpatient expenditure
(Monitor, 2014).
Healthcare quality and safety research has mostly taken place in the hospital setting; how-
ever, that research activity has largely focused on areas considered ‘evidently high risk’, i.e.,
surgery and anaesthesia. Dixon-Woods et al. (2009) highlight the ‘relative neglect of more ap-
parently mundane settings, such as medical wards’. In this chapter, I will set out why medical
wards are worthy of study in their own right. I will describe:
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(i) The evolving understanding of ward systems, and their impact on the delivery of care;
(ii) Evidence of serious failings in medical ward care; and
(iii) Characterisations of ward-level performance.
Any description of ward care must be seen in the context of the wider focus on healthcare
safety and quality from the beginning of the 21st century. I will therefore review some fun-
damental concepts in the broader patient safety literature, before turning more speci￿cally to
medical wards.
1.2 Key concepts in patient safety and healthcare quality
1.2.1 Changing perceptions of patient safety: from isolated harms to a global
public health problem
Patient safety - the absence of preventable harm to a patient during the process of health care - is
now considered a serious global public health issue (World Health Organisation, 2014a). It took
considerable time for the topic to capture such international attention, despite well-publicised
cases where individual patients had died due to medical errors (Knox, 1995; Robins, 1995).
Academic reports were similarly ine￿ective in generating public pressure, despite evidence
that around 9% of patients were a￿ected by adverse events1 (Vries et al., 2008). Harms were
typically understood as the result of individual clinicians’ mistakes, with little appreciation of
the extent of the problem, or its systemic causes (Li et al., 2015).
A seminal report by the Institute of Medicine, ‘To err is human’ (Kohn et al., 2000), ￿nally
launched the modern patient safety movement. It represented a distinct change of course, with
a clear message about the extent of harm - targeted, for the ￿rst time, directly to the lay public
(Elwyn and Corrigan, 2005). Much attention focused on the report’s estimate of up to 98,000
1An adverse event is an unintended injury or complication, resulting in prolonged hospital stay, disability or
death, caused by healthcare rather than the underlying disease process (Vries et al., 2008).
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American deaths per year from medical error, generating a momentum that led to notable
increases in academic patient safety publications and research awards (Stelfox et al., 2006). The
e￿ect, in practice, was most apparent in sustained reductions in hospital-acquired infections, an
important cause of harm (Pronovost et al., 2016). Progress in other areas, however, has been far
more limited,with a growing understanding thatmost patient safety problems aremore complex
and pervasive than was ￿rst thought to be the case (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015).
Still, there is no longer any credible debate that patient safety is an important public health
issue.
1.2.2 Systems approaches, blame and individual accountability
In addition to forcing patient safety onto the public and professional agendas, a key contribution
of the Institute of Medicine’s approach was its emphasis that ‘errors’ and ‘safety’ re￿ected
systems properties, more than the competence or e￿orts of individual clinicians (Donaldson,
2008). Systems changes, rather than a focus on individuals, would therefore hold the key to
improving safety and quality. A similar message emerged from the UK’s report one year later,
‘An organisation with a memory’ (Department of Health, 2000).
The need to understand systems failings as the foundational causes of most errors has now
been widely accepted. However, this does not absolve individual clinicians of their responsibil-
ities. A ‘just culture’ requires personal accountability for individual performance, in addition to
an atmosphere of trust that encourages the recognition of systemic inadequacies (Reason, 1997).
Tensions between the con￿icting approaches of ‘no blame’ and ‘accountability’, and indeed
between individual and collective accountability, must be balanced if patients and clinicians
are to feel that they have been treated fairly (Wachter, 2013). That this nuanced debate is tak-
ing place at all is a major step forward from the automatic blame response that errors once
provoked.
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1.2.3 De￿nitions of quality in healthcare
Having established that patient safety was one component of high quality care, the Institute
of Medicine then developed a more comprehensive description of the quality construct. In
‘Crossing the Quality Chasm’ (Institute of Medicine, 2001), six key characteristics of quality
were listed: safe, e￿ective, patient-centred, timely, e￿cient and equitable.
More recent reports describe fewer quality goals. In the NHS, quality was de￿ned as patient
safety, patient experience and the e￿ectiveness of care (Department of Health, 2008). In the USA,
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement described goals for high value care in a ‘Triple Aim’:
improving the patient experience of care, improving the health of populations, and reducing
the per capita cost of care (Berwick et al., 2008). This has since been expanded to a ‘Quadruple
Aim’, to include improving the experience of providing care, i.e., improving job satisfaction and
reducing burnout for healthcare providers (Bodenheimer and Sinsky, 2014; Sikka et al., 2015).
How best to de￿ne healthcare quality clearly depends, to some extent, on the sociopolitical
context in which that care is delivered. Nonetheless, these di￿erent descriptions of quality share
common components, notably patient experience and an element re￿ecting the e￿ectiveness of
care in improving health. Patient safety may be listed separately as a component of quality, as
it is in ‘Crossing the Quality Chasm’ and in ‘High Quality Care For All: NHS Next Stage Review’
(Department of Health, 2008). Alternatively, it might be incorporated into a broader category
of patient experience (Stiefel and Nolan, 2012).
1.2.4 Changes in healthcare safety over time
There is limited evidence that the safety of healthcare has improved in recent years. Admin-
istrative data indicate that adverse drug events, catheter-associated urinary tract infections
(CAUTIs), and pressure ulcers all decreased substantially in the USA between 2011 and 2014
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016). Record reviews show a 30% fall in prevent-
able adverse event rates in the Netherlands between 2008 and 2011/2012 (Baines et al., 2015).
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However, the large reductions in adverse event rates and complication rates were statistically
insigni￿cant. Previous work by the same group in the Netherlands had also demonstrated little
progress in reducing healthcare-associated harms (Shojania and Thomas, 2013).
Paradoxically, this might re￿ect rising standards of care. Over time, as more complications
of healthcare are brought within an expanded ‘perimeter of safety’ - viewed as unacceptable,
potentially preventable patient safety issues - signi￿cant reductions in adverse event rates are
increasingly di￿cult to achieve (Vincent and Amalberti, 2015). The clear exceptions to this rule
have been healthcare-associated infections, particularly central line-associated bloodstream
infections (CLABSIs). Once accepted as the inevitable sequelae of intravenous devices, CLABSIs
are now the target of well-de￿ned sociotechnical e￿orts to prevent them (Pronovost et al., 2006;
Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; Marsteller et al., 2012). Successes in CLABSI reduction are the clearest
possible demonstration of improved patient safety in recent years.
1.2.5 Quality improvement
Quality improvement (QI) interventions, broadly de￿ned as purposeful e￿orts to secure positive
change (Portela et al., 2015), can be broadly divided into two conceptually di￿erent approaches.
The ￿rst approach targets some underpinning aspect of care - for example, team structures or
routines, non-technical skills, or generic operational challenges faced by sta￿. The second aims
to improve the management of a speci￿c clinical condition (a diagnosis, or a complication of
that diagnosis). Here, I will discuss the relative attention a￿orded to each approach, and its
limitations.
1.2.5.1 Improving underpinning aspects of care
Healthcare delivery is not streamlined. Operational ine￿ciencies are commonplace: indeed,
process failures are an integral part of frontline healthcare delivery (Tucker and Edmondson,
2003). Nurses spend 10% of their time simply working around ‘routine’ problems: disruptions
and errors in the supply of information or materials are an expected part of their work (Tucker,
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2004). These problems do not attract signi￿cant attention, either in national safety initiatives
or within individual institutions (Tucker et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2009).
Few large-scale improvement interventions have formally addressed these characteristics of
ward care. One notable exception was the ‘Releasing Time to Care: The Productive Ward™ (PW)’
programme. Introduced in the UK in 2007 by the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement,
PW was a modular, self-directed toolkit. Its goal was to ‘empower ward teams to identify areas
for improvement, by giving sta￿ the information, skills and time they need to regain control of
their ward and the care they provide’ (Kings College London, 2009). Based on the principles of
the Toyota Production System, also known as ‘Lean thinking’ (Womack et al., 1991), PW claimed
to reduce ward activities that did not add value, releasing sta￿ time for work that actually met
patient needs.
The idea of a generic, cross-cutting, ward-level intervention was distinctly di￿erent to the
initiatives that had preceded it, as PW leaders described (Kings College London, 2009):
‘The ward environment is somewhere that in service improvement sort of initi-
atives has actually been largely ignored, because they’ve gone down pathways,
they’ve gone down speci￿c improvements in terms of clinical issues... but never
looking at the mundane processes that make up the [ward’s] activities... that really
hugely impact on... patient care and patient experience.’ (Lizzie Cunningham, NHS
Institute)
Despite a £50 million investment in its nationwide dissemination, signi￿cant voluntary local
uptake (Kings College London, 2009), and international adoption (Broek et al., 2014; Hamilton
et al., 2014; White et al., 2014), there is little evidence of PW’s e￿ectiveness. A systematic review
of PW literature found numerous ‘experiential’ publications extolling its bene￿ts, with few
negative reports, and little other substantive data. This suggests publication bias (Wright and
McSherry, 2013); only one report has been published independent of the NHS Institute for
Innovation and Improvement, which developed the programme (Wright and McSherry, 2014).
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PW’s key claim - to release time for nurses to spend with their patients - remains largely
unproven. A review of possible e￿ciency improvements associated with PW found that, where
nursing time had been freed up, the majority of it was then reinvested in completing more
PW modules (Kings College London, 2011). At the time of writing, e￿orts are underway to
re-evaluate PW, ten years after its original introduction (National Institute for Health Research,
2016).
A recent systematic review of other ‘Lean’ interventions in healthcare similarly found no
evidence of positive e￿ects on health outcomes, patient satisfaction or actual ￿nancial costs.
The e￿ect on process outcomes was inconclusive (Moraros et al., 2016). However, the evidence
was of poor quality, and it may be that Lean interventions focused on waste from the patient’s
perspective (rather than the provider’s) are more likely to improve outcomes (Blackmore and
Kaplan, 2016).
At best, we could say that the known e￿ect of these interventions is unclear. Tucker et al.
(2008) argued that improving work systems in general, rather than focusing more narrowly
on speci￿c clinical conditions, might increase both the safety and e￿ciency of ward care, and
improve patient experience. This is no simple task: cross-cutting interventions (whether they
focus on operational issues, transfers of information, teamwork or other non-technical skills)
are not easily implemented [see 1.4.1.2].
1.2.5.2 Improving the management of speci￿c clinical conditions
The majority of QI interventions adopt the second conceptual approach, addressing the man-
agement (prevention, diagnosis and treatment) of speci￿c clinical conditions. This is deliberate:
improvement teams are typically urged to choose goals that are speci￿c, measurable, achievable,
realistic and timely (Doran, 1981). For example, the Dutch national safety programme ‘Prevent
Harm, Work Safely’ included improvement modules on optimising care for acute coronary syn-
dromes, the prevention of renal failure due to iodinated contrast agents, and the prevention and
treatment of severe sepsis, amongst others (Baines et al., 2015).
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Whether these discrete, single-topic QI e￿orts make a substantial contribution to over-
all levels of healthcare quality and safety is far from certain. As these modular improvement
strategies accumulate, so do their unintended consequences, including an unmanageable prolif-
eration of performance metrics [see 1.5.3.4], and competition for limited sta￿ time and resources.
There is also the perception that single-issue QI does little to ease the complex, collaborative
care that sta￿must routinely deliver. This has been likened to ‘killing mosquitoes one at a time,
but not draining the swamp’ (Dixon-Woods, 2014b).
The most de￿nitive improvement in any single group of clinical conditions has been the
reduction in CLABSIs [see 1.2.4]. However, focal successes in CLABSI reduction are not repres-
entative of the QI ￿eld in general, which has not achieved similarly broad reductions in other
patient harms. Subsequent single-issue QI initiatives have been nowhere near as impressive.
This may be because CLABSIs are not representative of the common challenges that wards
face [see 1.5.3]. Moreover, sustained CLABSI improvement was brought about when synergistic
regulatory and social pressures aligned with technical advances in infection prevention. Such
alignment is extremely rare in QI, which is more often faced with competing priorities, con-
tradictory policies, and interventions whose e￿ects are contested. Newer QI programmes now
face a very di￿erent cultural context to the early CLABSI initiatives, which had a clearer ￿eld
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2013).
CLABSI reduction is, in some ways, a cautionary tale. Meaningful improvement on this
single topic required a powerful combination of sustained pressures, acting at micro-, meso-
and macro-organisational levels. With so many overt and subtle e￿ects, intended or otherwise,
the individual contribution of any single QI initiative becomes very hard to determine.
1.2.6 Evaluating quality improvement interventions
The QI literature would suggest that the majority of QI interventions have been e￿ective. How-
ever, this may re￿ect considerable publication bias (the preferential selection of reports with
positive results) and the choice of inadequate study designs (Shojania et al., 2004). Improvement
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interventions can be assessed with a range of study types, re￿ecting di￿erent trade-o￿s between
research rigour and pragmatic, dynamic interventions (Portela et al., 2015). Each methodology
has its particular strengths and weaknesses, and complementary quantitative and qualitative
evaluations may be needed to assess what works, how, and in what contexts (Dixon-Woods,
2014a).
The key issue for QI studies,whatever their design, is causation: did a particular intervention
lead to improvement beyond what could have been expected otherwise? Every evaluation needs
to answer this question. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and their variants are considered
the best designs for these inferences about causality, even if they too have drawbacks (Portela
et al., 2015). However, the predominance of uncontrolled before-after studies is a bigger concern.
These studies often falsely attribute improvements in care to an intervention, when the same
change would have been seen regardless (E￿ective Practice and Organisation of Care, 2014).
QI interventions are bedevilled by a phenomenon known as the ‘rising tide’. This is a
positive secular trend (widespread, incremental improvements in the quality and safety of care),
occurring contemporaneously with the QI evaluation (Chen et al., 2016). Importantly, rising
tides are the result of the same public and professional pressures that lead to the development
of QI interventions: their coexistence is no coincidence. Several major QI studies reporting null
results have identi￿ed and acknowledged the in￿uence of these secular trends (Benning et al.,
2011; Bion et al., 2013). The majority of the QI literature, however, has not been as rigorous.
The extent to which QI interventions can be relied upon as a delivery vehicle for improved care
standards - as opposed to regulation, professional incentives, or structural investment - remains
unknown.
The prioritisation of patient safety and high quality care, the understanding of failings
as predominantly systems de￿ciencies, and the contested value of quality measurement and
improvement are important themes throughout this thesis. I will now return to the main thrust
of this chapter: describing medical ward systems and their quality of care.
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1.3 Medical ward design and care delivery
1.3.1 Ward design
Hospital ward design has evolved in three distinct stages. Nightingale wards, featuring a long
nave in which all patients could be easily observed from a nurses’ station, were the design of
choice from the mid-19th century until the 1950s. Later ‘bay’ designs, separating wards into
numerous rooms that each housed a small number of beds, allowed for more ￿exible use of the
available accommodation. Bays could then be designated as ‘male’ or ‘female’ as required (NHS
Estates, 2002; Hurst, 2008).
Importantly, this design conceded for the ￿rst time that other priorities (here, an appropriate
organisational response to ￿uctuating demand) had to be balanced against the ease of nursing
observation. This concession paved the way for the increased prioritisation of patient privacy
and dignity, with a third generation of hospital wards expected to routinely provide single
rooms (Department of Health, 2011).
There are clear trade-o￿s between the di￿erent ward designs. For example, improved patient
privacy may come at the expense of reduced supervision by sta￿, negative e￿ects on sta￿
teamwork, and reduced social interaction for patients themselves (Maben et al., 2015). Even
apparently simple changes to the ward environment (however desirable in theory) may have
complex, even harmful, e￿ects on the nature of ward work (Wachter, 2015). Systems leaders
have focused on the assumed technical bene￿ts of their proposed changes, with less attention
to the socioadaptive adjustments that these changes demand. A more holistic paradigm for the
ward environment - the microsystem - can be adapted from the literature on organisational
e￿ectiveness.
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1.3.2 The medical ward as a clinical microsystem
The performance of any organisation’s core activities relies on its microsystems, the small
frontline units that deliver its services. High-performing institutions outside of healthcare re-
cognise that optimising microsystem performance is fundamental to the wider organisation’s
success (Quinn, 1992). For example, they continually re-engineer the frontline interface between
the customer and the institution’s core competency, and develop systems to capture microsys-
tem information. Here, I will describe the distinct characteristics of medical wards as clinical
microsystems, and identify demographic changes that will increase both their in￿uence and
workload.
1.3.2.1 Unit-level delivery of interdisciplinary care & production of the outcomes of
care
Health systems in turn are made up of multiple clinical microsystems. These are functional
interdisciplinary units, delivering care to particular groups of patients, with shared clinical
and business aims, linked processes, and a common information environment (Nelson et al.,
2002). These clinical microsystems - rather than the wider organisations to which they belong -
produce clinical and experiential outcomes, on which the quality of care is ultimately judged.
In this thesis, I describe the work of medical ward microsystems as ‘interdisciplinary’, fol-
lowing an established typology (Nancarrow et al., 2012) and consistent use of this term in
previous research (O’Leary et al., 2012a). Interdisciplinary work sits on a spectrum of integ-
ration between ‘multidisciplinary’, where individual contributions are made separately, and
‘transdisciplinary’, where workload is so integrated that disciplinary boundaries are at least
partly dissolved (Hibbert et al., 1994; Thylefors et al., 2005):
‘Outcomes [of interdisciplinary work] can only be accomplished through the inter-
active e￿ort and contribution of the disciplines involved; this implies a high level of
communication, mutual planning, collective decisions and shared responsibilities.
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These independent contributions have to be coordinated.’ (Nancarrow et al., 2012)
Medical ward interdisciplinary microsystems are then distinguished from other microsys-
tems by the nature, and variety, of their workload.
1.3.2.2 The importance of interpersonal networks, information ￿ow & uncertainty
Medical wards are an archetypal clinical microsystem, with distinct expertise, team members,
and budgets. In caring for a particularly heterogeneous group of patients, however, these mi-
crosystems are de￿nedmore by their interpersonal networks and information ￿ow than they are
by any speci￿c clinical or business aims. This sets them apart from other microsystems, which
typically have clearer clinical goals, arising from a more narrowly de￿ned patient population.
Two examples highlight this di￿erence more clearly. A haemodialysis unit provides a single
treatment to patients with end-stage renal failure: its work can largely be described with refer-
ence to the people, skills and equipment required to provide and supervise this single therapy.
Surgical wards, even with a broader patient group to serve, also have their own unifying refer-
ence point: the surgical operation. Although the indications for each patient’s operation, and
indeed the details of each procedure, will clearly vary, surgical patients must be prepared for
the experience in a similar way, and will need access to similar pathways in the post-operative
period to facilitate their recovery. Common post-operative complications can be anticipated and
managed in a standardised fashion (Pucher et al., 2014). Surgical wards, therefore, are de￿ned
in terms of their relationship with the operating theatre. Their goals revolve around the appro-
priate selection of patients for surgery, the timely delivery of safe and e￿ective surgery, and
patients’ subsequent rehabilitation.
The key characteristic of a general medical ward, by contrast, is the need to manage patients
for whom there is no single best pathway of diagnosis or treatment. Patients often present with
non-speci￿c symptoms, which may or may not represent an exacerbation of one of their many
pre-existing conditions. Empirical treatment can be started, and concluded, with no de￿nitive
diagnosis ever established. Perhaps more than any other inpatient clinical microsystem, general
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medical wards trade in variety and uncertainty. As institutions seek to establish alternatives
to hospital admission2, only those patients requiring substantial nursing assistance, intense
medical supervision, or both, will meet the high threshold for entry. The complexity of care
delivered in the ward environment will continue to increase, as these demographic changes
take e￿ect.
Recognising this as a key challenge, alongside the management of multimorbidity, has
two important implications. First, it suggests that interventions to help interdisciplinary teams
address the complexity of their workload may be more bene￿cial than disease-speci￿c QI e￿orts
[see 1.2.5.1]. Second, other inpatient microsystems - that have traditionally cared for patients
with more singular medical needs - may need to incorporate elements of medical ward practice,
as their own patient demographics become more complex.
1.3.2.3 An in￿uential inpatient microsystem
Medical team practice is increasingly in￿uential in other ways. Outside of the operating theatre
or intensive care unit, leadership of care is increasingly deferred to medical teams. In some
institutions this is a deliberate and positive change, with hospitalists (specialist inpatient phys-
icians) invited to manage or co-manage the patients admitted to surgical services (Auerbach
et al., 2010). For others, it is a more pragmatic phenomenon, often re￿ecting the immediate
availability of on-site medical expertise with limited access to an equivalently senior surgeon
(Royal College of Physicians, 2013).
The e￿ective expansion of medical ward practice has important resource implications, to
which restrictive organisational admission policies, and the need to assist non-medical teams,
both contribute. In the UK, there have been only limited e￿orts to rigorously reassess the
work￿ow of inpatient medical teams, although a programme to assess the impact of consultant-
led acute care is now in place (National Institute for Health Research, 2014). The need for this
work is borne out by empirical evidence of poorly understood ward changes (Maben et al.,
2For example, urgent care centres, ambulatory care centres, and hospital at home schemes make possible increas-
ingly intensive medical care delivery, without the patient requiring admission to a hospital bed.
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2015), widespread reports of workplace dissatisfaction (Royal College of Physicians, 2013), and
exemplar evaluations of service developments elsewhere (O’Leary et al., 2015b; Bilimoria et al.,
2016; University of Pennsylvania, 2016).
It is unsurprising, given these pressures, that medical teams might be unable to consistently
deliver high quality care. There is evidence that this is the case, with standards of ward care
falling below an acceptable threshold, causing harm.
1.4 Serious failings in medical ward care
Medical ward research is complicated by the same factors that make care delivery di￿cult: long
admissions, with frequent transfers of information (handovers); large, ￿uid and geographically
dispersed interdisciplinary teams; and patient heterogeneity [box 1.1]. Consequently, we know
more about optimising team practice in the operating theatre and intensive care unit (ICU),
which are more stable environments, with better de￿ned episodes of care.
Box 1.1 Speci￿c challenges for medical ward practice & research
Long admissions with frequent information transfers
Amorphous, poorly de￿ned episodes of care, commonly involving multiple care teams
Large, ￿uid & geographically dispersed interdisciplinary teams
Signi￿cant patient heterogeneity
Despite the widespread perception that ICU patients are at greater risk of a serious error,
medical wards are equally hazardous - perhaps because there is a better understanding of how
to prevent patient safety incidents in the ICU (Umscheid and Brennan, 2015). Medical wards and
ICUs expose similar proportions of their patients to preventable adverse events (10.6% vs 10.9%),
and at similar rates (1.0 vs 1.4 preventable adverse events/100 patient days) (Forster et al., 2011).
A higher percentage of these medical ward adverse events are fatal (2.3% vs 1.4%). Given the
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dispersion of the team, responsibility for these ward harms is then spread di￿usely, deterring
action. Suboptimal service delivery has been identi￿ed in both routine and emergency ward
care.
1.4.1 Problems in routine care
1.4.1.1 Opportunities to provide needed care are frequently missed
Medical wards are low reliability microsystems, failing to deliver interventions of proven bene￿t.
In routine ward care, opportunities to provide ideal interventions are taken up less than 75%
of the time (Huang et al., 2008). Fewer than 50% of the missed opportunities are justi￿ed in the
medical record. For treatment of ischaemic heart disease (a common reason for admission to
medical wards), ideal intervention use and justi￿ed non-use may each be as low as 55% (Huang
et al., 2008). Such poor performance may arise from teams’ working styles. Ward teams can
be ine￿cient, with providers working alone but assuming that their work will be coordinated
with others’ (Bharwani et al., 2012). In doing so, sta￿ form working groups, rather than working
teams. Any complacency that one’s colleagues will anticipate and remedy care problems is
unwarranted: 62% of care problems reach the patient, and 10% of those cause physical injury
(Lubberding et al., 2011). With medical wards depending on high-performing interdisciplinary
teams to manage uncertainty [see 1.3.2.2], the root causes of their reported problems relate to
human behaviours (particularly behaviours around situational assessment), more so than in
surgery or emergency medicine (Wagner et al., 2016).
1.4.1.2 Errors of omission are leading causes of preventable patient deaths
Missed opportunities to provide needed care are important, and not only as prima facie evidence
of medical wards’ systems failures. In this setting, errors of omission are much more likely
than errors of commission3 - and are far more likely to be serious errors at that (Hayward
3An error of omission is a medical error involving too little treatment (underuse). Errors of omission include dia-
gnostic delays, subtherapeutic medication doses, and failures to provide indicated treatments. Errors of commission
involve too much treatment, or hazardous treatment (overuse and misuse, respectively). Examples include excessive
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et al., 2005). In a major retrospective case record review study, omission errors (poor clinical
monitoring, diagnostic errors and inadequate drug or ￿uid management) were the principal
problems associated with preventable inpatient deaths (Hogan et al., 2012). In the same study,
general ward care was the phase of care in which problems contributing to death occurred most
often. Suboptimal ward care led to 44% of preventable deaths; problems in postoperative and
procedural care (including ICU care) accounted for only 8.3% (Hogan et al., 2012).
We see, then, that errors of omission on medical wards are common, serious, and leading
causes of preventable deaths in hospital. A change in terminology - for example, using ‘problem
in care’ rather than the more commonly used ‘adverse event’ - may be required to stop omission
errors from being overlooked in record reviews (Hogan et al., 2012). Even then, errors of omis-
sion are judged more leniently than equally harmful errors of action - a phenomenon termed
‘omission bias’ (Spranca et al., 1991; Baron and Ritov, 2004) - and their causes are extremely
heterogeneous, resisting simple solutions (Wong et al., 2015). This is a major challenge. Multiple,
targeted, modular improvement interventions will be required to address them, each requiring
substantial e￿ort. The alternatives, cross-cutting interventions targeting non-technical skills
such as teamwork or communication, are not easy substitutes. Team training and handover
bundles have been e￿ective, but require prolonged, multi-institutional, collaborative e￿orts
(Neily et al., 2010; Starmer et al., 2014). The sustained commitment required for either of these
optionsmay be a daunting prospect for organisations struggling to balance their existing clinical
and ￿nancial commitments.
1.4.2 Problems in emergency care
1.4.2.1 Five key failings in ward care for the acutely ill patient
An in￿uential report by McQuillan et al. (1998) identi￿ed serious ￿aws in the delivery of emer-
gency care on UKmedical wards. Reviewing the ward treatment of 100 patients4 immediately be-
medication doses, treatments that are contraindicated, or unnecessary interventions (Hayward et al., 2005).
451/100 of these patients were general medical patients.
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fore their emergency admission to intensive care, McQuillan found at least 54 who had received
suboptimal care, contributing to their morbidity or mortality. Five key failings in suboptimal
ward care were identi￿ed:
• Lack of knowledge;
• Failure to appreciate clinical urgency;
• Failure to seek advice;
• Lack of supervision; and
• Failure of organisation.
McQuillan’s ￿ve elements of suboptimal care were subsequently re-examined, in a review of
the ward management of acutely ill patients. Massey et al. (2009) argued that the failings listed
by McQuillan could be generalised beyond his case note review, and that they provided a useful
frame on which to analyse future work. Modern training curricula would certainly recognise
in McQuillan’s report indirect descriptions of both technical skills (lack of knowledge) and non-
technical skills (failures to appreciate clinical urgency and to seek advice). The problems he
described, spanning institutional levels from the individual clinician to the wider organisation,
also re￿ect the move to view errors through a system-wide lens [see section 1.2.2].
1.4.2.2 Competing priorities, sociocultural barriers and poor workforce planning
perpetuate these failings
McQuillan’s ￿ve failings remain relevant primarily because, to varying degrees, they all persist.
Despite e￿orts to resolve them [see chapter 2], each failing is still recognisable in modern ward
practice. There may be di￿erent reasons why each one has proven so refractory. For example,
recurrent technical failures - such as the lack of clinical observations at the appropriate times -
are common, despite automating technology. This might re￿ect the impact of other priorities
competing for sta￿ attention (Hands et al., 2013). Resource constraints (sta￿ng ratios and
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sta￿ workload) might also determine clinical supervision and organisational failure (Massey
et al., 2009). Importantly, these factors are impossible for individual UK hospitals to address
independently, requiring regional coordination, but worforce planning has been neglected at a
national level (Health Foundation, 2016).
E￿orts to detect and treat clinical deterioration, on the other hand, have been limited more
by the sociocultural barriers within teams (Shearer et al., 2012). These barriers complicate the
escalation of care from one professional to the next. Indeed, nurses still have to consciously use
speci￿c referral ‘strategies’ to successfully obtain medical advice for their patients (Andrews
and Waterman, 2005; Cox et al., 2006).
In summary, medical ward care failings are common and potentially serious, in both routine
and emergency care. Their persistencemay be due to psychological biases, complexity,workload,
poor workforce planning, and sociocultural barriers. Improving the organisation of medical
ward care has now become an international priority (American Hospital Association, 2013;
Future Hospital Commission, 2013).
1.5 Understanding ward-level performance
We see from the previous sections that successful businesses in other industries focus on their
own frontline microsystems; that medical wards are important, strained, microsystems in the
inpatient setting; and that they can have signi￿cant failings. One possibility is that these failings
simply re￿ect broader organisational struggles, i.e., that there are under-performing hospitals,
rather than simply under-performing wards. In this section, I will describe evidence that im-
portant variations in the delivery of care are indeed found at the ward level, and that a focus
on aggregated hospital-wide metrics is misguided. I set out criteria for performance measures
that might better re￿ect ward-level quality of care.
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1.5.1 Ward-level variation vs hospital-level variation
Even neighbouring wards within a single hospital can be very di￿erent. Holistic reviews of
failing institutions describe islands of excellent practice coexisting with egregious de￿ciencies
nearby (Bristol Royal In￿rmary Inquiry, 2001; Francis, 2010). The di￿erences within an institu-
tion may prove more important as targets for improvement than the contrasts between di￿erent
hospitals.
Ward-level variation is evident in data describing both safety climate and adverse events.
Safety climate is a super￿cial ‘snapshot’ of the safety culture within a work group or organisa-
tion (Flin et al., 2000; Flin et al., 2006), although the two terms are often used interchangeably
[see box 1.2]. Safety climate scores vary more between the clinical microsystems of a single
hospital than they do between hospitals (Pronovost and Sexton, 2005; Schwendimann et al.,
2013), and individual wards contribute more to the variance in teamwork and safety climates
than their wider departments (Deilkas and Hofoss, 2010).
Box 1.2 De￿nitions of safety culture & safety climate
Safety culture is ‘the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competen-
cies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and pro￿ciency
of, an organisation’s safety management’ (Advisory Committee for the Safety of Nuclear In-
stallations, 1993).
Safety climate can be regarded as the measurable surface features of the underlying safety
culture (Flin et al., 2000).
Similarly, adverse event rates vary more within hospitals than they do between hospitals.
Baines et al. (2015) calculated adverse event intraclass correlation coe￿cients (ICCs), to indicate
the relative in￿uence of each organisational level on the variance of the outcome. Department-
level ICCs were consistently higher than those at the hospital level: departments had a greater
in￿uence over adverse event rates than the hospital to which they belonged. In addition, inter-
hospital di￿erences have reduced: hospital ICCs fell from 6.5% to 2.6% between 2004 and 2012.
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Departmental level ICCs remained consistently higher (e.g., 9.7% in 2012), and were stable over
the same time period.
These data would suggest that our improvement e￿orts should focus on frontline units:
data capture and quality improvement interventions should both target this organisational
level (Deilkas and Hofoss, 2010; Schwendimann et al., 2013). As we will now see, policymakers
and healthcare regulators often take a di￿erent approach, using hospital-aggregated statistics
to inform organisational performance management - despite concerns about those measures’
validity and cost.
1.5.2 Aggregate hospital-wide metrics
The quality of inpatient care is most often judged on macrosystem data, aggregating together
the processes or outcomes of numerous di￿erent units to produce an organisational summary.
Outcomes are risk adjusted with routine administrative data to produce a single summary
statistic, which claims to describe the comparative performance of the organisation. Various
metrics have applied this methodology, including the Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio
(HSMR), andmore recently the SummaryHospital-levelMortality Indicator (SHMI). In each case,
a case-mix adjusted ratio of observed to expected deaths is produced; the number of expected
deaths is derived from the mean of all the ratios in the sample, which changes from year to year.
Although conceptually similar, the HSMR and SHMI have important di￿erences [table 1.1].
1.5.2.1 Widespread use of summary hospital statistics for regulation and policy
Healthcare regulators and policymakers rely heavily on these hospital-wide measures, and
the organisational rami￿cations of apparent underperformance can be severe. For example, in
the wake of a report into secondary care failings in the UK (Francis, 2013), high HSMRs and
SHMIs were used to select hospital trusts for intensive investigation (Keogh, 2013). Eleven of
the fourteen trusts selected in this way were then placed into ‘special measures’, with executive-
level leadership changes, suspension of ￿nancial privileges, and appointment of an external
Table 1.1: Organisational summary mortality statistics (Health and Social Care Information
Centre, 2016b)
HSMR SHMI
Included deaths In-hospital deaths In-hospital deaths & deaths
within 30 days of discharge
Selection of in-
hospital deaths
Deaths from 56 diagnostic groups,
accounting for around 80% of in-
hospital deaths (depending on the
services provided by the hospital)
All in-hospital deaths
Attribution of death Death can be assigned to more than
one hospital, depending on timing
of patient transfer
Death is assigned to the last









All providers Providers other than specialist
hospitals
Abbreviations: HSMR - Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio; SHMI - Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator.
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director for improvement oversight (NHS England, 2016b).
As the author of the subsequent report acknowledged, the two aggregate mortalitymeasures
‘generated two completely di￿erent lists of outlier trusts [to review]’ (Keogh, 2013). Nonetheless,
the Care Quality Commission (CQC) - the regulator of health and social care services in the
UK - continues to use HSMR and SHMI to inform its hospital inspections. Both measures are
incorporated into its ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ tool, the accuracy of which has been questioned
(Care Quality Commission, 2015; Gri￿ths et al., 2016a).
1.5.2.2 Concerns about validity and cost
Numerous international experts have raised concerns about the dubious value of these stat-
istical constructs, which have never been validated either as safety indicators themselves or
as screening tools for safety problems (Lilford et al., 2004; Shojania and Forster, 2008; Lilford
and Pronovost, 2010; Scott et al., 2011; Gestel et al., 2012; Girling et al., 2012; Hogan et al.,
2014; Hogan et al., 2015). Nor do these standardised ratios provide any actionable information:
comprehensive chart reviews are then required to determine what problems exist (if any) and
what needs to be done to resolve them. These reviews carry signi￿cant costs, which should be
included when estimating the overall costs of detecting a problem with standardised outcome
ratios (Shojania and Forster, 2008). There are also opportunity costs: the longstanding preoccu-
pation with aggregated organisational statistics has precluded any meaningful investment in
ward-level metrics.
We see from this that the key justi￿cation of hospital-wide statistics - that theymeaningfully
inform judgements about healthcare quality - is highly contentious. They are neither accurate
nor cheap, nor do they facilitate quality improvement. Their continued use, instead of developing
ward-level data capture, is likely to be a false economy.
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1.5.3 Measuring quality in ward care
If aggregated hospital-wide statistics fail to describe quality of care, how best can wards judge
their work? Operationalising quality - translating it into measurable variables - is di￿cult,
even though high standards of e￿cient, patient-centred care are conceptually easy to value
(Mosher and Kaboli, 2015). There are several key challenges. Performance measures need to be
sensitive to changes in care; attributable to the team responsible for care; re￿ect the complex
interdisciplinary nature of ward work; and ultimately be consistent with a burden of reporting
that is manageable in practice. Each of these criteria is discussed in turn.
1.5.3.1 Sensitivity to changes in care
Many outcomes (e.g., 30-day readmissions) are determined primarily by the characteristics of
the local patient population, and the resources of the local community, not by the quality of
care provided during the inpatient admission (Joynt and Jha, 2012). Medical patients’ outcomes,
in particular, are dependent on their comorbidities and socioeconomic status. They di￿er in
this respect from surgical patients, for whom an adverse outcome is more representative of the
quality of inpatient care (Tsai et al., 2013).
Performance metrics should not penalise medical wards for factors beyond their control;
nor should they fail to recognise tangible improvements in care. Participants in previous ward
QI initiatives have already voiced concerns that typical performance metrics would not re￿ect
the changes they were seeing at ward level (Kings College London, 2009). There may be parallel
concerns that ward-level data are inadequately powered to detect changes in the quality of care.
These latter concerns can largely be addressed through the use of statistical process control
and interrupted time series techniques (Fretheim and Tomic, 2015). Repeated small samples can
also be adequately powered for the purposes of QI interventions (Etchells et al., 2016).
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1.5.3.2 Attribution to the responsible care team
Medical patients are typically cared for by numerous teams, who are in continuous transition
throughout lengthy admissions. The overall standard of care is dependent not only on team
members’ actions during a given shift, but on the quality of handover between shifts. Unlike
surgical patients, whose care in the operating theatre and in the immediate aftermath is de￿n-
itive, medical patients have no single climactic episode of care or intervention around which
there is professional ‘ownership’ and responsibility.
Performance measures must be appropriately assigned and then fed back to the respons-
ible care team. This may require careful negotiation to establish boundaries of responsibility,
especially in situations where patients are routinely transferred between wards for ongoing
care. This is commonplace in the UK, as patients are stabilised ￿rst in an acute admissions
unit (AAU) for around 48 hours, before moving to a downstream general or specialty ward.
Where a performance measure may re￿ect the work of more than one team, those teams will
require support to de￿ne their contribution to the overall outcome, and to collaborate on its
improvement.
1.5.3.3 Re￿ecting complexity of care
As we have seen, medical wards are better described by the variety of their workload, and their
extensive interdisciplinary networks, than by any single pathology or process [see 1.3.2.2]. How
teams perform against these subtle challenges is di￿cult to measure. A common approach is to
assess the quality of care for selected ‘tracer’ conditions, to represent the broader performance
of the ward5 (Kessner et al., 1973). Acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure and
pneumonia have been used extensively as tracer conditions for hospital-based medical care
(Wang et al., 2014; Venkatesan et al., 2016). Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, stroke and
venous thromboembolism have been included as tracer conditions in more recent US analyses
5Tracer conditions are common, well-de￿ned conditions a￿ected by medical care, with agreed appropriate care
and a known epidemiology (Neuhauser, 2004).
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(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016a).
Speci￿c process and outcome measures for these tracer conditions are straightforward to
de￿ne (and collect). However, a focus on speci￿c elements of care for tracer conditions can
inappropriately skew priorities and promote unnecessary treatment (Wachter et al., 2008). The
prioritisation of tracer conditions - with a mandate to publicly report relevant process measures
and outcomes - may be ine￿ective (DeVore et al., 2016; Joynt et al., 2016), and comes with
opportunity costs. Disease-speci￿c quality metrics do little to incentivise robust systems of care
that protect complex medical patients from harm. Rather, their high pro￿le selection implies
that high quality care in this setting is best achieved by focusing on individual pathologies, one
at a time.
Instead of measuring clinical processes and outcomes, it may be more e￿ective to incentiv-
ise structures that facilitate implementation of best practice in a complex environment. NHS
England recently issued an updated set of ten overarching clinical standards for acute care
(NHS England, 2016a). These standards set out a di￿erent stall, requiring (amongst other things)
shared decision making; early multi-disciplinary assessment; multi-professional handovers;
repeated senior review; and attention to patient experience, safety and clinical e￿ectiveness.
This is a very di￿erent set of aspirations, better aligned with the needs of a complex patient
population, yet still backed by a series of levers and incentives (NHS England, 2013). The two
approaches need not be exclusive.
1.5.3.4 The burden of quality reporting
It is clear that performance measurement should be standardised. Inconsistent outcome meas-
ures and de￿nitions are currently used by various provider organisations, specialty societies,
countries and clinicians, dramatically slowing progress towards improvement (Porter et al.,
2016). Greater consistency of outcome measurement is now a key goal for initiatives in both
academic trials (Koroshetz, 2015) and routine practice (Porter et al., 2016).
However, these initiatives continue to focus on individual pathologies, with little consid-
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eration of complex patients with multimorbidity. They are likely to add to the proliferation of
performance data, which already far outstrip any organisation’s capacity to use them. This is
not a trivial concern: in addition to wasted sta￿ time, reporting of quality metrics costs health
systems billions of dollars each year (Casalino et al., 2016).
Leading experts in QI now openly call for the burden of quality measurement to be reduced -
and quickly (Berwick, 2016; Wachter, 2016). Ward quality measures should be assessed not only
for their sensitivity to change, attributability and re￿ection of complexity, but their contribution
to the overall burden of reporting. Existing metrics and new metrics should both be reassessed
with this in mind.
1.6 Aims of the thesis
The overall goal of this thesis is to explore the organisation of care on the general medical ward,
and identify e￿ective strategies for its improvement.
The speci￿c thesis aims are:
1. To categorise and evaluate existing improvement strategies for the medical ward (Part II:
chapters 2-3);
2. To design, implement and evaluate a novel interdisciplinary intervention to improve
medical ward care (Part III: chapters 4-7); and
3. To identify new medical ward improvement targets from organisational and patient per-
spectives (Part IV: chapters 8-9).
A schematic outline of the thesis is shown in ￿gure 1.1. In Part II, I review the existing
evidence base for strategies to improve medical ward care. Chapter 2 is a narrative review,
synthesising a disparate ward literature to de￿ne unifying themes of improvement attempts.
Chapter 3 then explores one of these themes in more detail, in a systematic review evaluating


















Figure 1.1: Thesis structure
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The strengths and weaknesses of the studies identi￿ed in these reviews inform Part III. Here,
I describe the development and mixed methods evaluation of a novel interdisciplinary team
care intervention: prospective clinical team surveillance (PCTS). The design of the intervention
(chapter 4), and its quantitative and qualitative evaluations (chapters 5 and 6, respectively)
attempt to build on earlier work, and address some of its methodological shortcomings. An
implementation evaluation in chapter 7 describes the implementation outcomes, facilitators
and barriers for PCTS on medical wards, to better understand its adoption and spread in practice.
Part IV explores other perspectives on ward quality improvement. Chapter 8 uses the ex-
ample of PCTS as empirical evidence to test a newmodel of organisational alignment for success-
ful quality improvement. Chapter 9 then describes an interview study with patients and their
carers, exploring their views on medical ward quality and its measurement. Part V (chapter 10)
concludes the thesis, drawing together a discussion of its ￿ndings and limitations, as well as
its implications for practice and future research. The main contributions of the thesis are then









Improving medical ward care: a
narrative review
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, I described the predominance of single-issue QI initiatives in the ward environment,
targeting the management of speci￿c conditions. Less attention has been devoted to the cross-
cutting factors that underpin ward care more generically. Relevant publications have aggregated
into siloed literature streams, with no unifying overview of the evidence base for how best to
organise, or improve, a general medicine service.
As a result, few clinicians are aware of the developing evidence for service delivery in this
setting. Medical ward services evolve organically and idiosyncratically, rather than through
rational design. Their organisation, particularly in the UK, has been determined by custom (the
routines of more senior clinicians) as much as it has by resource constraints. There is a clear
need for a synthesis of the disparate literature, both from an academic perspective and to inform
frontline care delivery.
The work described in this chapter has been published as: Pannick S, Beveridge I, Wachter RM, Sevdalis N.
Improving the quality and safety of care on the medical ward: A review and synthesis of the evidence base. Eur J
Intern Med. 2014; 25(10):874-87. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejim.2014.10.013
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Here, I conduct a narrative review of the existing literature on quality and safety in the
medical ward setting. Kastner et al describe this methodology:
‘[A narrative review] produces an account of the evidence with commentary and
interpretation. It can ‘integrate’ qualitative and quantitative evidence through nar-
rative juxtaposition (discussing diverse forms of evidence side by side). It is less
concerned with assessing evidence quality and more focused on gathering relevant
information that provides both context and substance...’ (Kastner et al., 2012)
This approach is helpful for the triangulation of di￿erent types of evidence, and is useful
for theory-building where there is a diverse and potentially large evidence base (Dixon-Woods
et al., 2005). With a focus on the breadth of evidence, rather than its depth, some authors might
now describe this type of work as a ‘scoping’ review (Davis et al., 2009). However, the term
‘scoping’ is variably used and ambiguously de￿ned (Levac et al., 2010), so I avoid it here.
2.2 Aims
The aims of this narrative review are to:
(i) Establish a high level overview of strategies to improve medical ward care;
(ii) Describe which strategies have been e￿ective, and in what circumstances; and




The search strategy was an iterative one. I searched English-language publications in PubMed
for articles pertaining to medical ward quality and safety, from inception until November 2013.
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There were two broad strands of search terms. The ￿rst strand related to quality and safety
outcomes, e.g., adverse events, complications, and objective and subjective healthcare outcomes.
The second strand involved descriptions of the wards themselves, such as admission units,
general medical wards, medicine inpatient service, or teaching wards.
Initial results were aggregated into themes, and as eachmajor themewas de￿ned, I identi￿ed
seminal papers and systematic reviews, as well as the later studies that cited them. Where
major reviews had been published on an overarching theme, the contributory papers relating
to medical patients were analysed separately. I also searched the relevant literature curated by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s patient safety network on its online database
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Patient Safety Network, 2014). Further themes
and relevant studies were proposed by senior academic patient safety researchers in the UK
and USA (Nick Sevdalis and Robert Wachter, respectively), initiating further hand searches.
This process continued until thematic saturation was reached - the point at which no further
categories of improvement targets or interventions were identi￿ed. The strategy was intended
to capture as broad as possible a representation of pertinent evidence for medical ward practice,
without focusing unduly prematurely on any specialised topic.
2.3.2 Article selection
Articles were selected on the basis of their focus on medical ward care, and their relevance to
quality and safety improvement. No papers were speci￿cally excluded because of their choice
of outcome measures. Clinical outcomes, process measures, and more subjective endpoints (e.g.,
patient- or sta￿-reported outcomes) were all included. Articles focusing solely on the episode
of inpatient care, rather than transitions at admission or discharge, were highlighted. Studies
describing computerised physician order entry systems, decision support systems or electronic
communication devices were excluded. These comprise separate topics in their own right, and
I felt that a focus on interventions not requiring signi￿cant capital investment would be of
greater interest to most general medical audiences.
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2.4 Results
Included studies described the type and incidence of problems on medical wards; observations
of current practice; and attempts to improve outcomes for both sta￿ and patients. The ￿ndings
from the literature search are summarised in table 2.1. Those studies that inform a deeper
understanding of how medical wards work, or describe an intervention, are explored further
here.
Five major themes were identi￿ed within the evidence base:
1. Sta￿ng levels and team composition;
2. Sta￿ communication and collaboration;
3. Standardisation of the processes of care;
4. Early recognition and treatment of the deteriorating patient; and
5. Local safety climate.
The evidence synthesis across each of these ￿ve themes is presented in turn.
Table 2.1: Evidence for ￿ve strategies to improve medical ward care








N/A N/A N/A N/A Patients per RN 6% reduction in medical pa-
tients’ odds of death for every
1 RN full-time equivalent in-
crease
Strong correlation between
nurse sta￿ng & mortality,
but further work needed to
establish a theoretical model
& demonstrate causality
Dose-response relationship
between nurse sta￿ng &
all-patient mortality
No consistent relationship











N/A N/A N/A Patient turnover: the





equals 1; high turnover
de￿ned as more than
one standard deviation
above that unit’s mean
value
Mortality signi￿cantly associ-
ated with patient exposure to
below-target or high-turnover
shifts; hazard ratio 1.02 for
below-target shifts.
No data on sta￿ other than
nurses. No data on patients
with do-not-resuscitate orders.
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Sta￿ng ‘below target’ if
the total nursing hours
worked in a shift was 8
hours less than the anti-
cipated requirement




















over 24hr call period.
Average daily census
5 patients/intern. Max-
imum daily census 10
patients/intern
Better quality of educational
experience & quality of life for
sta￿, with more time devoted
to teaching & patient care. No
change to objective healthcare
outcomes
Did not use a validated survey
tool to assess sta￿ experience,
and response rates not given
Compared overall mortality &
length of stay, with no risk ad-
justment
Did not recruit pre-speci￿ed
number of patients to the ex-
perimental teams
(Table 2.1, continued)




















Maximum census 15 pa-
tients/team. Median 62
hours work/week. Aver-
age daily census 3.5 pa-
tients/internet in inter-
vention group vs 6.6 in
control group
Length of stay reduced by 0.5
days, with no change in read-
mission rate or quality of care
No formal cost analysis
Geographic localisa-
tion
Signi￿cantly higher resident &
intern satisfaction in the inter-
vention teams
Did not use a validated survey
tool to assess sta￿ experience
Multidisciplinary
teams & more stable
medical teams
39% trainees spent time in








N/A N/A N/A Team workload (num-
ber of admissions) on
patient’s admitting day
Increasing team workload on
the day of admission increases
length of stay, total costs & risk
of inpatient mortality - partic-
ularly when more than 9 pa-
tients are admitted on the day
of admission
Study not powered to detect
di￿erences in mortality
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Teamworkload during a
patient’s hospitalisation
(average number of pa-
tients on the patient’s
team)
Increasing team workload dur-
ing the entire stay reduced av-
erage length of stay & total
costs
Only ￿rst hospitalisations in
the study periodwere analysed

















from 13 to 25 (inferred),
with relief from most
other clinical activities
Increased discharges & re-
duced average length of stay,
with unchanged readmission
rate & mortality
Control wards chosen for sim-
ilar caseloads; no patient demo-
graphics to validate this choice.







N/A N/A N/A Not given Reduced hospital adjusted case
fatality rates, and lower 28-day
readmission rates, in hospitals
that have a continous admit-
ting consultant presence for at
least 4 hours per day
Survey responses informed
analysis of consultant working
patterns - likely response bias
Full data only available for 58%
of hospitals
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Confounding factors include
nurse sta￿ng, access to dia-


















tion for 10 and
16 weeks of the
study period
Median caseload of 9-
14 patients per medical
team
Shorter length of stay Unclear whether intervention
group improvements were due
to consultant input or new
team structure









N/A N/A N/A Not given Trainees’ decisions to seek clin-
ical support are in￿uenced by
the clinical question, super-
visor factors & trainee factors
Potential observer e￿ect

















2- vs 4-week inpatient
consultant rotations










Not given No di￿erence in length of stay
or unplanned patient revisits
Did not account for physician
workload during each rotation
Better self-rated measures
of physician burnout &
emotional exhaustion with
2-week rotations, but worse
evaluations by trainees




















No change in 30-day readmis-
sions or hospital costs
No power calculation
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Maximum patient
census 12-16/team
Improved sta￿ work￿ow &
productivity, but trend to-
wards higher patient length of
stay
Faculty o￿cer determined pa-
tient allocation
Di￿erent workloads of inter-











1 year 73% eligible pa-
tients localised
to designated




Mean number of pa-
tients on day of inter-
view = 10 (doctor), 4
(nurse)
More frequent communication,
with nurses & physicians bet-




















6 months Not given 15 patients/team Lower length of stay & hos-
pital charges
No data on clinical outcomes
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Limited descriptions of the
rounds themselves (attendance









2 months Not given Not given No di￿erence in length of stay
or indirect measures of care
quality
Small study, underpowered to
detect length of stay changes















1 year Not given Not given Reduced length of stay, with
improved performance on core
quality measures
No description of intervention
uptake
Prompts and feedback
on core quality meas-
ures
Improvements in self-reported
trainee education & attitudes




















3 RNs & 2.5 non-
registered nurses per 15
beds
Improved physician reports of
collaboration with nurses
Sta￿ survey used unvalidated
tool
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Hospitalist medical
director
16 vs 22 patients per
team (intervention vs
control)
Reduced length of stay, in-
creased hospital pro￿t, and no
adverse change in mortality or
readmissions
Di￿erent workloads of inter-
vention & control teams
Advanced practice
nurse contribut-
ing to inpatient &
post-discharge care
No impact on patient ratings of
hospital care or health-related
quality of life





















Not given Improved nurse ratings of
teamwork climate & collabora-
tion
Intervention unit nurses were




Reduced adjusted rate of ad-
verse events
More patients under the care
of a hospitalist in the interven-
tion unit
No change in length of stay or
hospital costs
Adverse event screeners not



















Not given Higher nurse ratings of com-
munication, collaboration,
teamwork & safety climate
Case mix di￿erences between
control and intervention units
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Contamination between inter-
vention and control groups:










N/A N/A Not given Healthcare processes & out-
comes can be improved with
these interventions. Small
study sizes & heterogeneity
limit inferences about their
key elements or e￿ectiveness
Overly-restrictive inclusion
criteria
















the strength of the conclusions
Comprehensive systems
needed both to detect &
reliably respond to patient
deterioration. The most per-
tinent focus depends on the
healthcare system
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique














12 months Not given Not given No impact on mortality or ICU
transfers
E￿erent limb of alert system
was variable & not assessed -
no indication that the alert was
acted on
Algorithm identi￿ed patients
at higher risk of ICU transfer
& death, but with low positive
predictive value
Likely alert fatigue for clini-
cians, given the algorithm’s





N/A Rapid response sys-
tems
N/A N/A Not given Moderate evidence that these
systems are associated with re-
duced rates of cardiorespirat-
ory arrest & reduced mortality
Dependence on before-after
studies hampers evidence base,
as does likely publication bias
Standardisation of care - clinical protocols & checklists
Ko, 2011 Systematic
review
N/A Checklists N/A Not given Not given Patients twice as likely to re-
ceive appropriate antibiotics
within 8 hours














Not given Reduced hospital standardised
mortality ratio for the targeted
diagnoses
5/8 care bundles potentially re-
late to general medical ward
care
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Confounding factors include
introduction of an AAU &
change in consultant working
pattern
Rotter, 2010 Cochrane re-
view
N/A Clinical pathways N/A N/A N/A Reduced in-hospital complica-
tions & improved documenta-
tion
4/6 relevant studies hadmoder-
ate risk of bias
No di￿erences in readmissions
/ mortality
Likely reduction in length of
stay & hospital costs





N/A Not given Not given Reduced mortality & reduced
length of stay, with no increase
in readmissions
No prospective study ad-
equately controlling for
patient demographics or re-
ferral patterns from primary
care
Publication bias: only small
fraction of acute admissions
units published their outcomes
(Table 2.1, continued)










Acute admissions unit 5 years Not given Median 17 admis-
sions/unit/day




Physician / team work-
load not speci￿ed
No assessment of secular
trends, nurse sta￿ng, phys-









Acute admissions unit 2 years Not given Not given Reduced hospital length




No change in readmissions No assessment of secular
trends, nurse sta￿ng, phys-
ician workload or multiple
other confounders





















in place for 11
months of the
study period
Not given Reduction in avoidable hos-
pital days, with no change in
30-day readmission or mortal-
ity rates
Data collected only on one day
each month
(Table 2.1, continued)




Workload measure(s) Findings Critique
Findings may not be applicable
to other hospitals; 32% ‘med-
ically unwell’ patients were
in hospital for no apparent
reason





N/A N/A N/A Not given Multihospital physicians con-
form to local standards for
lengths of stay
Only two medical diagnoses
(chronic obstructive pulmon-


















3 years Not given Not given Average daily hospital census
reduced by 12%. No e￿ect
on number of inpatient dis-
charges
No statistical analysis
No attempt to explore con-
founding factors or identify
the most important compon-
ent of the intervention
(Table 2.1, continued)


































Nurses rated safety culture
more highly than other sta￿
Unclear why one intervention





No change in readmissions or
length of stay
Convenience sample of pa-
tients (with low response rate);
may not be representative of
population
Improved patient perceptions
of team function, & increased
perception of safety gaps
Expensive intervention
(Table 2.1, continued)













17 months Not given Not given Reduced 30-day mortality,
length of stay & cardiopul-
monary resuscitation rate
Di￿cult to discern additional
bene￿ts of quality improve-
ment programme above those
of the ward-based team struc-











Abbreviations: AAU - acute admissions unit; ICU - intensive care unit; N/A - not applicable; RN - registered nurse.
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2.4.1 Sta￿ng and team composition
2.4.1.1 Nursing sta￿
2.4.1.1.1 Numbers There is limited evidence that better nurse sta￿ng facilitates better
care, with no prospective studies to assess the impact of improving nurse-to-patient ratios.
The conclusion that nursing levels a￿ect patient outcomes relies predominantly on a single
centre’s descriptive, longitudinal study (Needleman et al., 2011), and a meta-analysis of the dose-
response relationship between nursing levels and patient deaths (Kane et al., 2007; Shekelle,
2013). However, not all patient outcomes presumed to be sensitive to nurse sta￿ng show this
relationship (Kane et al., 2007). Nonetheless, some states in the USA now mandate minimum
nurse sta￿ng levels based on this evidence. In the UK, the Francis Inquiry also recommended
that formal tools be devised to establish sta￿ng needs in individual units (Francis, 2013).
2.4.1.1.2 Skill mix The complexities of nursing provision do extend beyond a simple tally
of nurse-to-patient ratios; relative contributions from ‘registered’ and ‘unregistered’ (or in
the USA, ‘licensed’ and ‘unlicensed’) sta￿ should be taken into account. A ‘richer’ skill mix,
with higher proportions of care provided by registered nurses, is associated with improved
outcomes for medical patients. These include (in observational studies) lower failure to rescue
rates1 (Needleman et al., 2002), reduced in-patient and 30-day mortality (Person et al., 2004;
Estabrooks et al., 2005; Tourangeau et al., 2007), and improved patient satisfaction (Seago et al.,
2006). Improving skill mix may be the least expensive of the options available to improve nurse
sta￿ng (Needleman et al., 2006), although a good learning climate on the ward may mitigate
the impact of a poor skill mix (Chang and Mark, 2011).
2.4.1.1.3 Training Although a detailed discussion of nurse training lies outside the scope
of this review, it is important to note that nurse education may also impact on patient outcomes.
1Failure to rescue was de￿ned by Needleman et al. (2002) as death from one of ￿ve complications of care:
pneumonia, shock or cardiac arrest, upper gastrointestinal bleeding, sepsis, or deep venous thrombosis.
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In particular, units with higher proportions of Bachelor degree-quali￿ed nurses have lower
mortality (Estabrooks et al., 2005; Tourangeau et al., 2007), a lower risk of 30-day readmission
(McHugh and Ma, 2013), and fewer complications of care (Blegen et al., 2013).
Interestingly, hospital-wide studies suggest that team composition – speci￿cally, the ag-
gregate level of education – contributes to an individual nurse’s expertise, independent of their
individual education and level of experience (McHugh and Lake, 2010). Medical wards may
therefore require a critical mass of well-trained, expert nurses to guarantee high performance
throughout the team. Taken together, these observational studies strongly suggest that adequate
nurse sta￿ng is necessary, but not su￿cient, to improve patient outcomes. Skill mix, education
and aggregate expertise are important moderating factors.
2.4.1.2 Physicians
2.4.1.2.1 Consultant involvement in care Physician sta￿ng is similarly complex. There
is no de￿nitive agreement regarding the optimal degree of seniormedical involvement in patient
care, the substitution of less autonomous healthcare sta￿ for doctors (Parekh and Roy, 2010), or
the bene￿t of higher quali￿cations for clinicians managing medical patients (Norcini et al., 2002;
Tourangeau et al., 2002; Tourangeau et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2006). Despite a ￿rm consensus
that consultant-delivered (as opposed to consultant-led) care should improve patient outcomes,
there have been no major studies to compare the care delivered by fully accredited physicians
versus postgraduate doctors in training (Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, 2012).
Attention has focused instead on the timing of consultant involvement, and the structure
and workload of the teams they supervise. Consultants are likely to have an important role
in coordinating team workload, both at the time of admission and throughout the inpatient
stay. How the team handles this workload may have important e￿ects on patient outcomes. In-
creases in team workload on a patient’s day of admission are associated with increases in length
of stay, total costs and inpatient mortality (Ong et al., 2007). Similarly, increases in monthly
workload (monthly admissions) correlate with a higher risk of patient readmission (Averbukh
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and Southern, 2012). A large retrospective analysis showed that UK hospitals providing at least
four hours of daily consultant cover for new admissions had lower risk-adjusted mortality and
readmission rates (Bell et al., 2013).
2.4.1.2.2 Timing and frequency of consultant input Increasing senior clinical input
later in the admission may also be bene￿cial. In the UK, medical inpatients on general wards
typically see their consultant physician only twice each week. Single-centre studies have shown
that daily or even twice-daily consultant review is feasible, and may reduce length of stay
without adversely a￿ecting readmission rate or mortality (Ahmad et al., 2011; Fielding et al.,
2013). In one study, consultants were accompanied by a pharmacist, senior ward nurse and
medical assistant; it is impossible to separate the e￿ect of consultants’ frequent bedside presence
from that of the novel (interdisciplinary) team structure (Fielding et al., 2013). Investment in
auxiliary services may also be necessary if senior physicians are to improve patient outcomes
via more frequent patient reviews (Carey et al., 2005).
Outside the UK, there is less direct evidence that medical patients bene￿t from greater
senior clinical input. In the USA, increasing the ratio of consultant physicians to trainees (and
simultaneously reducing the team’s patient census) improved both the quality of junior doctors’
work and their educational experience (McMahon et al., 2010; Coit et al., 2011; Spellberg et al.,
2012). Objective healthcare outcomes and patient satisfaction were not a￿ected (McMahon et al.,
2010; Spellberg et al., 2012). Di￿erences between the UK and the USA in what constitutes an
‘acceptable’ patient census per doctor may explain these discordant ￿ndings (Goddard et al.,
2010; McMahon et al., 2010).
2.4.1.2.3 Consultant variation and stakeholder trade-o￿s Not all consultants are equal,
however: those focusing on inpatient care (hospitalists) may reduce resource use and improve
patient outcomes (Meltzer et al., 2002), even with relatively little of their time spent on direct
patient care (O’Leary et al., 2006). What it is that contemporary consultant physicians actually
do during their ward rounds has only recently been re-assessed (Stickrath et al., 2013), and little
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is known about the e￿ect of di￿erent ward round behaviours on clinical outcomes.
Maximising senior sta￿ presence on the wards also requires some compromise. A fortnight
of ward coverage may be tolerable for an individual consultant, but longer stints are associated
with self-assessed burnout and emotional exhaustion (Lucas et al., 2012). Yet trainees rate short
periods of consultant cover more harshly, illustrating the challenges of counterbalancing the
demands of di￿erent sta￿ members, patients and ￿scal requirements.
Overall, it seems likely that increasing consultant-delivered care will improve hospital e￿-
ciency and patient outcomes most where trainees have traditionally been less closely supervised.
2.4.1.2.4 Junior doctors: working patterns & credibility Excessive working hours have
long been considered a risk to the safe delivery of care by junior doctors. However, the anticip-
ated bene￿ts of restricting their duty hours have not materialised, with no clear improvements
in patient outcomes (Fletcher et al., 2011). The unintended consequences of more frequent shift
changes - such as the risks arising from inadequate handovers - may have replaced errors
provoked by exhaustion [see 2.4.2.4]. Changes in team stability may also play a part. Juniors
consider their professional credibility before calling for help (Kennedy et al., 2009), and it is
unsurprising that the loss of consistent team relationships and supervision may contribute to
team failings (Singh et al., 2007).
Having considered the evidence relating to individual sta￿ groups on the ward, I will now
describe the studies exploring their interdisciplinary practice.
2.4.2 Sta￿ communication and collaboration
Ward teams function less well, and team members understand each other more poorly, than
they might think. In general medicine, physicians dominate interactions with other health
professionals, ‘in￿icting’ information on their colleagues rather than exchanging it (Reeves
et al., 2009). Despite this tendency, physicians still think highly of their ability to collaborate
with nurses, a view not shared by the nurses themselves (O’Leary et al., 2010).
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Worryingly, some junior doctors, while aware of communication problems, dismiss them
as no threat to patient care (Weinberg et al., 2009). This may not simply be due to professional
myopia. In a small Swiss study, nurses and junior doctors had discordant perceptions and unmet
expectations about each other’s role, and limited knowledge of each other’s profession (Muller-
Juge et al., 2013). Nonetheless, a Cochrane review of RCTs of interprofessional collaboration
interventions only labelled them ‘promising’, rather than ‘proven’ (Zwarenstein et al., 2009).
The review’s inclusion criteria may have been overly restrictive (Shojania, 2013), and some of
this literature will therefore be discussed in more detail.
2.4.2.1 Structured team practices
One important study highlighted the potential impact of a well-placed change in hospital prac-
tice. In a non-randomised cluster trial, bringing ward sta￿ together in daily interdisciplinary
rounds reduced length of stay and total hospital charges (Curley et al., 1998). Earlier smaller
studies, with di￿erent patient demographics, had failed to demonstrate a comparable e￿ect,
suggesting that stable patients with straightforward diagnoses may have less to gain from an
investment in multidisciplinary input. Trials also need to be adequately powered to detect
relatively small changes in length of stay (Wild et al., 2004).
Subsequent research con￿rmed that regular interdisciplinarymeetings (of varying frequency,
and sometimes as part of multi-component interventions) had a role in reducing length of stay,
without negatively a￿ecting readmission rates or mortality (Cowan et al., 2006; O’Mahony et al.,
2007). Standard practice has evolved since those studies, with more emphasis on the importance
of interdisciplinary work, as well as baseline reductions in the average length of stay. It may now
be more di￿cult to further reduce length of stay or hospital charges through interdisciplinary
care arrangements (O’Leary et al., 2010).
Interdisciplinary interventions may still be worthwhile for other reasons, however. They
can reduce the incidence of adverse events, and improve nurses’ perceptions of teamwork and
collaboration (O’Leary et al., 2010; O’Leary et al., 2011a). These perceptions are important as
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they re￿ect a belief in the inherent value of an intervention; if well-received, trial interventions
may be continued inde￿nitely (O’Leary et al., 2010). Importantly, not all collaborative interven-
tions will be welcomed. Even simple changes to communication styles can be widely rejected,
particularly if senior sta￿ refuse to role-model them, they con￿ict with existing hierarchies, or
if interprofessional work is not prioritised (Rice et al., 2010).
2.4.2.2 Geographic localisation
Forming a cohesive unit is a challenge for teams responsible for patients on multiple wards.
Locating sta￿ on the same ward (geographic localisation) has face validity, although its anticip-
ated bene￿ts have not all been borne out in objective studies. Improvements in communication,
productivity and work￿ow may come at the unexpected cost of a greater length of stay, per-
haps re￿ecting the perverse incentives of geographic localisation (O’Leary et al., 2009; Singh
et al., 2012). For example, teams might retain patients in order to avoid new admissions to their
assigned beds. Even when organisations attempt geographic localisation, bed pressures still
result in patients being placed as ‘outliers’ or ‘boarders’ on other wards. Sta￿ are well aware of
problems arising from this inappropriate ward allocation (Goulding et al., 2012).
2.4.2.3 Team training
Practical changes that facilitate better teamwork and collaboration (e.g., making time for in-
terdisciplinary meetings and improving sta￿ng arrangements) might be more successful than
teamwork training per se, which, despite its promise, can fail to improve patient outcomes
(Vazirani et al., 2005; Auerbach et al., 2012). Very little research has evaluated team training in
the general medical environment (O’Leary et al., 2012b). A Cochrane review of interprofessional
education did not identify any studies with a signi￿cant focus on internal medicine (Reeves
et al., 2013). Further, there is little published evidence that simulation training for medical teams
– providing a setting in which they can rehearse their management of medical emergencies –
improves patient outcomes. However, it does increase sta￿ con￿dence and competence, with
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improved team and non-technical skills (Schmidt et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2013).
2.4.2.4 Handover
Communication between shifts demands a separate focus. As inpatient care fragments, transfers
of responsibility for ongoing patient care between di￿erent healthcare providers (‘handovers’,
‘hando￿s’ or ‘signouts’) are increasingly frequent. Patients can be handed over 15 times in a ￿ve-
day hospitalisation, and individual doctors participate in more than 300 handovers per month
(Vidyarthi et al., 2006). Despite their ubiquity, the quality of each handover is typically poor,
whether trainees or consultants are involved (Greenstein et al., 2013). Handover failures may
arise, at least in part, from fundamental disagreements about what should be discussed (Helms
et al., 2012). Perhaps as a result, receiving clinicians neither ask questions nor demonstrate the
active listening behaviours that promote memory retention (Horwitz et al., 2009; Greenstein
et al., 2013). With inadequate information to make clinical decisions, near misses and adverse
events are inevitable (Arora et al., 2005; Vidyarthi et al., 2006; Horwitz et al., 2008).
Addressing these challenges requires a combination of structural and process changes, and
clinical leadership (Vidyarthi et al., 2006). Standardisation with a structured handover form
leads to fewer perceived errors by the covering doctor (Salerno et al., 2009). Electronic handover
templates, especially those that auto-populate with accurate patient data, may be more e￿cient
than handwritten versions, although their role in reducing adverse events is unclear (Petersen
et al., 1998; Van Eaton et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2013). When designed well, the same handover
tool may be used by the entire multidisciplinary team, which might be an important goal in
itself in improving interdisciplinary communication (Collins et al., 2011; Vawdrey et al., 2013).
Consultant supervision of the handover process, with a structured teaching programme
or regular feedback, improves the quality of the handover’s content as well as junior doctors’
self-con￿dence in conducting an e￿ective handover (Chu et al., 2009; Bump et al., 2012). Peer
evaluations of handover quality, by contrast, are more lenient and less reliable (Arora et al., 2013).
Nonetheless, junior doctors identi￿ed by their peers as having exemplary handover skills agree
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common strategies for e￿ective handover: prioritisation of acutely ill patients, limiting discus-
sion of straightforward patients and inactive issues, and avoiding duplication of information
held in the medical record (Helms et al., 2012). Other recommendations include protected time
for handover preparation, face-to-face discussion, and a designated interruption-free environ-
ment, although thesemay be di￿cult to implement in practice (Arora et al., 2009; Raduma-Tomas
et al., 2012).
2.4.3 Standardisation of the processes of care
2.4.3.1 Acute admissions units (AAUs)
Medical teams are typically large, unstable, and geographically spread out — all factors thought
to hamper team performance. AAUs2 address some of these issues. AAUs are wards that con-
centrate and co-locate sta￿ expertise in acute disease management for the initial period of a
patient’s admission. Popular in the UK but uncommon in the US, they are both e￿ective and
safe, reducing all-cause mortality and length of stay with no negative impact on readmissions
(Moloney et al., 2007; Rooney et al., 2008). Overall, they have shown real bene￿ts, despite a high
risk of publication bias in their evidence base (Scott et al., 2009). Importantly, creating an AAU
is no panacea: these units too may need speci￿c help to improve process measures and patient
outcomes (Beckett et al., 2013).
2.4.3.2 Checklists
As individuals, clinicians do not reliably provide interventions of proven value, with high rates
of unexplained variation (Huang et al., 2008). Surgical checklists addressing this are associated
with improved outcomes (Haynes et al., 2009), and there has been great interest in ￿nding a
medical equivalent. Medical checklists may ￿nd local acceptance if driven by senior physicians
with clinical credibility and organisational support (Amin et al., 2012). There is currently little
evidence for their impact on patient outcomes, however: a systematic review identi￿ed only a
2AAUs are also known as acute medical units (AMUs).
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single formal description of checklists in an acute medical setting (Ko et al., 2011). Checklists
continue to be devised organically, with no validated methodology for their development (Hales
et al., 2008), and the same hierarchies that impede checklist adoption in the operating theatre
could also hinder their uptake on medical wards (Amin et al., 2012).
2.4.3.3 Clinical protocols
Clinical protocols, promoting best practice when patients have a clear presenting symptom or
acute diagnosis, can also aid standardisation of care. A Cochrane review concluded that these
protocols are associated with reduced in-hospital complications and improved documentation,
without negatively impacting on length of stay or hospital costs (Rotter et al., 2010). Most experts
agree that poorly performing teams are likely to bene￿t from these interventions, although
there are dissenters (Rotter et al., 2012; Vanhaecht et al., 2012).
Disease-speci￿c guidelines typically do little to address multimorbidity, with its attendant
risks of polypharmacy and adverse drug interactions (Boyd et al., 2005). Inappropriately slavish
adherence to a protocol may actually diminish the quality of care provided, to the extent that
the protocol can no longer be considered applicable (Lugtenberg et al., 2011). This is particularly
relevant as the generalmedical inpatient population becomes older andmedicallymore complex,
often presenting with non-speci￿c symptoms, for which there is no single best pathway of
diagnosis or management.
Of the studies meeting the Cochrane review’s inclusion criteria, only six described clinical
pathways used substantially for medical ward patients; four of those had a moderate risk of
bias (Rotter et al., 2010). However, a subsequent UK study from a single hospital demonstrated
reduced mortality rates after implementing care bundles in targeted clinical areas (Robb et al.,
2010). The question of how best to harness the bene￿ts of clinical protocols for an increasingly
complex, frail, elderly inpatient population has not yet been resolved.
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2.4.3.4 Behavioural nudges
Physicians can also be ‘nudged’ towards standardisation. Showing physicians the untapped
‘discharge potential’ on their wards (patients who meet pre-de￿ned criteria indicating their
readiness for discharge), and overtly comparing physician-level average length of stay, reduced
avoidable hospital days in one cluster randomised trial (Caminiti et al., 2013). Even with reser-
vations about this study’s generalisability, strategies promoting direct physician accountability
and awareness of local practice may have wider bene￿ts. Organisations might capitalise on
physicians’ tendency to adapt their own practice to the norms of each workplace (Lagoe et al.,
2005; Jong et al., 2006).
2.4.4 Early recognition and treatment of the deteriorating patient
It has been di￿cult to prove the bene￿ts of early warning scoring systems, tools that grade
the patient’s physiological disturbance and recommend appropriate action, with con￿icting
evidence and a paucity of high quality data (McNeill and Bryden, 2013). Lacking information
speci￿c to medical wards, hospital-wide data suggest that aggregate weighted scoring systems
are most e￿ective (McNeill and Bryden, 2013), but these remain entirely dependent on two
factors.
Firstly, they should help clinicians recognise a deteriorating patient earlier than they would
otherwise — the ‘a￿erent limb’ of the system. In day-to-day use in an Emergency Department,
though, healthcare providers did not complete the necessary charts fully and even miscalculated
the constituent scores (Wilson et al., 2013). It is unsurprising that the evidence supporting these
tools is underwhelming, if they are routinely incomplete and numerically incorrect.
Secondly, clinicians should react appropriately to a documented deterioration. The ‘e￿erent
limb’ of early warning scoring systems often involves deployment of a rapid response team, a
group of clinicians with critical care skills, to quickly assemble su￿cient expertise at the bedside
of a sick patient. However, those teams’ impact is limited by repeated failures to seek their help,
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despite guidance for ward sta￿ (McNeill and Bryden, 2013). Even an automated system alerting
senior ward nurses to a patient’s deterioration had no e￿ect on clinical outcomes, perhaps
because the activation of the nurses was no guarantee that appropriate action would be taken
(Bailey et al., 2013).
A systematic review concluded that rapid response systems – comprising both earlywarning
triggers and de￿ned clinical responses – are associated with reduced rates of cardiorespiratory
arrest outside the ICU and reduced mortality (Winters et al., 2013). Many of the reviewed
studies were of poor quality, relying on before-and-after designs whose results may not be
borne out when compared to more rigorously controlled research. Nonetheless, these rapid
response systems have become an established feature of most healthcare organisations. Some
authors contend that their ‘success’ is, at best, a mitigation of hospital failures earlier in the
admission, and that a better approach would be to eliminate those failures at their source (Litvak
and Pronovost, 2010).
2.4.5 Ward safety climate
High levels of safety culture and safety climate [see box 1.2] are associated with organisation-
wide reductions in adverse events, and improving them is therefore a valid goal (Mardon et al.,
2010). However, two systematic reviews found little evidence that interventions to improve
safety climate improved patient outcomes: at the current time, such interventions are only
‘potentially e￿ective’ (Morello et al., 2013; Weaver et al., 2013). Very little of the safety climate
literature relates to adultmedical wards. The available data are con￿icting, in that improvements
in teamwork and collaboration are not always paralleled by a change in safety climate (O’Leary
et al., 2010; O’Leary et al., 2011b). Conversely, safety culture can be improvedwithout de￿nitively
improving teamwork (Blegen et al., 2010; Auerbach et al., 2012).
Without a good theoretical understanding of how these factors interact, assessing di￿erent
sta￿ groups in turn is important. In operating theatres, for example, nurses are the least satis￿ed
with collaboration and teamwork and are able to perceive greater improvements than other sta￿
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(Makary et al., 2006). The most disenfranchised sta￿ group may report the worst safety culture,
although the identity of this group will vary between microsystems. Compared to the typical
surgeon-dominated operating theatre, the medical ward is relatively ‘owned’ by its nurses, with
physicians and pharmacists often seen as more transient visitors (Blegen et al., 2010). These
subtleties complicate the evaluation of safety culture interventions.
2.4.6 Combined approaches
Some organisations have introducedwider-ranging programmes, successfully bringing together
all ￿ve major themes identi￿ed in this evidence base (Lagoe et al., 2005; Beckett et al., 2013;
McAlister et al., 2014). Their outcomes vary, from reduced length of stay in a large scale RCT to
improved mortality in a single centre’s longitudinal study (Beckett et al., 2013; McAlister et al.,
2014). In each case, there was an overt organisational statement of the project’s aims, as well as
a commitment to the substantial organisational change that improvement would require. This
was necessary, but not su￿cient, for success: why an intervention does well in one setting and
not another, even with similar organisational backing, remains unclear. This emphasises the
importance of multi-centre trials (Blegen et al., 2010).
2.5 Discussion
This narrative review appears to be the ￿rst deliberate synthesis of the published literature on
improvement strategies for general medical ward care. Many of the interventions described
in this chapter had themselves been the focus of previous reviews. However, those reviews
typically aggregated reports of their intervention’s use across di￿erent settings. For example,
the Cochrane review by Zwarenstein et al. (2009) included structured interprofessional inter-
ventions enacted in medical wards, surgery, nursing homes, and ambulatory care. Similarly,
Ko et al. (2011) reviewed the use of safety checklists in all acute hospital settings, including
intensive care, surgery, the emergency department and acute care departments.
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The deliberate choice to summate the e￿ects of complex interventions3 in di￿erent settings
has two main disadvantages. First, it ignores di￿erences between microsystems, the organisa-
tional level at which important variation occurs [see 1.5.1]. This is particularly important when
incorporating medical wards into broader summaries, given the speci￿c challenges that they
face [see box 1.1]. The e￿cacy of the intervention may depend very much on the characteristics
of the microsystem, as will the details of the implementation model it requires.
Second, it obscures the relative paucity of high quality evidence pertaining speci￿cally to
medical wards, compared to more stable clinical environments such as the ICU and operating
theatre. For example, Ko et al. (2011) found only one checklist study based on medical wards.
Interventions tested in other settings may be extrapolated too broadly to the medical ward, with
little speci￿c evidence of similar e￿ectiveness. Nonetheless, there was still su￿cient evidence
to elicit broad categories of improvement interventions in this microsystem, and to meet the
other aims of this review, as summarised below.
2.5.1 Summary of ￿ndings
2.5.1.1 High level overview of strategies to improve medical ward care
Interventions to improve the quality and safety of medical ward care can be grouped into ￿ve
common themes: sta￿ng levels and team composition; interdisciplinary communication and
collaboration; standardisation of care; early recognition and treatment of the deteriorating pa-
tient; and local safety climate. These categories have good face validity, addressing the common
ward failings elicited by McQuillan et al. (1998) [￿gure 2.1; see also 1.4.2.1]. In doing so, they
facilitate better care and promote improved outcomes.
3Complex interventions are commonly de￿ned as ‘interventions that comprise multiple interacting components,
although additional dimensions of complexity include the di￿culty of their implementation and the number of










































Figure 2.1: Common themes for medical ward quality & safety interventions. Intervention themes [green] address
previously-identi￿ed failings [red], facilitating better care and promoting improved outcomes.
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2.5.1.2 Which strategies are e￿ective, and in what circumstances?
Many interventions in these common themes were reported to improve medical ward care to
some extent. However, there was little de￿nitive evidence of process improvements leading
to better patient outcomes. Successful innovations in service delivery frequently combined
multiple elements from these di￿erent themes, making it di￿cult to distinguish their individual
e￿ects. Overall, these improvement strategies are best described as promising, rather than
proven.
Strategies to improve medical ward care are heavily context-dependent, and di￿erent ward
stakeholders may have competing perspectives of what an e￿ective intervention should achieve.
Integrating interventions into existing work￿ow, along with meaningful and sustained senior
support, may be necessary prerequisites for their success, but most reports did not focus on
identifying important implementation factors. Comparison of the same type of intervention
in di￿erent contexts is hampered by international variation in what constitutes an acceptable
model of care.
2.5.1.3 Common methodological issues
Many of the studies discussed in this review shared the methodological failings that feature
more broadly in QI literature [see 1.2.6]. Inadequate study designs, and failures to account
for secular trends, were common. Speci￿c additional issues included the failure to account for
workload (an important confounding factor), the absence of an implementation evaluation, and a
predominance of small, underpowered, single centre studies. Unit of analysis errors (interpreting
results at the patient level when interventions were delivered at ward level, without adjusting
for the clustering of results) were also common.
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2.5.2 Study limitations
2.5.2.1 Search strategy
The principal limitation of this narrative review was its iterative search strategy. It is possible
that relevant literature was not included as a result. However, given the wide-reaching primary
aim for the review and the variety of interventions and study designs to be described, the search
strategy could not be more exhaustive. In any case, the review reached thematic saturation,
and later reports of novel interventions (published after the review period ended) have also
been well categorised by the themes de￿ned here. This suggests that the ￿ve major themes of
medical ward improvement are su￿ciently comprehensive.
2.5.2.2 Synthesis methodology
Much as the search strategy developed iteratively, so too did the synthesis of the included studies.
The absence of a pre-de￿ned analytical frameworkmight be considered a limitation of this work.
However, my approach adopted many of the recommended principles for narrative synthesis
(Popay et al., 2006). Recommendations include clustering and tabulating the primary studies,
to facilitate an inductive thematic analysis that ‘translates’ the dominant concepts reported in
them. This process helps an author to explore the relationships within and between the themes.
This is, by its nature, an iterative process; arti￿cially constraining a theory-generating review
to a pre-de￿ned framework would have been inappropriate (Popay et al., 2006).
2.5.2.3 Strength of conclusions
This review was only able to draw tentative conclusions. This was a function both of the review
methodology itself and the primary studies on which it relied. The methodological limitations
of those primary studies were numerous [see 2.5.2.2], and many described medical ward data
without focusing on medical wards per se. This precluded all but the broadest statements re-
garding the likely e￿ectiveness of medical ward interventions. It is important to note that the
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systematic reviews cited in this chapter also drew limited conclusions about the de￿nitive bene-
￿ts of these interventions, even with a narrower focus (Zwarenstein et al., 2009; Weaver et al.,
2013).
2.5.3 Implications for further work
Calls for evidence-based changes to service delivery are increasing; this review is a timely
summary of the evidence for care delivery interventions in the most familiar inpatient setting.
A limited number of prominent improvement strategies were established within the broader
literature; each of these can now be evaluated in more detail as required.
A number of other speci￿c opportunities to contribute to the existing knowledge base were
also identi￿ed. The literature currently lacks robust, mixed method assessments of medical
ward interventions that can be disseminated at scale. Structured interventions should target
caregivers who are disadvantaged by the existing workplace hierarchy. Evaluations should
ideally include both clinical and sta￿-reported outcomes, representing multiple stakeholders.
The development and evaluation of a novel interdisciplinary intervention, described in chapter 4,
are informed by these ￿ndings.
2.5.4 Conclusion
The ￿ve strategies for medical ward improvement are supported by a limited evidence base. The
next chapter focuses on one of these major improvement strategies: sta￿ communication and
collaboration. Interdisciplinary practice on the ward is increasingly structured, with assumed
safety and quality bene￿ts. The results of this narrative review suggest that a more formal





interventions on medical wards: a
systematic review
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, I described the ambiguous evidence supporting medical ward interdisciplinary
collaborative interventions. These team-based interventions form one of the ￿ve major ward
improvement strategies; they have been associated with numerous improvements in ward care,
from reduced length of stay to lower adverse event rates. However, many positive reports relied
on weak study designs, unable to properly distinguish chance variation from the e￿ects of an
intervention. Complex interdisciplinary interventions may also have unintended consequences,
and their ability to bring about positive change may be lessening, as standard care improves.
In other settings, there is evidence that patient outcomes have been improved by interdis-
ciplinary interventions. Interdisciplinary safety checklists in the operating theatre, for example,
The work described in this chapter has been published as: Pannick S, Davis R, Ashra￿an H, Byrne BE, Beveridge
I, Athanasiou T, Wachter RM, Sevdalis N. E￿ects of Interdisciplinary Team Care Interventions on General Medical
Wards: A Systematic Review. JAMA Intern Med. 2015; 175(8):1288-98. DOI: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.2421
74 Interdisciplinary team care interventions: a systematic review
reduce surgical morbidity (Bergs et al., 2014; Gillespie et al., 2014; Haugen et al., 2015); and
interdisciplinary initiatives in the ICU reduce CLABSIs (Pronovost et al., 2006; Bosk et al., 2009).
Interdisciplinary collaborations are increasingly formalised in ward practice, with the expecta-
tion of similar improvements in care outcomes and e￿ciency. The bene￿ts of these interventions
on the medical ward have not been systematically assessed, and there is little agreement on
how we might best judge their value [see 1.5.3].
In this chapter, I describe a systematic review to determine the impact of interdisciplinary
ward team interventions - to my knowledge, the ￿rst review of its kind. The systematic search
addresses the limitations of the iterative strategy used in the last chapter to categorise the
broader evidence base [see 2.5.2]. The review also deliberately focuses on articles using higher
quality study designs, given themethodological issues seen in much of the literature [see 2.5.1.3].
3.2 Aims
This study has two aims:
(i) To describe the range of objective patient outcomes used to evaluate general medical ward
interdisciplinary team interventions; and
(ii) To summarise the performance of interdisciplinary team interventions against those out-
comes.
I de￿ned appropriate interventions as those that targeted interdisciplinary team care (ITC)
on the medical ward [box 3.1].
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Box 3.1 Interdisciplinary team care (ITC)
The structured working practices dictating which di￿erent healthcare practitioners interact
together to contribute to patient care, as well as when and how they do so.
The de￿nition incorporates sta￿ who routinely attend to the patient (e.g., nurses and ward
physicians), as well as those who intermittently provide specialist review and advice.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Search strategy & data sources
The research question was structured with the elements of the ‘Population, Intervention, Com-
parison, Outcomes (PICO)’ framework (Huang et al., 2006) [see table 3.1 for summary]. The
question was framed as: ‘For adult patients on general medical wards, what are the e￿ects of
ITC interventions on objective patient outcomes, compared to standard care or against other
ITC interventions, as evaluated in primary studies with an appropriate design?’
The search strategy de￿ned three components, each of which had to feature within an
article’s title or abstract, linked by the Boolean ‘AND’ operator. The three components were: an
objective outcome of care, a term to indicate a trial or programme evaluation, and a descriptor
to indicate the appropriate setting of a general medical ward. The search terms making up each
component are listed in Appendix A.
The EMBASE, Ovid MEDLINE, and PsycINFO databases were then searched for studies
meeting these criteria. Limits were applied to restrict matches to those published between 1998
and 2013, in English, applicable to adult humans, and to automate the removal of duplicate
results. The reference lists of included studies were hand-searched for other relevant studies.
3.3.2 Article selection: inclusion & exclusion criteria
Speci￿c inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed to re￿ne the basic PICO structure
[table 3.2]. RCTs, studies with an appropriate comparison group, and interrupted time series
76 Interdisciplinary team care interventions: a systematic review
Table 3.1: Summarised PICO formulation of the systematic review research question
PICO element Descriptor summary
Population Adult patients on general medical
wards
Intervention Any interdisciplinary team care in-
tervention delivered during the in-
patient admission
Comparison Standard care, or another eligible in-
tervention
Outcomes Objective patient outcomes
were included. The criteria and terminology of the Cochrane E￿ective Practice andOrganisation
of Care (EPOC) review group (2014) were used to de￿ne study types.
Table 3.2: Systematic review inclusion & exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Population
Adult patients (aged  18 years) on general medical wards Children & adolescents
Intensive care units, high dependency or coronary care (level 2) units
Operating theatres or stroke units
Whole-hospital initiatives not reporting medical patient outcomes or predominance of medical patients
Interventions
Any intervention to alter ITC delivery, typically including  1 of the
following components:
• Interdisciplinary rounds
• Geographic localisation of medical teams
• Direct incorporation of allied health professional or subspe-
cialty input into ward teams
• Proactive or unsolicited patient management from a health
professional not ordinarily part of the ward team
Pharmacotherapy (e.g., a trial of drug vs placebo)
Medicine reconciliation
Substitution of one type of healthcare provider for another (e.g., physician assistants instead of junior doctors)
Direct comparison of specialist vs general medical care, without other changes to the system of care (e.g., nephrology vs internist
care for haemodialysis patients, or hospitalist vs clinic-based faculty)
Case managers / discharge facilitators
Changes a￿ecting a single sta￿ group, with no other ITC components (e.g., unidisciplinary education)
Patient-focused intervention, directly targeting health behaviours or understanding
Intervention delivered during hospitalisation Intervention involving signi￿cant post-discharge follow-up or outpatient care
Comparators
Usual care (as de￿ned by the primary studies) Comparison of an eligible intervention with an ineligible intervention
Comparison of two eligible interventions
(Table 3.2, continued)
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Outcomes
Objective outcomes; e.g., mortality rate, length of stay, readmission
rate, complications of care, or composites of these
Subjective / patient-reported outcomes
Process measures (e.g., guideline compliance, or error reporting rather than objective error rates)
Financial outcomes
Publication details
Published between 1998 & 2013, in English
Appropriate study design, such as:
• Randomised & non-randomised controlled trials
• Prospective cohort studies with a valid comparison group
• Interrupted time series
Published before 1998, after 2013, or in a language other than English
Inappropriate study design, such as:
• Case report or case series
• Letter to the editor or editorial
• Meeting abstract
• Case-control study
• Retrospective cohort study
• Uncontrolled before-after study
• Secondary publication, e.g., systematic or non-systematic review
Abbreviations: ITC - interdisciplinary team care.
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3.3.3 Screening & data extraction
All retrieved articles underwent title and abstract review. A second reviewer with systematic
review expertise1 independently screened a randomly-selected 15% of the articles. All articles
thought to meet the review criteria were examined in full by both reviewers, and the ￿nal set
of studies to be included was con￿rmed after discussion with an experienced third reviewer2.
Quantitative data were extracted with a structured form, devised with an academic clinician
with experience in meta-analysis3. If the required information was not available in the published
report, its authors were contacted for further data or clari￿cation.
Interventions were classi￿ed as low, medium, or high intensity. Implementation intens-
ity (sometimes used interchangeably with ‘implementation strength’) is an emerging concept,
de￿ned as a measure of the activity required to support a programme’s implementation (Har-
greaves et al., 2016). Intensity may mediate the success or failure of the programme (Schellen-
berg et al., 2012). It can be described with reference to absolute levels of implementation (e.g.,
hours of contact per week) or relative scales, but is poorly de￿ned: one study considered it
the ‘aggressiveness’ of e￿orts to deliver the programme (Gold et al., 1993). The components
of implementation intensity naturally vary from one programme to the next, but typically in-
clude elements of infrastructure (organisational arrangements for service delivery), type of
services provided, resources, leadership and coordination, training, and information systems
(Schellenberg et al., 2012). There is as yet no consensus or uniform approach in de￿ning and
measuring implementation intensity (Schellenberg et al., 2012). In this study, a global grade
for implementation intensity took into account factors such as the frequency of the mandated
use of the intervention; autonomy of the individuals on the interdisciplinary team to enact
recommendations; resource provision; and follow-up.
1Rachel Davis, Senior Research Associate
2Nick Sevdalis, Professor of Implementation Science & Patient Safety
3Hutan Ashra￿an, Clinical Lecturer
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3.3.4 Assessment of study quality
All included studies were assessed for risk of bias using prede￿ned criteria, based on the Co-
chrane EPOC group’s guidance (E￿ective Practice and Organisation of Care, 2013). Studies were
classed as having low, medium, or high risk of bias, using a scoring system employed previously
for heterogeneous healthcare interventions (Davey et al., 2013).
Scores were based on adequate allocation sequence generation; allocation concealment;
measurement of baseline outcomes and characteristics; data collection; blinding; protection
against contamination; and freedom from selective outcome reporting or other biases. If all
criteria were met, the risk of bias was graded as ‘low’; if one to three criteria were scored as
‘unclear’ or ‘not done’, the riskwas ‘medium’; if four ormore criteria were ‘unclear’ or ‘not done’,
the risk was ‘high’. A second reviewer4 independently assessed each study, with disagreements
resolved by consensus.
3.3.5 Statistical analysis
Interventions were categorised according to their focus on interdisciplinary team composition
or practice. Interdisciplinary team composition interventions were subcategorised by the type
of specialist input they described. The studies’ outcome measures, and the adjustment methods
used to account for their patient case-mix, were tabulated. For meaningful analysis, outcomes
were grouped into early (occurringwithin 30 days of receiving the intervention) or late outcomes
(31 days to 12 months).
Where appropriate, the associations between studies’ intensity ratings and their outcomes
were tested (  2 analysis; di￿erences were considered signi￿cant at p < 0.05). The studies were
too heterogeneous for summary e￿ect statistics to be wholly reliable. Instead, the available
data is presented as an exploratory analysis in weighted bubble charts, with pooled values and
95% con￿dence intervals (CIs) [￿gures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4]. Bubble sizes re￿ect the sample size
4Ben Byrne, Clinical Research Fellow
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of each study. The relative risk of outcomes, or weighted mean di￿erence (for length of stay
data), was calculated with DerSimonian and Laird random-e￿ects modelling. Between-study
and within-study variances contributed to study weighting. Analyses were conducted using
Stata, version 125.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Abstract screening & application of the inclusion criteria
A total of 6,934 potentially relevant citations were identi￿ed. After excluding abstracts from
conferences, there was 100% agreement between the two reviewers on the initial inclusion of a
15% sample of abstracts (1,040 citations). After full text review, 30 studies met the inclusion cri-
teria, 26 of which were identi￿ed from the initial database search and four from hand-searching
reference lists. The ￿ow of records through the di￿erent phases of the review is shown in
￿gure 3.1.
3.4.2 Study characteristics
3.4.2.1 Trial designs & interventions
The 30 included studies comprised eight RCTs,6 nine cluster RCTs,7 8 non-randomised cluster
trials,8 four controlled before-after studies,9 and one interrupted time series (Auerbach et al.,
2012). Study characteristics are summarised in table 3.3. Other than one example (Fine et al.,
2003), studies compared an interdisciplinary team care intervention with usual care.
Interventions were grouped into two categories. The ￿rst group of interventions altered
5Hutan Ashra￿an, Clinical Lecturer, assisted with the production of summary e￿ect statistics.
6Soifer et al., 1998; Cole et al., 2002; Dey et al., 2005; Mannheimer et al., 2006; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Kircher et al.,
2007; Lisby et al., 2010; Lesprit et al., 2013
7Solomon et al., 2001; Fine et al., 2003; Camins et al., 2009; Makowsky et al., 2009; O’Leary et al., 2010; Korbkit-
jaroen et al., 2011; O’Leary et al., 2011a; O’Leary et al., 2011b; Schillig et al., 2011
8Curley et al., 1998; Webster et al., 1999; Kucukarslan et al., 2003; Mudge et al., 2006; Manuel et al., 2010; Wald
et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2012; Esparza et al., 2013















Figure 3.1: Information ￿ow through the systematic review
3.4 Results 83
the composition of the interdisciplinary team routinely attending to the patient, such as by
requiring additional specialists or professionals to provide advice. The second group addressed
team practice - the logistics of when, where, and how existing team members would work
together.
The 30 studies included 66,548 patients with a mean age of 63 years, and a variety of
primary diagnoses. Six studies targeted patients with speci￿c diagnoses (delirium,10 community-
acquired pneumonia (Fine et al., 2003), acute stroke (Dey et al., 2005), and advanced liver disease
(Lai et al., 2009)), although they were treated on general medical rather than specialist wards.
One study evaluated a service for patients taking anticoagulant medication (Schillig et al., 2011).
Twenty-one studies were conducted in North America, eight in other developed countries,
and one in an upper-middle-income country. Trials were conducted in a range of settings,
including community and urban teaching hospitals, quaternary academic facilities, and Veterans
A￿airs hospitals. Five were multicentre studies.
Of the 20 studies that addressed interdisciplinary team composition, 15 investigated pro-
active, unsolicited consultations from a specialist or specialist team.11 Consulting professionals
specialised in geriatrics (Webster et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2002; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Kircher et al.,
2007), infectious diseases,12 intravenous therapy (Soifer et al., 1998), stroke (Dey et al., 2005),
pharmacotherapy (Mannheimer et al., 2006; Lisby et al., 2010; Schillig et al., 2011), or psychiatry
(Desan et al., 2011). Four studies assessed the e￿ect of embedding additional health care pro-
fessionals in rounding teams, incorporating pharmacists (Kucukarslan et al., 2003; Makowsky
et al., 2009), medical librarians (Esparza et al., 2013), or supervising medical subspecialists (Lai
et al., 2009).
Ten studies investigated interdisciplinary team practice, often using interdisciplinary rounds
(Curley et al., 1998; O’Leary et al., 2010; O’Leary et al., 2011a; O’Leary et al., 2011b) or a package
10Webster et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2002; Pitkälä et al., 2006
11Soifer et al., 1998; Webster et al., 1999; Solomon et al., 2001; Cole et al., 2002; Fine et al., 2003; Mannheimer et al.,
2006; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Kircher et al., 2007; Camins et al., 2009; Lisby et al., 2010; Manuel et al., 2010; Desan et al.,
2011; Korbkitjaroen et al., 2011; Schillig et al., 2011; Lesprit et al., 2013
12Solomon et al., 2001; Fine et al., 2003; Camins et al., 2009; Manuel et al., 2010; Korbkitjaroen et al., 2011; Lesprit
et al., 2013
Table 3.3: Systematic review: characteristics of included studies
Author, Year
(Country)
Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Interdisciplinary team compositiona
Geriatrics
Webster et al., 1999
(USA)b
Geriatric delirium care team (physician
& nurse) proactively identify patients
with delirium and guide management




High Reduced LOS; no di￿erence in dis-
charge disposition or mortality
Cole et al., 2002
(Canada)
Systematic delirium detection;
Geriatician review and specialist nurse
follow-up
High LOS; discharge to the community; death
within eight weeks of enrolment (all second-
ary outcomes)
RCT Medium No di￿erences in LOS, discharge to
the community, or survival
Pitkälä et al., 2006
(Finland)
Systematic delirium detection, followed
by geriatrician review and specialist
nurse follow-up; no de￿nitive descrip-
tion of who delivered the intervention,
or how
Low Patients discharged to permanent institu-
tional care or deceased at one year (compos-
ite primary outcome)
Permanent institutional care at one year;
acute hospitalisation days during delirium
episode; total number of days spent in any
institution and in permanent institutional
care during the follow-up year; days spent
in community care before permanent insti-
tutional care; one-year mortality (secondary
outcomes)
RCT Medium No di￿erence in primary outcome




Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Kircher et al., 2007
(Germany)
Geriatrician, social worker and nurse
consultation service; geriatrician sum-
marised recommendations in a struc-
tured format; input from nurse and so-
cial worker as required
Medium Living location; proportion of patients with
 1 readmission; days of readmission at 12
months (all described as primary outcomes)
12-month survival; Timed-Up-And-Go-Test;
hand grip (secondary outcomes)
RCT High No di￿erence in any outcome
Hepatology
Lai et al., 2009
(USA)
Multidisciplinary hepatology team;
Direct supervision of a specialised hous-
esta￿ team structure
High LOS (primary outcome) Controlled before-
after study
High Adjusted LOS reduced with inter-
vention (when adjusted for CMI
and MELD score); concurrent con-





Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Infectious disease
Solomon et al., 2001
(USA)
Multidisciplinary AUT (clinician-
educator/ infectious disease physician/
clinical pharmacist);
Systematic screening for unnecessary
antibiotic prescriptions, followed by
educational intervention to prescriber;
‘Academic detailing’ (one-on-one inter-
active educational outreach, delivered
by a professional trained to discuss pre-
scribing decisions in a manner likely to
induce evidence-based practice change)
Medium LOS; 30-day readmissions; in-hospital




High No di￿erence in any outcome (N.B.:
intervention was not designed to
a￿ect these outcomes per se; they
were used as balancing measures)
Fine et al., 2003
(USA)
Specialist nurse input to facilitate anti-
biotic management;
Screening for patient stability su￿cient
to allow conversion from IV to oral an-
tibiotic therapy, or discharge;
Direct communication with primary
team to discuss recommendations
Medium LOS (primary outcome)
30-day mortality; medical complications; 30-
day readmissions (secondary outcomes)
Cluster randomised
trial
High No change in LOS; fewer med-
ical complications in intervention





Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Camins et al., 2009
(USA)
Multidisciplinary AUT (infectious dis-
ease physician & specialist pharmacist);
Systematic screening for unnecessary
antibiotic prescriptions, followed by
academic detailing




High Shorter median LOS; no di￿erence
in mortality
Manuel et al., 2010
(Switzerland)
Infectious disease specialist;
Systematic antibiotic prescription as-
sessment with regard to need, choice of
drug, route and dose;
Feedback to treating physician










team (infectious disease physician &
infection control nurse) identifying risk
factors for hospital-acquired infection;
Feedback to the treating team, includ-
ing observations of adherence to infec-
tion control measures
High LOS; in-hospital mortality; hospital-
acquired infection rates (not speci￿ed)
Cluster randomised
trial
High Reduced hospital-acquired infec-
tion rate (driven by reductions in
pneumonia and CAUTI)




Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Lesprit et al., 2013
(France)
Infectious disease physician;
Systematic antibiotic prescription as-
sessment;
Feedback to the treating physician
Low LOS (primary outcome)
ICU admission; in-hospital mortality; 60-
day readmission for relapsing infection (sec-
ondary outcomes)
RCT Medium No change in LOS, in-hospital mor-
tality or ICU admission.
Fewer 60-day readmissions for re-
lapsing infection
IV therapy
Soifer et al., 1998
(USA)
IV therapy (nursing) team;
Insertion and/or management of peri-
pheral IV catheters
High IV line-related bacteraemia; local complica-
tions from catheter insertion (not speci￿ed)
RCT High Reduced catheter-related bacter-
aemias and local complications
Medical librarian
Esparza et al., 2013
(USA)
Clinical medical librarian embedded in
medical rounds to answer speci￿c ques-
tions posed by team members;
Detailed answers supplied by email
after rounds
Low LOS; 30-day readmissions (not speci￿ed) Non-randomised
cluster trial







Participation in rounding and prospect-
ive evaluation of patient medications
High Preventable adverse drug events (primary
outcome)
LOS; time to respond to therapy; readmis-
sion rate (secondary outcomes)
Non-randomised
cluster trial
High Fewer preventable adverse drug
events/1000 patient-days
No change in LOS, time to respond




Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)




Clinical pharmacologist & specialist
nurse;
Systematic screening for potential drug
interactions contributing to patient
symptoms;
Feedback to the treating physician
Low Readmission and/or death at 6 months
(primary outcome)
6-month readmissions; 6-month deaths (sec-
ondary outcomes)





Participation in rounding and provision
of proactive clinical services
High 3-month readmissions; 6-month readmis-




High Reduced 3-month readmissions; no
e￿ect on 6-month readmissions
Increased LOS in intervention
group
Lisby et al., 2010
(Denmark)
Clinical pharmacologist & clinical phar-
macist;
Systematic medication review;
Advisory feedback to treating physician
Low LOS (primary outcome)
3-month readmissions; 3-month mortality;
time to ￿rst readmission; number of read-
missions; 3-month emergency department
visits, 3-month outpatient care visits (sec-
ondary outcomes)
RCT Medium No di￿erence in any outcome




High Composite outcome of INR >5, major bleed-
ing, or development of new thrombosis in-




High No di￿erence in composite out-




Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Psychiatry
Desan et al., 2011
(USA)
Psychiatrist;
Proactive identi￿cation of patients with
mental health issues;
Early psychiatric consultation;
Coordination with primary team
High LOS (primary outcome) Controlled before-
after study
High Reduced LOS; reduced proportion
of cases with LOS >4 days
Stroke
Dey et al., 2005
(UK)
Multidisciplinary stroke team (consult-
ant & senior therapist);
Advised primary team on acute stroke
management;
Coordinated early input from therapy
groups
Low 6-week mortality; 12-week mortality
(primary outcomes)
Death or institutionalised care (secondary
outcome)
RCT Medium No di￿erence in any outcome
Interdisciplinary team practiced
Curley et al., 1998
(USA)
IDRs including physician, nurse, phar-
macist, nutritionist & social worker;
Orders written during rounds
High LOS; in-hospital mortality (not speci￿ed) Non-randomised
cluster trial





Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)
Trial design Risk of bias Results
Mudge et al., 2006
(Australia)
Consistent multidisciplinary teams
aligned with admitting medical units;
Expanded senior clinical nurse role,
with structured assessment of patient’s
premorbid function;
Investment in allied health professional
sta￿ng to allow a consistent sta￿mem-
ber from each discipline in each inter-
vention unit;
Early discharge planning
High LOS; in-hospital mortality; 6-month mortal-
ity (primary outcomes)
6-month readmissions; discharge to residen-
tial care (secondary outcomes)
Non-randomised
cluster trial
High Reduced in-hospital mortality;
No change in 6-month mortality,
LOS, 6-month readmissions or dis-
charge to residential care
O’Leary et al., 2010
(USA)
Structured IDRs & structured commu-
nication tool for newly admitted pa-
tients;
Attended by nurses, resident physi-
cians, pharmacist, social worker, & case
manager
High LOS (primary outcome) Cluster randomised
trial




Structured IDRs & structured commu-
nication tool for newly admitted pa-
tients;
Attended by nurses, resident physi-
cians, pharmacist, social worker, & case
manager
High Adverse events (primary outcome) Cluster randomised
trial
High Fewer patients experienced ad-
verse events; reduced adverse





Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)




Structured IDRs & structured commu-
nication tool for newly admitted pa-
tients;
Attended by nurses, resident physi-
cians, pharmacist, social worker, & case
manager
High LOS (secondary outcome) Cluster randomised
trial
High No di￿erence in outcome
Wald et al., 2011
(USA)e
IDRs, attended by nurses, physi-




Focus on safety & early discharge plan-
ning;
Educational curriculum for geriatric
care









curriculum & unit safety teams




Medium No di￿erence in any outcome
Singh et al., 2012
(USA)
Localisation of each medical team’s pa-
tients to a single nursing unit
Medium LOS; 30-day readmissions (not speci￿ed)
Inpatient deaths described as patient charac-
teristic rather than outcome
Non-randomised
cluster trial




Intervention Intensity Objective patient outcomes
(primary or secondary)




Localisation of each medical team’s pa-
tients to a single nursing unit
Census cap of 14 patients/service
High 30-day readmissions; cardiac arrests; rapid
response team events; ICU transfers; ad-
verse events as de￿ned by AHRQ patient
safety indicators (not speci￿ed)
Controlled before-
after study
High Reduced 30-day readmissions, but
not meeting the prede￿ned p < 0.01
threshold for multiple comparis-
ons;
No change in rapid response team
events, cardiac arrests, ICU trans-
fers or complications of care
Saint et al., 2013
(USA)
IDRs, attended by doctors, nurses, phar-
macist & clinical care coordinator;
Modi￿ed attending rounds;
Regular attending team meetings;
Increased attending commitment to in-
patient service provision;
Educational curriculum for attendings
and residents





Medium No di￿erence in any outcome
Abbreviations: AHRQ - Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; AUT - antimicrobial utilisation team; CAUTI - catheter-associated urine tract infection; CMI - Case Mix Index; ICU - intensive care unit; IDRs -
interdisciplinary rounds; IV - intravenous; LOS - length of stay; MELD - Model for End Stage Liver Disease; RCT - randomised controlled trial.
aInterventions to alter the composition of the interdisciplinary team routinely attending the patient, through proactive and/or unsolicited involvement of medical specialists or allied health care professionals. bResults from
phase 2 of the study relating to interdisciplinary team care intervention. cLength of stay excluded from analysis owing to changes over the course of the intervention (expansion of an advanced heart failure service).
dInterventions to alter the practice of the established interdisciplinary team in terms of where, when, and how sta￿ work together. eAuthors argue that their intervention is not a typical acute care of the elderly unit but a
hybrid general medical service (N.B.: no environmental changes or separate nursing training or protocols). fResults from phases 1 and 2 of the study, excluding the patient-targeted interventions of phase 3.
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of interventions including interdisciplinary rounds (Mudge et al., 2006; Wald et al., 2011; Saint et
al., 2013). Two studies assessed team localisation, with medical and nursing sta￿ co-positioned
in the same geographic area in the hospital (Singh et al., 2012; Thanarajasingam et al., 2012).
One study described an interdisciplinary teamwork and communication programme (Auerbach
et al., 2012).
3.4.2.2 Objective patient outcome measures
Of the 30 studies, 19 (63%) reported length of stay, readmission, or mortality as their primary out-
come measure, or did not specify the primacy of their outcome measures. The most commonly
reported objective patient outcome measures were length of stay (23 of 30 [77%]), complications
of care (10 of 30 [33%]), in-hospital mortality (eight of 30 [27%]), and 30-day readmission rate
(eight of 30 [27%]). Seven of nine studies (78%) that reported mortality after discharge used
time points later than 30 days.13 Seven of 30 studies (23%) reported requirements for institu-
tional care either at discharge or subsequently.14 One of 30 studies (3%) reported patients’ use
of community health care services following discharge (Lisby et al., 2010), and one of 30 studies
(3%) reported objective assessments of functional status (Kircher et al., 2007). Studies reported
a mean of 3.1 objective patient outcome measures.
Several studies did not seek improvements in these outcomes per se, targeting a di￿erent
aspect of care. Interventions involving infectious disease specialists, for example, were often
restrictive in nature, advocating narrower-spectrum antibiotic choices, or oral rather than intra-
venous therapy (Solomon et al., 2001; Fine et al., 2003; Camins et al., 2009; Lesprit et al., 2013).
Those studies sought only to show that their intervention had no detrimental e￿ect on patient
outcomes, aiming instead to demonstrate improvements in processes of care.
3.4.2.3 Risk of bias and intervention intensity
No study had a low risk of bias; seven (23%) had a medium risk of bias,15 and the remaining 23
(77%) a high risk of bias. Eight studies (27%) involved low-intensity interventions; the remainder
were of medium or high intensity.
13Cole et al., 2002; Dey et al., 2005; Mannheimer et al., 2006; Mudge et al., 2006; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Kircher et al.,
2007; Lisby et al., 2010
14Webster et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2002; Dey et al., 2005; Mudge et al., 2006; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Kircher et al., 2007;
Wald et al., 2011
15Cole et al., 2002; Dey et al., 2005; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Lisby et al., 2010; Auerbach et al., 2012; Lesprit et al., 2013;
Saint et al., 2013
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3.4.3 Outcome risk adjustment and analysis
Of the 30 studies, 16 (53%) did not adjust their results for their patient case mix.16 Eleven of 30
studies (37%) used patient characteristics as independent variables in a multivariate analysis to
isolate the e￿ect of their intervention.17 Two of 30 studies (7%) adjusted results for predicted
outcomes based on diagnosis-related groups (Webster et al., 1999; Thanarajasingam et al., 2012),
and two of 30 studies (7%) used a disease-speci￿c severity index (Fine et al., 2003; Lai et al.,
2009). Only seven of 30 studies (23%) accounted for autocorrelated outcomes, in which patients
treated by the same physician (or team) are more likely to have similar results than those who
are not.
3.4.4 Complications of care and discharge location
Of 10 interdisciplinary team care interventions,￿ve (50%) reduced complications of care.18 Three
of those ￿ve harnessed input from infectious diseases specialists or specialist nurses (Soifer
et al., 1998; Fine et al., 2003; Korbkitjaroen et al., 2011). Both studies that reported preventable
adverse events suggested improvement, either through embedding pharmacists in the clinical
team (Kucukarslan et al., 2003) or formalising interdisciplinary rounds (O’Leary et al., 2011a).
Four of the ￿ve interventions that showed reduced complications of care were rated high
intensity (Soifer et al., 1998; Kucukarslan et al., 2003; Korbkitjaroen et al., 2011; O’Leary et
al., 2011a), but there was no apparent relationship between high-intensity categorisation and
reduced complications (  2 = 0.476; p = 0.49). Zero of seven interventions successfully reduced
the need for institutional care after discharge; four of those seven were rated high intensity
(Webster et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2002; Mudge et al., 2006; Wald et al., 2011).
16Solomon et al., 2001; Cole et al., 2002; Kucukarslan et al., 2003; Dey et al., 2005; Mannheimer et al., 2006; Mudge et
al., 2006; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Camins et al., 2009; Lisby et al., 2010; Manuel et al., 2010; Desan et al., 2011; Korbkitjaroen
et al., 2011; Schillig et al., 2011; Wald et al., 2011; Esparza et al., 2013; Lesprit et al., 2013
17Curley et al., 1998; Soifer et al., 1998; Kircher et al., 2007; Lai et al., 2009; Makowsky et al., 2009; O’Leary et al.,
2010; O’Leary et al., 2011a; O’Leary et al., 2011b; Auerbach et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2012; Saint et al., 2013
18Soifer et al., 1998; Fine et al., 2003; Kucukarslan et al., 2003; Korbkitjaroen et al., 2011; O’Leary et al., 2011a
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3.4.5 Length of stay
Saint et al. (2013) documented signi￿cant secular reductions in length of stay. In this context,
16 of 23 interventions (70%) had no e￿ect on the length of stay;19 ￿ve of 23 (22%) reduced the
length of stay;20 and one (4%) may have increased the length of stay (Makowsky et al., 2009).
A study that associated clinical librarian input with increased length of stay was too heavily
confounded by patient group di￿erences to support this conclusion, as acknowledged by its
authors (Esparza et al., 2013).
Four of ￿ve e￿ective interventions (80%) incorporated subspecialist input to the primary
general medical ward team (Webster et al., 1999; Camins et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2009; Desan et al.,
2011). Again, four of ￿ve e￿ective interventions were of high intensity (Webster et al., 1999;
Curley et al., 1998; Lai et al., 2009; Desan et al., 2011), without a signi￿cant overall correlation
between intensity and e￿ect on length of stay (  2 = 1.433; p = 0.49).
Of the studies that failed to demonstrate a statistically signi￿cant change in length of stay,
nine of 16 (56%) reported increased length of stay with their intervention.21. Singh et al. (2012)
explained how this result could be an unintended consequence of localisation interventions.
However, the exploratory quantitative summary did not detect a signi￿cant change in length
of stay overall. The weighted mean di￿erence in length of stay for interdisciplinary team com-
position interventions was 0.087 (95% CI -0.083 to 0.257). For interdisciplinary team practice
interventions, the weighted mean di￿erence in length of stay was 0.001 (95% CI -0.035 - 0.037)
[￿gure 3.2].
19Solomon et al., 2001; Cole et al., 2002; Fine et al., 2003; Mudge et al., 2006; Pitkälä et al., 2006; O’Leary et al.,
2010; Korbkitjaroen et al., 2011; O’Leary et al., 2011b; Wald et al., 2011; Auerbach et al., 2012; Saint et al., 2013
20Curley et al., 1998; Webster et al., 1999; Camins et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2009; Desan et al., 2011
21Cole et al., 2002; Pitkälä et al., 2006; Lisby et al., 2010; Manuel et al., 2010; O’Leary et al., 2010; O’Leary et al.,
2011b; Wald et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2012; Saint et al., 2013
Figure 3.2: E￿ect of ITC interventions on length of stay
The ￿gure’s exploratory analysis indicates no signi￿cant e￿ect of interdisciplinary team care interventions on length
of stay. This was the case for each of the two subcategories: interventions altering interdisciplinary team composition
(ITC-C; weighted mean di￿erence 0.087; 95% CI -0.083 - 0.257) and interventions altering interdisciplinary team
practice (ITC-P; weighted mean di￿erence 0.001; 95% CI -0.035 - 0.037).
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3.4.6 Readmissions and use of outpatient care
Twelve of 15 interventions (80%) did not reduce readmissions. One study (7%) reported readmis-
sions at seven days (Saint et al., 2013); eight studies (53%) reported readmissions at 30 days;22
￿ve studies (33%) reported readmissions at points between 60 days and six months;23 and one
study (7%) reported readmissions at one year (Kircher et al., 2007). One study reported both
three- and six-month readmissions (Makowsky et al., 2009).
One of three infectious disease interventions (33%) reduced 60-day readmissions related
to relapsing infection (Lesprit et al., 2013); the other two similar interventions did not a￿ect
readmissions, albeit when measured at 30 days (Solomon et al., 2001; Fine et al., 2003). One
of four pharmacy interventions reduced admissions (at three months), although the e￿ect had
dissipated by six months (Makowsky et al., 2009).
Zero of six interdisciplinary team practice interventions reduced readmissions.24 One study
suggested reduced readmissions after localising teams and introducing service census limits, but
the results did not meet the prede￿ned statistical threshold allowing for multiple comparisons
(Thanarajasingam et al., 2012). Increased readmissions in the study by Esparza et al. (2013) were
again attributed to confounding factors. Of the two interventions that reduced readmissions,
one was of low intensity (Lesprit et al., 2013) and the other was of high intensity (Makowsky
et al., 2009).
An exploratory analysis showed interdisciplinary team care interventions had an incon-
sistent e￿ect on early readmissions. Team composition interventions tended to increase early
readmissions, albeit with important confounding factors in the included studies: weighted risk
ratio (RR) 1.341 (95% CI 1.120 - 1.607). Team practice interventions did not signi￿cantly reduce
early readmissions: weighted RR 0.995 (95% CI 0.912 - 1.085) [￿gure 3.3].
22Solomon et al., 2001; Fine et al., 2003; Wald et al., 2011; Auerbach et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2012; Thanarajasingam
et al., 2012; Esparza et al., 2013; Saint et al., 2013
23Mannheimer et al., 2006; Mudge et al., 2006; Makowsky et al., 2009; Lisby et al., 2010; Lesprit et al., 2013
24Mudge et al., 2006; Wald et al., 2011; Auerbach et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2012; Thanarajasingam et al., 2012; Saint
et al., 2013
Figure 3.3: E￿ect of ITC interventions on early readmissions
The ￿gure’s exploratory analysis indicates no consistent e￿ect of interdisciplinary team care interventions on
early readmissions. Interdisciplinary team composition interventions (ITC-C) tended to increase early readmissions,
albeit with important confounding factors in the included studies as described in the text (weighted risk ratio [RR]
1.341; 95% CI 1.120 - 1.607). Interdisciplinary team practice interventions (ITC-P) did not signi￿cantly reduce early
readmissions (weighted RR 0.995; 95% CI 0.912 - 1.085).
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Last, one study reported contact with primary health care (ambulatory visits to medical spe-
cialists, family physicians, and the emergency department) (Lisby et al., 2010) and one reported
objective functional measures at 12 months (Kircher et al., 2007). The interdisciplinary team
interventions had no e￿ect on these outcomes.
3.4.7 Mortality
Only one of 15 (7%) studies that reported mortality rate showed a signi￿cant e￿ect at any
time point. Mudge et al. (2006) were the only group to describe a sustained increase in allied
health care professional resourcing (physiotherapy, occupational therapy, social work, dietetics,
and speech therapy) alongside an interdisciplinary structure to make use of those sta￿. Their
intervention was rated high intensity. However, the observed reduction in in-hospital mortality
did not persist at six months.
Team practice interventions tended to reduce early mortality, although only two studies
contributed data: weighted RR 0.665 (95% CI 0.449 - 0.986). Interdisciplinary team composition
interventions did not signi￿cantly reduce early mortality: weighted RR 0.925 (95% CI 0.816 -
1.049) [￿gure 3.4].
3.5 Discussion
This systematic review summarises the e￿ects of ITC interventions on medical wards. For the
￿rst time (to my knowledge), a de￿ned set of exclusion criteria were used to identify relevant
studies with higher quality designs. It was important to stratify the evidence base in this way,
describing these reports separately, given that so much of the ITC literature stems from low
quality, uncontrolled studies. With an increasing emphasis on interdisciplinary care delivery, it
was important to establish the likely true bene￿t of this type of intervention. Additional insight
into the most relevant metrics for medical ward care was also required. I will now highlight the
principal ￿ndings of the review.
Figure 3.4: E￿ect of ITC interventions on early mortality
The ￿gure’s exploratory analysis indicates no signi￿cant reduction in early mortality with interdisciplinary team
composition interventions (ITC-C; weighted risk ratio [RR] 0.925; 95% CI 0.816 - 1.049). The two interdisciplinary
team practice interventions (ITC-P) tended to reduce early mortality (weighted RR 0.665; 95% CI 0.449 - 0.986). The
arrow marker for the study by Webster et al indicates that the 95% CI for the RR (2.167) was out of the range of the
plot.
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3.5.1 Summary of ￿ndings
3.5.1.1 Characteristics of included studies
The majority of the 30 included studies were RCTs (randomised at the patient level), cluster
RCTs (randomised at the level of the physician, team or ward), or non-randomised cluster trials.
They described interventions changing interdisciplinary team composition (the make-up of
the team routinely attending to the patient) and interdisciplinary team practice (the logistics
of how the interdisciplinary team worked together). In contrast to many trials evaluating the
e￿cacy of a drug or device, the studies included here had relatively few exclusion criteria.
Included studies took place in a variety of settings, from safety-net hospitals to large aca-
demic facilities, and across numerous countries with disparate health care systems. The ￿ndings
of this review are therefore generally applicable to a broad range of medical patients interna-
tionally. However, the quality of the available evidence was relatively poor. Despite restricting
the search strategy to higher quality study designs, 77% of the included studies were graded at
high risk of bias, the remainder having a medium risk of bias. Only a minority (23%) accounted
for the clustering of patient results by ward, an important statistical adjustment to reduce the
risk of type 1 (false positive) errors.
3.5.1.2 The objective outcomes used to evaluate medical ward ITC interventions
ITC evaluationsmost commonly chose length of stay, complications of care, in-hospitalmortality
and 30-day readmission rate as their primary outcome measures. Length of stay was the most
popular choice of outcome, identi￿ed in 77% of studies. Most other outcome metrics similarly
described the immediate inpatient period (e.g., in-hospital mortality and complications of care).
However several studies anticipated an e￿ect on post-discharge and even late post-discharge
outcomes, frequently reporting results at time points beyond 30 days.
Outcomes identi￿ed here were used both as the primary target for interventions, and as bal-
ancing measures to evaluate the unintended consequences of interventions with other primary
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aims. Each study reported, on average, 3.1 objective patient outcomes. Only 47% of the stud-
ies adjusted their results for their patients’ characteristics, with a variety of risk adjustment
techniques.
3.5.1.3 The performance of ITC interventions against commonly chosen outcomes
Most ITC interventions do not a￿ect length of stay, readmissions, or mortality rates. There is
some evidence that improvements in interdisciplinary collaboration may reduce preventable
complications of care and adverse events. One study described a signi￿cant contemporaneous
secular reduction in length of stay, which these interventions did not reduce further.
Interdisciplinary interventions con￿ned to the inpatient setting are unlikely to reduce read-
missions, the need for institutional care after discharge, or mortality rates. However, simultan-
eous investments in sta￿ng and team structures may reduce mortality rates in the short term.
Where interventions did report improvement, it appeared that high-intensity delivery was a
necessary pre-requisite, but was not in itself su￿cient, for the desired impact.
3.5.2 Study limitations
The heterogeneity of studies included in this review limited the quantitative analysis, which
could only be described as exploratory. Many of those studies had notable methodological
limitations, increasing their risk of bias. The review also included controlled before-after studies
with only one intervention or control site,which are particularly prone to confounding (E￿ective
Practice and Organisation of Care, 2014). However, this review re￿ected the best published
evidence currently available. Including a su￿ciently broad range of studies is helpful, facilitating
a deeper understanding of context-speci￿c improvement strategies than relying on RCTs alone
(Zwarenstein et al., 2009; Shojania, 2013).
The search strategy may not have been fully sensitive to all relevant articles: only 15%
of retrieved articles were reviewed by more than one author. This is an acceptable degree of
oversight for the ￿eld, particularly as all retrieved articles underwent title and abstract review,
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rather than title review alone. Moreover, the two reviewers were in complete agreement as
to the inclusion of articles for full text review. This suggests that the inclusion and exclusion
criteria were su￿ciently well de￿ned to be applied consistently and reproducibly. There was
no assessment of publication bias or selective reporting, and not all the authors contacted for
further data replied. Given the tendency in QI literature to over-report positive results, this is
unlikely to have substantially a￿ected the review’s overall ￿ndings.
3.5.3 Implications for further work
Study investigators have preferred outcome measures that can be extracted from administrative
data: mortality rates, length of stay, readmission, and so on. Whilst easy to obtain, these have
proved insensitive to changes in care. This is a common failing of administrative data. It is
important to note it here, as ITC interventions were assumed to be e￿ective when judged
against these metrics. Administrators may have relied too heavily on changes in ITC to achieve
reductions in length of stay, for example, neglecting more necessary changes in infrastructure
or sta￿ng. At the same time, the selection of inappropriate metrics may have the unintended
consequence of eroding team function, setting unattainable targets that can demotivate team
members (Mosher and Kaboli, 2015).
More work is needed to de￿ne valid measures of medical ward performance, and a core data
set that all medical ward studies should report (Koroshetz, 2015). The patient perspective on
this issue is explored in chapter 9. It is likely that additional e￿orts will be required to collect
nuanced data, that better re￿ect ward quality. Preventable complications of care, or unnecessary
length of stay, are possible examples of relevant - if resource-intensive - metrics. A modi￿cation
of length of stay (excess length of stay) is used as the primary outcome in the evaluation of a
novel interdisciplinary intervention in chapter 4.
Evidence from other clinical settings also suggests that collaborative, interdisciplinary in-
terventions may not a￿ect patient outcomes (Nielsen et al., 2007; Zwarenstein et al., 2009; Ven,
2012; Weaver et al., 2013; Reames et al., 2015). These negative results underscore the importance
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of appropriate study design: ￿ndings from higher quality studies in this ￿eld di￿er from the
conclusions of a broader evidence base. The selection criteria of systematic reviews play a key
role: more permissive criteria may generate very di￿erent conclusions (Bhamidipati et al., 2016).
Investigators and reviewers should place greater emphasis on the choice of an appropriate
evaluation methodology. Health service research could make greater use of the stepped wedge
trial design,which has several pragmatic and statistical advantages over other approaches (Hem-
ming et al., 2015a). However, ITC interventions are - by their nature - complex interventions,
targeting a number of organisational levels withmultiple interacting components, and are poten-
tially di￿cult to implement (Craig et al., 2008). The Medical Research Council recommends that
any assessment of their outcomes should be accompanied by a process evaluation (Moore et al.,
2015). This clari￿es the causal assumptions behind the intervention and how it was delivered
in practice, to examine whether its e￿ects varied with implementation quality. The process
evaluation should extend to an analysis of the implementation context, which may shape the
theory of how the intervention works, in￿uence its outcomes, and be in￿uenced by them in
turn (Moore et al., 2015).
The next chapters apply these lessons to the evaluation of a novel, complex interdisciplinary
intervention. Chapter 4 describes the design of a stepped wedge trial; chapter 5 the application
of quantitative process data to identify varying intervention e￿ectiveness with degrees of im-
plementation; chapter 6 a qualitative analysis of the intervention’s mechanisms of action; and
chapter 7 its implementation context [see 7.1.2 for more theoretical detail on context].
3.5.4 Conclusions
ITC is a cornerstone of modern medical practice, incorporated into standard care. However,
interventions to improve ITC have not proven e￿ective in improving objective outcomes. Pos-
sible contributory factors include ceiling e￿ects (high quality interdisciplinary collaboration at
baseline) (O’Leary et al., 2016), ine￿ective interventions, and insensitive outcome metrics. In
part III, I will describe the design and evaluation of a collaborative interdisciplinary intervention,
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surveillance: a programme theory &
study protocol
4.1 Introduction
I showed in part II [chapters 2 and 3] that strategies to improve medical ward care have not been
underpinned by universally high quality evidence. In particular, ward level interdisciplinary
interventions may not improve patient outcomes, particularly when those interventions are
rigorously evaluated. There are notable exceptions. Some multifaceted improvement strategies,
properly assessed with appropriate study designs, have improved outcomes (Beckett et al., 2013;
McAlister et al., 2014). However, these wide-ranging interventions may require substantial
organisational change, which is a barrier to their wider dissemination. A simpler intervention
with wider applicability is required, together with a su￿ciently comprehensive evaluation to
support its adoption outside of the trial setting.
The work described in this chapter has been published as: Pannick S, Beveridge I, Ashra￿an H, Long SJ, Ath-
anasiou T, Sevdalis N. A stepped wedge, cluster controlled trial of an intervention to improve safety and quality on
medical wards: the HEADS-UP study protocol. BMJ Open. 2015; 5:e007510. DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2014-007510
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Earlier, I noted that a limited number of interventions have sought to improve foundational
aspects ofward care, rather than themanagement of speci￿c clinical conditions [see 1.2.5.1]. This
is an attractive approach, if largely unproven. Here, I develop a novel intervention to augment
one underpinning facet of ward work: the use of frontline sta￿ knowledge to improve care
quality. I begin by considering why frontline knowledge of service provision is so important,
and some of the barriers to the e￿ective escalation and use of sta￿ concerns. I then develop
a programme theory of how a ward-level intervention could better translate this frontline
knowledge into improved processes and patient outcomes. Finally, I describe the piloting of the
intervention, and a study protocol to more de￿nitively assess its impact.
4.2 Aims
The principal aims of this chapter are:
(i) To develop an interdisciplinary intervention to improve the use of frontline sta￿ know-
ledge, with a programme theory for its e￿ects;
(ii) To pilot the intervention, and establish its feasibility; and
(iii) To describe a study protocol for the structured implementation and evaluation of the
intervention in two institutions.
4.3 Frontline ward sta￿: an important, underused, source of in-
formation
4.3.1 Frontline re￿ections on care delivery correlate with patient survival
Frontline sta￿ are the clinical and non-clinical employees who are directly involved in the
delivery of ward care and its operational support. They are a relatively untapped source of
information about their own organisation and the e￿ectiveness of its procedures and processes.
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Few tools systematically capture sta￿ knowledge to successfully improve clinical and opera-
tional processes (Stavropoulou et al., 2015). Centralised incident reporting systems, for example,
have major failings, and physicians as a group do not engage with them (Farley et al., 2008;
Shojania, 2008). Other strategies are required to detect and address problems (Olsen et al., 2007).
E￿orts to capitalise on the frontline experience of daily care delivery will be worthwhile.
Sta￿ perceptions correlate with ‘hard’ outcomes, including patient survival and measures of
‘harm-free’ care (Tvedt et al., 2014; Lawton et al., 2015). Eliciting these perceptions might itself
facilitate positive change: organisations that deliberately seek out discom￿ting insights, con-
sciously listening to their sta￿, develop more holistic improvement strategies (Dixon-Woods
et al., 2014a).
4.3.2 Frontline sta￿ default to ￿rst-order problem solving, hindering organ-
isational improvement
From an organisational viewpoint, barriers to the delivery of high quality care often remain hid-
den. Sta￿ do not typically volunteer information about lapses in care quality, nor the problems
they encounter that hinder the delivery of high quality care. Operational issues are common-
place, but the vast majority of them are immediately addressed at the frontline, the sta￿member
￿nding a way to compensate for the problem and complete the task that had been blocked or
interrupted. Tucker and Edmondson (2003) describe this as ￿rst-order problem solving, i.e.,
generating short-term remedies that are successful at the time but do nothing to prevent the
problem’s recurrence. First-order problem solving is encouraged by an organisational emphasis
on individual vigilance (encouraging each professional to independently resolve problems as
they arise), few slack resources for quality improvement, and the progressive separation of
managers from frontline work (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). In contrast, second-order prob-
lem solving involves additional behaviours to address the underlying causes of the problem,
and facilitate organisational improvement. This may involve communicating with the depart-
ment responsible, escalating the concern, sharing ideas for its resolution, and implementing
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and verifying process changes. Second-order problem solving behaviours are much rarer.
As a result, 7%-14% of each nursing shift is lost to system failures that could have been
addressed (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003; Tucker, 2004; Tucker et al., 2014). To date, there has
been little focus on the concerns that trouble frontline sta￿: local managers and national safety
initiatives have turned their attention elsewhere (Tucker et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2009). In short,
sta￿ are discouraged from raising important operational concerns, both by counterproductive
organisational values and the deliberate prioritisation of other issues.
4.3.3 Collating team experiences, rather than individual reports, may be be-
ne￿cial
Conceptualising frontline experiences as team knowledge, rather than individuals’ insights,
might be a more helpful approach. This reframing could guide novel e￿orts to capture data,
with the development of team-wide interventions. Importantly, it might also give those data
su￿cient authority to motivate change at higher organisational levels, where ‘validating’ any
one individual’s perceptions of care is seen as a major challenge (Martin et al., 2015).
Teams gathered together already identify numerous quality and safety issues, in the course
of existing ward rounds and interdisciplinary meetings (Andrews et al., 1997; Lamba et al.,
2014). Improvement interventions could take advantage of these existing fora. Alternatively,
innovations can deliberately engage whole teams in new schemes to identify recurrent problems
(Sujan et al., 2011; Lear et al., 2013). These initiatives di￿er from ‘team huddles’ that formalise
shift-by-shift risk monitoring, which protect the patients at hand, without necessarily recording
problems or preventing their recurrence (Brady et al., 2013; Goldenhar et al., 2013).
Observational reports have described how embedded observers can work with interdis-
ciplinary teams to facilitate rapid identi￿cation and review of potential adverse events. This
has been termed ‘prospective clinical surveillance’ (Andrews et al., 1997; Forster et al., 2006;
Forster et al., 2008; Forster et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2015). Prospective clinical surveillance can
be understood as a way to engage frontline sta￿ in formally recording their routine experiences
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of care delivery and its consequences, with a structure to support data capture. It may prompt
teams to go beyond a simple formal recognition of problems, galvanising them to ameliorate
defects in near-real time (Thomas, 2015). However, this strategy has never been evaluated in a
controlled trial, nor linked to improved patient outcomes (Forster et al., 2011). The requirement
for multiple external observers is also likely to impede wider implementation: a more frugal
strategy is required.
Frontline teams may be able to accurately detect and report hazards without an observer.
Structured team self-report captures the majority of major errors documented by a trained
observer, at least in the operating room (Mason et al., 2013). Without a structure, teams recognise
a much smaller proportion of errors, and even those that are recognised are not captured in the
medical record or in incident reports.
4.4 Prospective clinical team surveillance: a programme theory
I have described how sta￿ perceptions of care challenges correlate with patient outcomes, yet
there are systemic incentives for sta￿ to use only ￿rst-order problem solving, and organisations
are poorly oriented to frontline clinicians’ concerns. Observational reports suggested that a
team-wide focus on problem identi￿cation andmitigationmight change this, and could generate
data to be taken up for organisational improvement. An intervention to promote this e￿ective
team approach was then developed, with a theoretical grounding.
QI interventions, particularly complex interventions [see 3.5.3], should be informed by the-
ory - in both their development and evaluation. This theory need not be abstract: a programme
theory is a deliberately practical, accessible framework, speci￿c to each QI intervention. It de-
scribes the components of the intervention, its expected outcomes, and how those outcomes will
be assessed, often in a logic model or driver diagram (Davido￿ et al., 2015). A driver diagram be-
gins with a clearly de￿ned goal, identi￿es the high-level factors believed to have a direct impact
on it, and subdivides those factors into underpinning goals (i.e., ‘drivers’) that help de￿ne the
114 Prospective clinical team surveillance: a programme theory & study protocol
actions to be taken (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2013). The driver diagram
for the novel complex intervention in this study is shown later in the chapter [￿gure 4.1]. The
programme theory should also make clear the rationale and assumptions about the interven-
tion’s mechanisms (i.e., its ‘theory of change’), in a narrative that links its inputs to outcomes.
The full programme theory incorporates the description of the intervention’s components, and
the narrative about structures, behaviours and processes that are needed to ‘achieve the aims
and actions of the intervention’ (Davido￿ et al., 2015). Importantly, the programme theory also
begins the process of evaluation, by de￿ning what is to be tested, and suggesting how best that
testing might be carried out (Parry et al., 2013). A comprehensive programme theory therefore
promotes clarity about the intervention, its mechanisms of action, its key outcomes, and the
measurement tools and analytical approaches that will be used to evaluate it (Davido￿ et al.,
2015).
In this section of the chapter, I outline the programme theory for an interdisciplinary team
intervention, navigating ￿rst its components and then its proposed mechanisms of action.
4.4.1 Prospective clinical teamsurveillance: structured interdisciplinary team
brie￿ngs, facilitated escalation, and feedback
As described above, structured team self-report is feasible in a clinical microsystem, and suf-
￿ciently accurate to capture a majority of the problems documented by an external observer
(Mason et al., 2013). To foster second-order problem solving and organisational improvement,
a system for e￿ective team self-report should:
(i) promote the unassisted identi￿cation of safety concerns by frontline sta￿;
(ii) motivate them to resolve unit-level issues within their control;
(iii) record frontline successes and challenges to build a richer understanding of safety and
resilience; and
(iv) engage leadership in attending to frontline concerns.
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Such a system might achieve these goals by supplementing autonomous, structured front-
line brie￿ngs for self-report, with facilitated escalation and feedback of the issues they identi￿ed
[box 4.1]. I described this system as prospective clinical team surveillance (PCTS), emphasising
its reliance on frontline teams - rather than an external observer - for primary data collec-
tion. With no requirement for an external observer in each area, improvement resource was
assigned instead to a single facilitator who then coordinated escalation and feedback. As the
driver diagram shows, improvements in interdisciplinary team care e￿ectiveness would then
be brought about by parallel improvements in ward teams’ function and incremental support
service improvements responding to their concerns [￿gure 4.1].
Box 4.1 Prospective clinical team surveillance
Prospective clinical team surveillance (PCTS) is the identi￿cation of recent clinical and ad-
ministrative challenges a￿ecting frontline care delivery, using a structured brie￿ng for team
self-report.
Issues raised at the team brie￿ng may be amenable to immediate intervention, or may require
a more detailed assessment with input from other departments. A facilitator summarises the
brie￿ng results for dissemination within the organisation, and coordinates follow-up and feed-
back.
Each of the three components of the intervention - interdisciplinary brie￿ngs, facilitated
escalation, and feedback - is discussed in turn.
4.4.1.1 The HEADS-UP brie￿ng
Designed to be used on adult medical wards, the Hospital Event Analysis Describing Signi￿cant
Unanticipated Problems (HEADS-UP) brie￿ng focused on the clinical and administrative prob-
lems most commonly identi￿ed in these areas, as described in a large, observational European
study (Lubberding et al., 2011) [￿gure 4.2]. The brie￿ng was developed with frontline clinical
sta￿ between October 2013 and November 2013 [see 4.4.4], in which time additional pertinent























Figure 4.1: Prospective clinical team surveillance driver diagram
Increasingly e￿ective interdisciplinary team care might be achieved through improvements in information sharing and problem solving within the ward team,
allied with organisational responses to ward concerns. These will be driven by structured team (HEADS-UP) brie￿ngs, with ward-level feedback, organisational
feedback and facilitation.
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sta￿ had noted on their wards. Brie￿ngs could be led by any member of the interdisciplinary
team, regardless of seniority or role. Indeed, rotating leadership was encouraged, to embed
HEADS-UP in routine practice.
As a result of early feedback from clinicians, a checklist-style pro forma provided the brie￿ng
structure, reducing the time taken for its completion. A visual format similar to theWorldHealth
Organisation’s surgical safety checklist (World Health Organisation, 2014b) was adopted. The
earliest versions of the pro forma [￿gure 4.3] underwent numerous iterations before arriving
at the ￿nal design [￿gure 4.4]1. The brie￿ngs ended with prompts for the team to resolve, or
escalate, the concerns that they have discussed. These prompts were developed with feedback
from both clinical sta￿ and governance teams. Ward teams could adapt their brie￿ngs, whilst
retaining the same overall format. Similar ￿exibility has been recommended in other QI work
(Bosk et al., 2009; World Health Organisation, 2014b).
4.4.1.2 Facilitated escalation of HEADS-UP-identi￿ed concerns
Facilitation advanced the issues raised in the HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, helping to translate HEADS-
UP-identi￿ed concerns into tangible organisational changes. In a recent update to the Promoting
Action on Research implementation in Health Services (PARiHS) framework, facilitation was
recognised as a key component of successful improvement e￿orts. It is the construct that ‘ac-
tivates implementation through assessing and responding to characteristics of the innovation
and the recipients (both as individuals and in teams), within their contextual setting’ (Harvey
and Kitson, 2016). Facilitation is not merely an active element of implementation, but is itself
a complex intervention, aligning and integrating the innovation, its recipients and its context
(Harvey and Kitson, 2016).
Facilitation requires both a role (the facilitator) and a set of strategies and actions (the
facilitation process); it is necessarily opportunistic and malleable, taking advantage of existing
organisational levers and ￿nding co-enthusiasts. Here, it involved (for example) working with
1The ￿nal design was produced with Matthew Harrison, Senior Designer at the HELIX Centre, a joint venture






















Figure 4.2: Categories of unintended events on medical wards, impacting negatively on patient
care (after Lubberding et al., 2011)
The HEADS-UP Study: 
Hospital Event Analysis Describing 
Significant Unanticipated Problems 
	
  





WERE THERE CONCERNS ABOUT: 
 
STAFFING LEVELS? 









SERVICES? (and how long was the delay?)  
 
☐ Phlebotomy ……………………………. 
 
☐ Echo ………………………………… 
 
☐ Radiology    ☐ USS      ☐ CT        ☐ MRI 
 




☐ In-patient reviews 
☐ Delayed      ☐ Too junior    Team:  .……………. 





☐ No concern  
NAME + ROLE:    ……………  TEAM MEMBERS PRESENT       WARD:  ……………………….. 
      .....................  Ward staff: ☐ Physio ☐  OT  ☐ Nurse  ☐ Pharmacist 
DATE:      /      /       Doctors:     ☐ F1  ☐ F2  ☐ CT  ☐ SpR  ☐ Consultant    ☐ Research SpR   	








NEW HOSPITAL-ACQUIRED INFECTION? 
 
☐  UTI     ☐ Pneumonia   ☐ C.diff     ☐ MRSA 
 
☐  Pressure ulcer   ☐No concern 
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☐  Day  ☐  Night 
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Figure 4.4: Late iteration of HEADS-UP pro forma
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frontline teams to identify and document their areas of concern more e￿ectively; championing
those concerns in meetings with service leaders and safety committees; and following up on
subsequent agreed actions when other priorities threatened resolution. Other studies that have
used a facilitator in a similar way have described the facilitator as an ‘animateur’, bringing on
board people over whom he has no direct managerial authority (Checkland et al., 2012; Moore
and Buchanan, 2013). Detailed advice on operationalising facilitation for future improvement
e￿orts is now available (Kitson and Harvey, 2015).
4.4.1.3 Feedback
Feedback was delivered to participating ward teams, to their managers, and to senior executives.
The feedback summarised and disseminated the information collected in the daily brie￿ngs,
highlighting HEADS-UP performance in each area, common concerns and challenges, poten-
tial opportunities for improvement, and recurrent or unresolved problems that might require
additional support. HEADS-UP data were provided on request to service leads, to support
their business planning. System changes arising from HEADS-UP were publicised, e.g., in ex-
isting departmental meetings, and via email and posters. Wherever possible, feedback delivery
was timely, focused on solution-￿nding, signposted to relevant resources, and adopted a non-
judgmental approach. These have been cited as characteristics of e￿ective feedback delivery
(Reynolds et al., 2016). Where teams provided more detail in their HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, feed-
back could be more speci￿c, with clinical teaching sessions on topics identi￿ed as problematic.
Although feedback modes (email, posters, clinical presentations, etc.) remained the same, style
and content naturally evolved throughout the study period. Facilitation and feedback were
targeted to participating clinicians; mid-level and senior hospital leadership; unit- and division-
level quality meetings; and safety governance committees. Both facilitation and feedback were
provided by an embedded clinical researcher [see 4.4.2].
Cycles of e￿ective brie￿ngs, feedback and facilitation were intended to bolster meaning-
ful implementation of HEADS-UP brie￿ngs at ward level. In turn, this would progressively
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strengthen the programme’s impact on incremental ward-level changes, and garner greater or-
ganisational support. Although described separately for the purposes of this programme theory,
the intervention’s components can be understood as interlinked [￿gure 4.5].
4.4.2 Embedded research model
The intervention was delivered by a clinician with joint academic and clinical commitments at
the site contributing the majority of HEADS-UP wards2. The academic component to the role
made up a 0.75 full time equivalent. A key characteristic of this intervention, therefore, was
‘embedded research’. McGinity and Salokangas proposed a de￿nition for this type of endeavour:
‘Embedded researchers are de￿ned as those who work inside host organisations as
members of sta￿, while also maintaining an a￿liation with an academic institution.
Their task is seen as collaborating with teams within the organisation to identify,
design and conduct research studies and share ￿ndings which respond to the needs
of the organisation, and accord with the organisation’s unique context and culture.’
(McGinity and Salokangas, 2014)
Other important features of embedded research include the relationships between sta￿ and
the researcher, who is seen as part of the team, and the role of the researcher in contributing
to the research capacity of the host organisation (Vindrola-Padros et al., 2016). Characterising
the intervention as embedded research is important, because it illuminates various elements of
context [see 7.1.2]. First, the appointment of a clinical research fellow represented a signi￿cant
new investment in QI sta￿ng for the medical department contributing most wards (albeit one
partially paid for with clinical shifts). Senior managers were involved in the negotiation to
establish the post, and therefore retained an interest in seeing it produce something of value.
The research fellow’s ongoing clinical work maintained links with the frontline teams imple-
2The clinician was a clinical research fellow atmedical registrar grade (i.e., a sub-consultant,middle-grade doctor),
with specialty experience in gastroenterology and internal medicine. The clinician was in a full-time clinical role at
















Figure 4.5: Interlinked intervention components
A virtuous cycle links the intervention components described in the programme theory.
Changes arising from the programme would motivate increasing engagement with the
frontline brie￿ngs, in turn increasing their ability to bring about change.
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menting the intervention. This promoted a sense of local ownership of the intervention, rather
than a feeling that it was externally imposed. Second, the post embodied a formal link with the
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Imperial Patient Safety Translational Research
Centre. Through this link it enhanced the research capacity of the hospital. The ￿nancial in-
vestment in, and research engagement with, the programme stimulated local interest in seeing
it meaningfully implemented.
4.4.3 Proposed mechanisms of action
I hypothesised that PCTS would improve the sharing and use of data within frontline teams,
and between those teams and the wider organisation. Information may not be shared within
healthcare teams for a variety of clinical and non-clinical reasons (Kennedy et al., 2009; Black-
man et al., 2013). Introduction of PCTS would empower junior clinicians to voice their concerns,
improving their teams’ situational awareness - itself an important factor in mitigating risks
(Brady et al., 2013). This would lead to improvement in units’ safety and teamwork climates.
With earlier team recognition of deteriorating patients, the process of escalation of care would
be eased. Information generated by ward teams would inform their own practice, and prompt
downstream service reorganisation. The combination of ward and support service improve-
ments would ultimately improve clinical outcomes, with a dose-response relationship. Lastly,
an explicit focus on team-wide recognition of adverse events would improve engagement with
existing incident-reporting systems, with an increase in formally reported incidents.
Three speci￿c mechanisms of action were proposed to underpin these anticipated changes:
an increase in second-order problem solving, the generation of psychological safety, and in-
creased managerial attention to operational failures.
4.4.3.1 Increased second-order problem solving and psychological safety
In order to increase second-order problem solving by frontline sta￿, managers should increase
their availability during shifts, increasing the likelihood of their being informed of problems
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(Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). They should also create a psychologically safe work environ-
ment, in which team members can express their concerns and admit their own errors (Tucker
and Edmondson, 2003; Tucker, 2007). This may be more important for frontline system improve-
ment than the e￿orts of highly motivated individuals (Tucker, 2007).
PCTS was intended to make second-order problem solving the default mode for problem
resolution, rather than the exception. Although not directly impacting on the time managers are
available, it would e￿ectively increase the chance of their being informed of any problems, by
providing a structured mechanism for that information transfer to occur. Structured brie￿ngs
explicitly required that problems should be recognised as common and pervasive, not deemed
rare indicators of personal failings. This would establish the psychological safety required for
improvement.
4.4.3.2 Increased managerial attention to operational failures
PCTS also reinforced the need for managers to address common operational problems. Ordinar-
ily, frontline workers ‘do not control the organisational processes responsible for the majority
of failures they encounter, and have a di￿cult task convincing managers that they warrant res-
olution’ (Tucker, 2004). Systematic collation of these problems would support frontline sta￿ in
their requests for managerial help. Successfully resolving operational issues is likely to improve
both safety and e￿ciency, in contrast to the perceived trade-o￿s between them (Tucker et al.,
2008). With local evidence of this, managers would then be more willing to help resolve future
issues.
4.4.4 Pilot implementation
HEADS-UP brie￿ngs were piloted on one gastroenterology ward at a district general hospital,
over a 6 week period (October-November 2013). The brie￿ngs were initially led by a clinical re-
search fellow [see 4.4.2], to explain the programme’s intentions, demonstrate an ‘ideal’ brie￿ng,
and prompt feedback about how it might be improved. Leadership of the brie￿ngs was then
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delegated to ward sta￿, at ￿rst with direct observation (with feedback to the brie￿ng leader)
and then unsupervised.
When led by a clinician, the HEADS-UP brie￿ng typically took between ￿ve and eight
minutes to complete. Clinical teams’ use of the tool was deliberately unsupervised for the
latter half of the pilot period, to gauge whether it was suitably concise and relevant to be
used in practice without the researcher being present. The HEADS-UP brie￿ng was completed
unsupervised on 80% of working days. Taken together, these data suggested that a formal
HEADS-UP trial was feasible.
4.5 The HEADS-UP trial: study design and setting
HEADS-UP (the operationalisation of PCTS, with HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, facilitation and feed-
back) was evaluated in a prospective stepped wedge, cluster controlled trial. The primary aim
of the study was to assess the impact of HEADS-UP on clinically relevant patient outcomes.
The secondary aim was to explore how changes in patient outcomes, if any, were mediated by
changes in workplace climate and ward processes.
Stepped wedge study designs involve the sequential introduction of the intervention to each
of the clusters (in this case, wards) over time. Clusters progressively moved from the control
group to the intervention group [￿gure 4.6]. The staged implementation in a stepped wedge
design is particularly helpful when simultaneous roll-out of an intervention to all clusters is
impractical, e.g., because of logistical constraints, as was the case here. This trial design is
typically used to evaluate interventions whose e￿ects are predicted to be more bene￿cial than
harmful (Mdege et al., 2011). Stepped wedge designs are increasingly used to test interventions
in acute care (Fuller et al., 2012; Kitson et al., 2013; Poldervaart et al., 2013; Pearse, 2014).
The order in which clusters received the intervention here was guided by logistical re-
strictions, and to some extent the de facto recognition of clinicians enthusiastic to introduce









































Figure 4.6: Stepped wedge cluster design in the HEADS-UP trial
New ward clusters introduced HEADS-UP brie￿ngs at two-month intervals. After discussion
with senior sta￿ about the optimum timing of implementation in their units, two wards joined
the intervention group in April 2014, and another two in August 2014.
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gical and obstetric safety checklists, advocate this approach (World Health Organisation, 2014b;
World Health Organisation, 2016). Although cluster randomisation (randomising the order in
which the clusters receive the intervention) might have been preferable, it was deemed im-
portant to recognise the impact of willing early adopters, who could lead their colleagues in
rigorously implementing the intervention (Ham et al., 2002; Wilson, 2006; Frankel et al., 2008).
In the event, unanticipated sta￿ng changes, such as early retirements and maternity leave,
limited the participation of these early adopters, and implementation order was determined
primarily by logistical restraints. HEADS-UP brie￿ngs were introduced to clusters of wards at
two-monthly intervals [see ￿gure 4.6].
4.5.1 Setting
The study was conducted at two sites in London, UK. The ￿rst was a university-associated
district general hospital. Clusters from this site were generated from the acute admissions
and downstream medical (gastroenterology, respiratory and geriatric) wards. Each cluster com-
prised clinical areas that were physically linked, served by the same medical team, or both.
This helped to limit contamination between groups. The second site was an academic hospital,
where HEADS-UP was implemented on a geriatric ward [see table 5.1].
4.5.2 Implementation
Support for the study was sought from senior clinicians and executives with responsibility for
clinical quality, safety and risk management at each site. The intervention was introduced to
clinicians and managers with regard to their work￿ow, opportunities for feedback and learning,
and monitoring of implementation ￿delity.
4.5.2.1 Introduction to ward teams
Presentations to each clinical team publicised the intervention prior to its introduction. Inter-
disciplinary ward teams were asked to use HEADS-UP brie￿ngs on a daily basis during the
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normal working week (Monday to Friday). Sta￿ng and service provision were signi￿cantly
reduced out of hours, and it was not thought practical to incorporate a HEADS-UP brie￿ng at
night or at weekends within those constraints. The initial HEADS-UP brie￿ngs in each unit
was supervised by the research fellow, but rapidly delegated to the clinical team. The presence
of a researcher was documented when appropriate.
4.5.2.2 Work￿ow change
To maximise clinical engagement with this intervention, teams’ existing working patterns were
disrupted as little as possible: they used HEADS-UP wherever it ￿tted most naturally into their
existing schedule. This was ordinarily early in the day. No protected time was available for
HEADS-UP training, but the ideal format for each brie￿ngwas discussed in departmental rounds,
team meetings and with participating clinicians.
4.5.2.3 Feedback and learning
The information shared during the daily HEADS-UP brie￿ngs prompted a degree of re￿ective
practice and immediate learning. In addition, a regular summary of the HEADS-UP events
recorded from their clinical area was given to each team. The format of this feedback again
depended on the team’s existing schedule; where possible, it was incorporated into existing
departmental educational or governance meetings, to place it in the appropriate context and
minimise any additional time commitments. This feedback emphasised the ongoing impact of
the information gathered during the HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, highlighting any subsequent quality
improvement work or changes to support services.
HEADS-UP summaries were also shared with the governance committees responsible for
the issues raised. Clinicians and managers already accountable for quality and safety in these
clinical areas were expected to use the information appropriately to guide resource allocation,
and make changes to routine processes or procedures as they saw ￿t. No speci￿c guidance was
issued as to how the HEADS-UP data should be used. However, signi￿cant safety concerns and
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adverse events raised through HEADS-UP brie￿ngs were emphasised to the responsible clinical
team or governance body, in order that they could take appropriate action. The need for this
proviso was emphasised by peer reviewers of the published study protocol (Pannick et al., 2015).
4.5.2.4 Fidelity assessment
The ￿delity of HEADS-UP implementation was evaluated primarily through the completed
brie￿ng pro formas, which recorded the team members present, number and type of concerns
raised, and the decisions taken as a result. A narrative diary, describing the qualitative impact
of HEADS-UP, as well as the downstream QI work and service changes arising from it, com-
plemented the quantitative outcomes. The narrative account also recorded the observation of a
number of HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, and the extent to which they held true to the perceived ideal
in terms of participants, timeliness, focus and intent.
4.5.3 Study population
The study focused on adult medical patients admitted to study wards between 2013 and 2015.
To isolate the e￿ect of the intervention, patient-level exclusion criteria included:
• Time spent on the speci￿ed ward comprising less than 50% of the total inpatient stay;
• Discharge to a new skilled care facility or other hospital (i.e., not the patient’s address
at the time of admission. Discharge to a new facility typically incurs substantial delays,
outside of the ward team’s control.);
• Multiple intra-hospital ward transfers. A single transfer from the initial admissions unit
to a downstream medical ward was permitted. One further transfer to an escalation area
to facilitate discharge (whereby the patient spends less than 24 hours in the escalation
area immediately prior to their discharge home) was also permitted;
• Admission to the high dependency unit or intensive care unit;
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• Elective admission or direct admission from another hospital; and
• Surgeon-directed care for more than 24 hours during the inpatient stay.
4.5.4 Study outcomes & hypothesis testing
The primary study outcome was excess length of stay (eLOS): a surplus stay of 24 hours or more,
compared to local peer institutions’ Healthcare Resource Group (HRG)-predicted length of stay3.
The local average HRG-predicted length of stay was generated with data from four other nearby
hospitals, broadly subject to the same community service restrictions and healthcare economy
demands. Secondary outcomes were:
• 30-day readmission;
• a composite of in-hospital death or death/readmission within 30 days of discharge;
• complications of care (hospital-acquired infections and pressure ulcers);
• escalation of care (a composite of emergency calls, referrals to the ICU outreach service,
and transfers to the ICU [see 5.3.2]);
• sta￿ engagement with the existing web-based incident reporting system (number, and
type, of incidents reported); and
• safety and teamwork climates (using the relevant subsections of the well-validated Safety
Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2006)).
The selected measures were similar to those used in other studies evaluating the quality of
ward care (Timmermans et al., 2014), and have been assessed in a UK setting where appropriate
(Sexton et al., 2006). Table 4.1 lists how the study’s outcomes tested each of its hypotheses, and
the rationale for their selection. The qualitative impact of the intervention, its implementation,
3HRGs are standard groupings of clinically similar patient events,which use common levels of healthcare resource
(Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2016a).
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and the multilevel barriers and facilitators to its introduction were also assessed through focus
groups and auto-ethnography [described in detail in chapters 6 and 7]. Togetherwith the patient-
and ward-level outcomes described here, they completed a mixed methods analysis of PCTS.
4.5.4.1 Confounding factors
Sta￿ workload and patient casemix were likely to be the two predominant confounding factors
for this non-randomised study. Ward admissions were documented from hospital administration
systems, and sta￿ perceptions of workload assessed periodically with the validated NASA-Task
Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart, 2006). Patient comorbidities were identi￿ed from administrative
data with an updated version of the Charlson comorbidity index (Charlson et al., 1987; Health
and Social Care Information Centre, 2014).
4.5.5 Sample size, power calculation and analysis
Local data from six of the seven anticipated clusters were evaluated. Between 2011 and 2013, a
median of 522 patients matched the inclusion/exclusion criteria each month (range 316–722).
Mean cluster eLOS rates ranged from 5.6% to 51.5%.
Cluster controlled trials require an estimate of the intraclass correlation coe￿cient (ICC);
this is complex, and observed ICCs rarely match their predicted values. ICC estimation should
take into account the results of previous studies, as well as the anticipated numbers of individuals
and clusters in the index study. Greater numbers of individuals in a study reduce the width
of the ICC con￿dence interval, mitigating the e￿ect of a relatively small number of clusters
(Eldridge, 2011).
In addition, clinical outcome measures tend to have lower ICCs than process measures
(Eldridge, 2011). The observed ICC for falls in a multifactorial intervention on elderly care wards
was only 0.007 (Cumming et al., 2008). However, ICCs for length of stay and appropriateness
of stay in trials of inpatient care pathways were an order of magnitude higher (Kul et al., 2014).
For this study, a more conservative ICC estimate of 0.06 was therefore adopted.
Table 4.1: HEADS-UP hypotheses & their corresponding outcomes
Study hypothesis Outcome component(s) Rationale for outcome selection
Incremental improvements to ward care & support
services would improve clinical outcomes
Excess length of stay Length of stay re￿ects e￿cient resource use, and possibly quality of care (Svend-
sen et al., 2009)
eLOS increases study power compared to length of stay, without requiring an
excessive number of wards or data collection period, and may be more likely
to re￿ect interdisciplinary team care [chapter 3]
Mortality Correlates with quality of care (Jha et al., 2007) and may relate to performance
in non-technical skill domains (Curry et al., 2011)
Readmission Need to con￿rm that any improvements in hospital e￿ciency do not come
at the expense of increased medical readmissions, 37% of which are avoidable
(Donze et al., 2013)
Improved situational awareness would mitigate pa-
tient risks
Complications of care These outcomes are appropriate patient safety indicators (Savitz et al., 2005),
reliably reported because of stringent mandated targets (NHS England, 2014a;
NHS England, 2014d)
Earlier team recognition of the deteriorating patient
would facilitate processes underpinning escalation
of care
Escalation of care Multidisciplinary interventions, increasing team situational awareness (Pronov-
ost et al., 2003), may address sta￿ reluctance to appropriately escalate concerns
(Kennedy et al., 2009; McNeill and Bryden, 2013)
Team-wide recognition of adverse events would im-
prove engagement with existing incident reporting
systems
Number & characteristics of in-
cident reports
More reports overall,with a lower contribution from reports of slips & falls, asso-
ciated with more positive safety culture and risk management ratings (Hutchin-
son et al., 2009)
Empowerment of junior clinicians would improve
perceptions of safety & teamwork
Safety & teamwork climate Improved safety climate is associated with organisation-wide reduction in ad-
verse events (Mardon et al., 2010)
SAQ scores have substantial validity evidence, with data for inpatient internal
medicine settings and in the UK. Higher scores have been associated with
improved patient outcomes (Sexton et al., 2006; Havyer et al., 2014)
Abbreviations: eLOS - excess length of stay; SAQ - Safety Attitudes Questionnaire.
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In any case, the power under a stepped wedge cluster randomised trial is relatively insens-
itive to ICC underestimation, compared to a parallel cluster design (Hemming et al., 2015b).
Similarly, stepped wedge trial power is relatively insensitive to variations in the coe￿cient of
variation (Hussey and Hughes, 2007). In the best-case prediction, the coe￿cient of variation
approached the level at which adjusting for variable cluster size has a negligible impact on
sample size, even in parallel cluster trials (Eldridge et al., 2006). No adjustment for coe￿cient
of variation was therefore required.
Given the variation in baseline outcomes in the local data set, I then estimated the study’s
power to detect a one standard deviation reduction in eLOS on the wards with the highest and
lowest baseline outcome rates. With 7840 patients in the trial (560 patients/month), and two-
sided p<0.05, the study would achieve 100% power to detect a 14% absolute risk reduction. At
worst, in the ward with the lowest baseline outcome rate, it would achieve 75% power to detect
a 2.3% absolute risk reduction. The study’s power to detect a 2–14% absolute risk reduction
therefore lay between 75% and 100%. With this complex trial design, statistical uncertainty in
power calculations is not considered unusual. The protocol of a large stepped wedge cluster
randomised trial similarly produced a range within which its power might lie (Pearse, 2014).
Experts also advocate more widespread recognition of the inherent limitations of statistical
power thresholds (Campbell, 2013).
The stepped wedge design compares outcomes in each cluster before and after the intro-
duction of the intervention. Overall di￿erences in outcomes between pre-intervention and
post-intervention periods were calculated. Primary analysis was on an intention-to-treat basis,
with a separate pre-speci￿ed, per-protocol analysis of those units implementing the intervention
with high ￿delity. Analyses used the patient-level data described above, clustered within ‘units’,
using random e￿ects to model the correlation between individuals within the same cluster. Gen-
eralised linear mixed-e￿ects models, and generalised estimating equations, formed the basis of
the analysis (Hussey and Hughes, 2007). The choice between the two mathematical approaches
is discussed in more detail in the next chapter [see 5.3.3.2]. Underlying temporal trends were
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accounted for. No interim analyses were conducted, nor was a formal health economics analysis.
4.5.6 Allocation and blinding
Individual patients were not recruited separately to the study, so there was no anticipation of
signi￿cant bias due to lack of allocation concealment (Hemming and Taljaard, 2016). Sta￿ could
not be blinded to their ward’s assignment. Clinical outcome data and escalation of care data
were extracted by local administrative sta￿ blinded to the study, as part of their ordinary duties.
Hospital peer group data were generated, under existing contracts, by CHKS (Alcester, UK) and
Dr Foster (London, UK), also blinded to intervention group. Implementation data were recorded
from the daily proformas completed by ward teams, before the clinical outcomes in each area
were known.
4.5.7 Data management
Data were extracted directly from hospital administrative systems, with a monthly assessment
by administrative sta￿ to con￿rm their reliability. Where appropriate, anonymised data were
held securely on password-protected hospital intranet systems. Given the nature of the inter-
vention, the time scale of the study, and the extraction of outcomes from existing administrative
systems, no data monitoring committee was required. The summarised trial data set was held
by the clinical research fellow, and disseminated to local clinicians and managers as required
after the study, with no contractual limitations.
4.5.8 Ethical approval
Permission for the study was sought from the relevant Research & Development authority
at each participating institution. Both authorities approved the study as a service develop-
ment initiative not requiring formal ethical evaluation [see appendix B]. The O￿ce for Regu-
latory Compliance at the Imperial College Academic Health Science Centre initially advised
that registration with a clinical trial database would not be required, given the nature of the
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intervention. This decision was reviewed again, and the study was ultimately registered –
prior to completion of data collection – in the ISRCTN registry, identi￿er ISRCTN34806867
(http://www.isrctn.com/ISRCTN34806867).
4.6 Discussion
This stepped wedge, cluster controlled trial assessed the impact of an intervention to improve
quality and safety onmedicalwards. The intervention built on existing observationalwork about
team-wide identi￿cation and management of failures in care delivery. A programme theory
described how the intervention was anticipated to work, making explicit its assumptions, and
generating a framework for evaluation.
The design of the HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, as well as their proposed implementation, inten-
tionally minimised the disparity between the trial setting and daily clinical practice. This was
intended to maximise the study results’ applicability to other healthcare settings. However, the
relatively prolonged data collection period made the study vulnerable to unanticipated changes
in the local healthcare system. There was also a tension between e￿ective programme pro-
motion, essential for adequate sta￿ engagement, and contamination of the control groups. In
addition, downstream interventions arising from the programme could have impacted multiple
wards, regardless of their participation in HEADS-UP brie￿ngs. The narrative record helped to
highlight where this may have been the case, and contextualised the impact of the programme.
In summary, PCTS o￿ered a novel, rapid, whole-team analysis of clinical and administrative
challenges, including adverse events, at ward level. Facilitated organisational feedback aimed to
improve the use of ward-level data in service delivery. This prospective trial aimed to identify
whether PCTS was a useful addition to existing safety systems, with broader lessons for the
implementation of safety and quality interventions in the complex medical ward environment.
In the following chapters, I describe the results of the programme’s mixed methods evaluation,
beginning with its e￿ects on patient outcomes and processes of care.
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Chapter 5
The e￿ect of PCTS on patient
outcomes and processes of care
5.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I proposed a programme theory for PCTS, which was then operationalised
and piloted as the HEADS-UP intervention. HEADS-UP consisted of a daily, structured inter-
disciplinary brie￿ng for medical ward teams, with facilitation and feedback to escalate and
address ward concerns at higher organisational levels. The intervention underwent a mixed
methods evaluation, including quantitative and qualitative analyses, auto-ethnography and
semi-structured focus groups.
The multifaceted evaluation followed the Medical Research Council’s guidance for the
design and testing of complex interventions - interventions that ‘comprise multiple interacting
components, with additional dimensions of complexity including the di￿culty of their imple-
mentation and the number of organisational levels they target’ (Craig et al., 2008; Moore et
al., 2015). This guidance recognises the importance of implementation factors, and context, in
determining the ultimate impact of the intervention. However, it is common practice to ￿rst de-
scribe the quantitative results of a complex intervention, before a full analysis of the extraneous
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factors that in￿uenced them.
I will follow this approach, describing ￿rst the e￿ect of HEADS-UP on di￿erent quantit-
ative patient outcomes and processes of care, particularly in the subgroup of months where
HEADS-UP was implemented with high ￿delity [as speci￿ed in the study protocol - see 4.5.5].
In chapters 6 and 7, there will then follow a more detailed discussion of the environment into
which HEADS-UP was introduced, and how it was implemented.
5.2 Aims
The aims of this chapter are:
(i) To characterise the quantitative use of HEADS-UP during the study period;
(ii) To use di￿erent multi-level modelling techniques to analyse the e￿ect of HEADS-UP on
patient outcomes and processes of care; and
(iii) To use a quantitative measure of ward-level HEADS-UP implementation in a subgroup
analysis.
5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Study design & participating institutions
The intervention, study design, and patient inclusion criteria were described in detail in the last
chapter [see 4.5]. Brie￿y, the HEADS-UP intervention was progressively introduced to seven
wards, from two London hospitals. Characteristics of the participating hospitals are listed in
table 5.1. The study was designed as a stepped wedge, cluster controlled trial. Interdisciplinary
ward teams were assigned to implement the intervention at intervals, such that by the end of the
trial all teams had adopted the intervention and had contributed both control- and intervention-
group data. The order in which wards adopted the intervention was pragmatically guided by
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logistical constraints, as described in previous stepped evaluations (Bion et al., 2013). Baseline
data collection began in August 2013, with introduction of the intervention to newwards at two-
month intervals from December 2013 [see ￿gure 4.6]. Data collection continued until February
2015.
5.3.2 Study outcomes and data collection
The primary outcome of the HEADS-UP trial was eLOS. This was a binary variable, de￿ned
as an admission lasting at least 24 hours longer than the local average for similar patients, as
classi￿ed by their HRGs (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2016a) [see 4.5.4]. The
study was adequately powered even for a small (2%) absolute risk reduction in eLOS [see 4.5.5].
Changes of this magnitude, which are still meaningful for an organisation, may be expected in
interdisciplinary collaborative interventions (Wild et al., 2004; Jenq et al., 2016).
The remaining quantitative outcomes should be regarded as more exploratory. These in-
cluded two patient-level outcomes: (i) 30-day readmission, and (ii) a composite of in-hospital
death or death/readmission within 30 days of discharge. There were also two ward-aggregated
outcomes: (iii) escalation events, and (iv) complications of care. Escalation events comprised re-
ferrals to the ICU outreach service1, patient transfers to the ICU, and emergency calls2. Complica-
tions of care were de￿ned as hospital-attributed pressure ulcers, Clostridium di￿cile (C.di￿cile)
infections, and selected bacteraemias for which there is clinical surveillance3.
1ICU outreach services are teams of senior practitioners with experience in critical care or acute care, facilitating
interventions for deteriorating patients on the general ward. A referral to the ICU outreach service represents a
stepwise escalation of patient care (National Outreach Forum, 2012).
2Emergency calls are calls to a standardised hospital switchboard number, requesting immediate assistance for a
life-threatening emergency. These emergencies include, but are not limited to, cardiac and respiratory arrests. Sta￿
may also use these calls to request assistance in the case of a patient’s rapid, severe physiological deterioration.
3Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), meticillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) and
Escherichia coli (E.coli).
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the participating institutions










Acute medical unit (2)
Gastroenterology / internal
medicine (1)
Heart failure / internal medicine
(1)
Geriatrics (1)









round’, typically focused on pa-
tients’ discharge requirements
Daily interdisciplinary ‘board
round’, typically focused on pa-
tients’ discharge requirements
Online incident reporting sys-
tem












5.3.3.1 Adjustment for clustering
The analysis of stepped wedge trials is a developing area, with little consensus on the best
approach (Eldridge and Kerry, 2012). As with any trial, covariates are incorporated into a re-
gression model appropriate for the dataset (e.g., logistic regression for binary outcomes). Here,
an additional adjustment needs to be made to account for the e￿ect of clustering. Data points
are correlated, not independent: the outcomes of patients treated on the same ward are more
likely to be similar than those of patients on di￿erent wards.
Di￿erent techniques are available to account for clustering. Two conceptually di￿erent ap-
proaches will be discussed: mixed-e￿ects models and generalised estimating equations (GEEs).
Mixed-e￿ects models use cluster-speci￿c models, summarising the response of an individual
over time, i.e., the e￿ect of that patient moving from control arm to intervention arm, whilst re-
maining in the same cluster. GEEs use population-averagedmodels, calculating average changes
in response over time (Eldridge and Kerry, 2012; Ma et al., 2012). Both techniques have advant-
ages over repeated-measures ANOVA, which makes statistical assumptions that are unrealistic
for longitudinal datasets (Ma et al., 2012).
The choice between mixed-e￿ects models and GEEs depends on numerous competing trial
features,which a￿ect the robustness of their results. Their relative advantages and disadvantages
will be outlined brie￿y, as it is prudent to use more than one analytic technique to con￿rm
stepped wedge trial ￿ndings (Eldridge and Kerry, 2012).
5.3.3.2 The relative merits of mixed-e￿ects models vs generalised estimating equa-
tions
Mixed-e￿ects models are so called because they generally contain covariates with ￿xed e￿ects
(those that have the same e￿ect across many patients) and random e￿ects (those that vary
substantially from one patient to the next) (Detry and Ma, 2016). Ward-level variance in patient
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outcomes is represented as a random e￿ect. As with GEEs, mixed-e￿ects models require suf-
￿cient clusters to produce reliable estimates of treatment e￿ects. However, when the number
of clusters is small, as it is here, mixed-e￿ects models are less biased than GEEs (Eldridge and
Kerry, 2012). Primarily for that reason, mixed-e￿ects models will be used for the main analysis,
and GEEs for a secondary analysis.
Mixed-e￿ects models may also be more e￿cient, in that they achieve higher study power
than GEEs, albeit at the expense of higher type I error rates (Ma et al., 2012). Increasing sample
size reduces the relative advantage of GEEs above mixed-e￿ects models in terms of type I
error rates (Ma et al., 2012). An important advantage of GEEs is their tolerance of misspeci￿ed
correlation structures between data points (Overall and Tonidandel, 2004). However, this may
not substantively a￿ect results (Gardiner et al., 2009).
5.3.3.3 De￿nition of HEADS-UP implementation ￿delity
For the per protocol analysis, a quantitative de￿nition of implementation ￿delity was required.
Based on direct observations of HEADS-UP use during the pilot period, the implementation
￿delity for a given month was de￿ned as a combination of brie￿ng frequency and team engage-
ment. A categorical interaction term combining ‘frequency*engagement’ was incorporated into
each statistical model, as well as a dummy code representing the HEADS-UP intervention itself.
Frequency had three categories: high ( 75% working days that month), medium (50-75%), and
low (<50%). Monthly engagement was de￿ned as high (documentation of more than the median
number of monthly issues) or low (below the median).
The interaction term therefore combined brie￿ng frequency and engagement into a single
representative coding of implementation ￿delity. Four categories of implementation ￿delity
(high, moderate, low and poor) could be represented in the data [see table 5.2].








Low Low (<50%) 0 Poor
Medium (50-75%) 0
High ( 75%) 0
High Low (<50%) 1 Low
Medium (50-75%) 2 Moderate
High ( 75%) 3 High
High engagement re￿ected documentation of more than the median number of monthly
issues; low engagement, correspondingly, re￿ected documentation below the median.
144 PCTS: patient outcomes & processes of care
5.3.3.4 Model speci￿cation
5.3.3.4.1 Mixed-e￿ects models Analyses were conducted in Stata/SE v14.1. Mixed-e￿ects
models were used to evaluate the e￿ect of HEADS-UP on each patient- and ward-level outcome.
For the binary patient-level outcomes, binary logistic models were used (‘melogit’ command).
Fixed e￿ects were included for the HEADS-UP intervention; implementation ￿delity; study
month; the number of ward admissions that month; the patient’s Charlson comorbidity score;
age; and palliative care code. A random e￿ect was included for ward. Analyses solely involving
eLOS or readmission were restricted to those patients who survived to discharge; no patients
were excluded on the basis of ‘outlier’ length of stay. Other analyses included all patients. The
postestimation ‘estat icc’ command was used to estimate the intraclass correlation for eLOS.
For ward-aggregated counts data (complications of care and processes of care), Poisson
loglinear models were used (‘mepoisson’ command). Fixed e￿ects were included for season,
time, the median Charlson score of patients on the ward that month, and the time accrued
in that department by the team’s most junior doctors (based on 4-monthly rotations between
departments). A random e￿ect was included for ward.
5.3.3.4.2 Generalised estimating equations For the secondary analysis of binary patient
outcomes, the ‘xtgee’ command was used, with a binomial distribution and logit link. The
same covariates were entered into the model, specifying them as continuous or categorical as
appropriate, setting ‘ward’ as the panel variable. The analysis was run with an exchangeable
correlation structure. A similar process was followed for counts data, using the ‘xtpoisson’
command to specify a population-averaged Poisson model with log link.
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Intervention and control group characteristics
12,077 eligible admissions took place during the study period, of which 11,445 could be included
in the primary analysis. 4,927 admissions were in the control group and 6,518 admissions were
in the intervention group. Monthly ward admissions were higher in the intervention months (77
admissions/ward/month vs 64 admissions/ward/month), as was unadjusted length of stay (2.2
days vs 2.0 days) [table 5.3]. eLOS could be assessed in 4927/4929 (99.96%) control admissions
and 6543/6546 (99.95%) intervention admissions where the patient survived to discharge [see
appendix C].
5.4.2 HEADS-UP use during the study period
HEADS-UP implementation data were available for 71/73 (97.2%) ward months. On average,
wards conducted HEADS-UP brie￿ngs on 74.2% working days/month (range 15 – 100%), docu-
menting 80.7 issues/ward/month (range 6 – 208). In the intervention group, 3607/6518 (55.3%)
admissions were in high ￿delity months (￿delity code = 3), 990/6518 (15.2%) admissions were
in moderate ￿delity months (￿delity code = 2) and 1921/6518 (29.5%) admissions were in poor
￿delity months (￿delity code = 0)4.
The following sectionswill describe the intention-to-treat and per protocol impact ofHEADS-
UP on the study’s primary and secondary outcomes. In each section, the main analysis (using
mixed-e￿ects models) is reported before the secondary analysis (using GEEs).
4No months were coded as low ￿delity (￿delity code = 1).
Table 5.3: Ward & admission characteristics in the control and intervention groups
Control group Intervention group
Ward characteristics





64 (55-153) 77 (64-133)
Length of stay for study pa-
tients, days
2.0 (0.8 - 7.6) 2.2 (0.9 - 7.3)
Admission characteristics
Age, years 67 (49 - 80) 65 (47 - 78)
Age  65 years [n (%)] 2707 (54.9) 3275 (50.2)
Female [n (%)] 2537 (51.5) 3391 (52.0)
Charlson comorbidity in-
dex
3 (0 - 10) 3 (0 - 8)
Palliative coding [n (%)] 50 (1.0) 94 (1.4)
Values are median (interquartile range) unless otherwise stated.
5.4 Results 147
5.4.3 Primary outcome: excess length of stay (eLOS)
5.4.3.1 Intention-to-treat and per protocol analyses produced con￿icting results
1279/4927 (26.0%) control admissions had eLOS vs 1714/6518 (26.3%) intervention admissions.
In the unadjusted mixed-e￿ects model (intention-to-treat), HEADS-UP had no impact on eLOS
(odds ratio (OR) = 1.07, 95% CI 0.96 - 1.19, p = 0.219). In the adjusted intention-to-treat model, the
intervention was associated with increasing eLOS (OR = 1.34, 95% CI 1.10 - 1.64, p = 0.004). How-
ever, this did not re￿ect whether the intervention had actually been used, and implementation
￿delity signi￿cantly a￿ected the result (  2 = 7.62, p = 0.0221).
5.4.3.2 High ￿delity HEADS-UP implementation reduced excess length of stay
The percentage of admissions with eLOS varied with implementation ￿delity: 904/1921 (47.1%),
196/990 (19.8%) and 614/3607 (17.0%) for poor, moderate and high ￿delity respectively. An
exploratory GEEs plot of the relationship between engagement, brie￿ng frequency, and the
probability of eLOS is shown in ￿gure 5.1, using engagement as a continuous variable (the
number of issues reported each month). This showed a progressive reduction in eLOS as ￿delity
improved, i.e., with increasing engagement at high frequency brie￿ngs. The relationship was
not apparent for increasing engagement at low frequency brie￿ngs.
Point estimates at moderate and high ￿delity favoured the intervention, with signi￿cant im-
provement, i.e., reduced eLOS, at high ￿delity (OR = 0.78, 95% CI 0.66 - 0.94, p = 0.007) [table 5.4].
Of note, the ICC for eLOS in the mixed-e￿ects model was 0.07 (95% CI 0.018 - 0.250).
These ￿ndings were replicated in the GEEs model. HEADS-UP implementation ￿delity
again signi￿cantly a￿ected eLOS (  2 = 17.91, p < 0.001). The magnitude of the e￿ect size for
high ￿delity implementation was higher using GEEs than the mixed-e￿ects model, with an odds
ratio of 0.72 (95% CI 0.62 - 0.84, p < 0.001). The GEEs models are reported in full in appendix C.
Figure 5.1: The relationship between engagement, brie￿ng frequency, and the probability of
excess length of stay
Table 5.4: Intention-to-treat and per protocol analyses for patient outcomes and processes of care (mixed-e￿ects models)
Adjusted outcome ratio*
Outcome HEADS-UP Control Intention-to-treat Moderate ￿delity** High ￿delity***
Outcome ratio
(95% CI)
P value Outcome ratio
(95% CI)
























































*Odds ratios for binary outcomes, and incidence rate ratios for continuous outcomes. **Medium frequency brie￿ngs with high engagement. ***High frequency brie￿ngs
with high engagement. ****Emergency calls, referrals to the ICU outreach service, and ICU transfers.
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5.4.4 Secondary outcomes
5.4.4.1 30-day readmission
In themixed-e￿ectsmodel,HEADS-UP hadno detectable e￿ect on 30-day readmissions [table 5.4].
This remained the case regardless of changes in implementation ￿delity. Results were similar
with GEEs, HEADS-UP having no e￿ect on the odds of readmission, either in the intention-to-
treat analysis (OR = 1.10, 95% CI 0.87 - 1.38, p = 0.433) or in the per protocol analysis (  2 for
implementation ￿delity = 1.42, p = 0.492).
5.4.4.2 In-hospital death/death or readmission within 30-days of discharge
HEADS-UP had no detectable e￿ect on the composite of in-hospital death/death or readmis-
sion within 30 days of discharge [table 5.4]. This remained the case regardless of changes in
implementation ￿delity. Similarly, there was no detectable HEADS-UP e￿ect on this outcome
in the GEEs model (OR = 0.99, 95% CI 0.82 - 1.19, p = 0.921;   2 for implementation ￿delity =
2.46, p = 0.292).
5.4.4.3 Processes of care
Escalation events were higher in the intervention group than the control group (median of
8 vs 3 escalation events/month). There was some evidence that this may have been due to
the intervention. In the mixed-e￿ects model, there was no detectable intention-to-treat e￿ect
(OR = 0.83, 95% CI 0.62 - 1.10, p = 0.20). However, moderate ￿delity HEADS-UP implementation
was associated with signi￿cantly more escalation events per month (incidence rate ratio (IRR)
1.35, 95% CI 1.04 - 1.75, p = 0.024). The IRR for escalation events in the high ￿delity HEADS-UP
implementation group was also greater than 1, although in this group the increase was not
statistically signi￿cant (IRR 1.09, 95% CI 0.88 - 1.35, p = 0.440).
In the GEEs model, the intention-to-treat analysis suggested a reduction in escalation events
(IRR = 0.78, 95% CI 0.69 - 0.89, p < 0.001),with implementation ￿delity having a signi￿cant impact
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(  2 = 23.77, p < 0.001). Increases in escalation events were seen with both moderate and high
HEADS-UP ￿delity (IRR = 1.38, 95% CI 1.21 - 1.57, p < 0.001; and IRR = 1.10, 95% CI 0.997 - 1.20,
p = 0.059, respectively).
5.4.4.4 Complications of care
Complications of care were similar in the intervention and control groups (median of 1 complic-
ation/month in each group). In the mixed-e￿ects model, there was no evidence that HEADS-UP
implementation a￿ected complication rate, regardless of ￿delity (IRR 0.87 for intention-to-treat;
1.20 for moderate ￿delity group; 1.33 for high ￿delity group; all 95% CIs crossed 1; all p values
> 0.29;   2 for ￿delity = 1.15, p = 0.56). These ￿ndings were replicated in the GEEs model [see
appendix C].
5.5 Discussion
This study used one of the preferred QI methodologies - a stepped wedge, cluster controlled
study design - to evaluate a novel interdisciplinary team care intervention. The HEADS-UP
trial was adequately powered to detect appropriately small changes in its primary outcome.
The calculated ICC was similar to the value predicted in the study protocol [see 4.5.5], and two
complementary analytical techniques were used to evaluate the ￿ndings. However, the study
had limitations, which will be discussed after a brief summary of the principal ￿ndings.
5.5.1 Summary of ￿ndings
5.5.1.1 Patient outcomes
High ￿delity implementation of the HEADS-UP intervention reduced eLOS. This signi￿cant
improvement was identi￿ed in per protocol, but not intention-to-treat, analyses. HEADS-UP
did not improve - or worsen - 30-day readmissions, nor the composite of in-hospital death/death
or readmission within 30 days of discharge.
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5.5.1.2 Processes of care
There was some evidence that HEADS-UP increased the rate of escalation events. However, in
the main analysis, statistically signi￿cant increases in escalation event rate were only associated
with moderate (and not high) ￿delity implementation.
5.5.1.3 Complications of care
HEADS-UP did not appear to a￿ect the rate of complications of care, regardless of implementa-
tion ￿delity.
5.5.2 Limitations
There are two main limitations in this study. First, opposing results from the intention-to-treat
and per protocol analyses suggest there may have been important unmeasured confounding
factors. Though some quality improvement e￿orts may indeed worsen outcomes, perhaps by
distracting attention from existing good practice (Anthony et al., 2011; Nicholas and Dimick,
2011), this did not appear to be the case here. Low ￿delity implementation may have been
confounded by worsening health economy pressures and an increasingly high threshold for
hospital admission later in the study period, when the intervention group (by design) accrued
more data. Ward admissions are an imperfect proxy for this increasing workload: demands on
sta￿ increase as the numbers of admissions, transfers and discharges all increase (Needleman
et al., 2011). However, ward admissions were the only workload measure consistently available
from both participating institutions.
Second, under-use of HEADS-UP may have been a marker of wider team dysfunction and
poor performance, rather than itself directly leading to poorer outcomes. Teams that participate
more wholeheartedly in trials may be more innovative, with strong leadership, a readiness
for change, and better managerial relations (McMullen et al., 2015). It is therefore di￿cult to
entirely separate the intervention’s e￿ect from the characteristics of the teams that implemented
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it best. Nonetheless, the statistical models incorporated baseline data from each area, and direct
observation showed multiple teams using HEADS-UP meaningfully, even during periods of
great pressure [see chapter 7]. It is unlikely, therefore, that the results are a simple re￿ection of
teams’ pre-existing practice or ￿uctuations in their workload.
5.5.3 Implications for further work
The adoption of HEADS-UP here compared favourably to that of other team initiatives (O’Leary
et al., 2015b; Mayer et al., 2016), suggesting it merits further development. As with other team-
based initiatives, the change in the primary outcome was seen only with high ￿delity use of
HEADS-UP (Mayer et al., 2016). Future work should therefore elicit strategies to improve the
implementation of PCTS, as operationalised here with the HEADS-UP intervention. The calibre
of implementation varied widely even between the wards of a single hospital; tailored support
to help teams engage with this type of QI initiative may be required (Hamilton et al., 2014).
Chapter 7 describes the implementation outcomes for HEADS-UP during the study period,
which will inform future dissemination e￿orts. The integration of PCTS alongside other safety
strategies also merits further investigation, as do the drivers for resolution of PCTS-raised
concerns. Chapter 8 explores why only a subset of clinical concerns may have been formally
resolved.
5.5.4 Conclusions
PCTS is a novel strategy to harness frontline sta￿ experience in the pursuit of service improve-
ment. This study provides empirical evidence that high ￿delity PCTS implementation reduces
eLOS, supporting the contention that healthcare safety and e￿ciency need not be opposing
values (Tucker et al., 2008). The e￿ects of this complex intervention cannot be fully encapsu-
lated by changes in patient outcomes and processes of care. In chapter 6, I will now explore the





PCTS mechanisms of action,
qualitative impact, and e￿ects on
incident reporting
6.1 Introduction
The quantitative analysis in chapter 5 identi￿ed an improvement in eLOS, corresponding to
high ￿delity implementation of the HEADS-UP intervention. That analysis used numerical
de￿nitions of implementation ￿delity, based on frontline brie￿ng frequency and engagement.
As a complex intervention [see 5.1], however, the use and impact of HEADS-UP were contingent
on meaningful adoption by clinical and managerial sta￿. This cannot be fully encapsulated in
a numerical summary. PCTS - which HEADS-UP operationalised - was also hypothesised to
improve frontline teams’ safety and teamwork climates, and to provoke service developments
in response to ward teams’ concerns [see ￿gure 4.1]. These hypotheses too require additional
investigation.
In this chapter, I describe more qualitative components of the mixed method evaluation of
the HEADS-UP trial. Semi-structured focus groups, auto-ethnography, validated survey tools
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and hospital databases are used to describe the e￿ect of HEADS-UP on sta￿ and the broader
organisation, and its interaction with existing safety structures.
6.2 Aims
The aims of this chapter are:
(i) To explore sta￿ perceptions of the e￿ects of HEADS-UP, and describe the organisational
changes it prompted;
(ii) To analyse the e￿ect of HEADS-UP on sta￿ safety and teamwork attitudes, using a valid-
ated survey tool; and
(iii) To relate HEADS-UP implementation to changes in sta￿ safety behaviours.
6.3 Methods
The intervention and study design were described in detail in chapter 4 [see also the summary
in 5.3.1]. Here, I will report how data were collected and analysed for the qualitative reports of
HEADS-UP’s usage and e￿ectiveness.
6.3.1 Data sources and analysis
6.3.1.1 Auto-ethnography
Fieldnotes over a 20-month period recorded exchanges and emails with sta￿, personal observa-
tions, re￿ections on the broader context, wider governance proceedings, and other implement-
ation challenges. These ‘auto-ethnographic’ insights have been widely used in organisational
case study research, providing broad accounts of culture and practice (Watson, 2011; Shaw et al.,
2014; McMullen et al., 2015).
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As an embedded researcher [see 4.4.2], there were ample opportunities to create a rich data-
set. I observed at close quarters the intervention, the context into which it was launched, and
the competing demands placed on those involved. At hospital 1, the institution contributing the
majority (6/7 [85.7%]) of the study wards, I became part of the small hospital quality improve-
ment team, in addition to retaining clinical relationships within the department of medicine.
During the early study period, links were established with senior hospital leaders, including the
Chief Executive; the Director of Workforce & Development; the Medical Director; the General
Manager for Medicine (later the Director of Operations); and the Director of Quality Improve-
ment. In addition, the post required close collaboration with numerous ‘hybrid’ managers (e.g.,
senior matrons and clinical directors), who had ongoing clinical responsibilities alongside their
managerial workload (Birken et al., 2012; Buchanan, 2013). Middle managers - reporting to the
executive team - were also closely involved.
One facet of the role of embedded researcher is to expand the host organisation’s knowledge
capacity (Vindrola-Padros et al., 2016). The nature of the HEADS-UP intervention - as well as
its link to the NIHR Imperial Patient Safety Translational Research Centre (PSTRC) - provided
novel insights into broader issues of patient safety and quality at the hospital. I was therefore
invited to attend regular meetings of a hospital-wide mortality review group (chaired by the
Medical Director and attended by the Chief Executive), the hospital-wide patient safety forum,
and a divisional quality and risk meeting. These experiences, along with email exchanges and
personal interactions, were typed up formally as ￿eldnotes as soon as was practicable.
At the second participating institution - a far larger organisation - there was much less
access to equivalently senior leadership. Nonetheless, appropriate links were made with de-
partmental clinicians and managers. Those interactions were documented in a similar way,
alongside personal re￿ections on the departmental safety and quality meetings that were held
intermittently.
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6.3.1.2 Semi-structured focus groups
Semi-structured focus groups were undertaken at hospital 1 in July 2015. The topic guide ex-
plored PCTS as a tool, as well as the implementation process that introduced it: implementation
is discussed in detail in chapter 7. Participants were asked to discuss existing systems for identi-
fying team concerns and improving patient care, to orientate themselves to the topic. They then
re￿ected on their experiences of using HEADS-UP. Questions and follow-up probes scrutinised
team-wide involvement in HEADS-UP; whether HEADS-UP a￿ected perceptions of the ward’s
safety and quality; how it was used in sta￿ interactions; and whether teams made changes based
on their HEADS-UP brie￿ngs and feedback. The full topic guide is provided in appendix D.
Topic questions were reviewed and piloted within the research team involved in the study,
and with researchers who had not been involved with HEADS-UP. The focus groups were
advertised in clinical areas, by email, and in person. All ward sta￿ were invited to attend, but
certain sta￿ groups were purposively targeted to ensure that key stakeholders (junior doctors,
senior nurses, and service managers) were represented. Focus groups were led by experienced
qualitative researchers1, using the topic guide ￿exibly in view of the di￿erent roles and ex-
periences within the two groups. The focus groups’ discussions were recorded, and the audio
recordings then professionally transcribed (PageSix Transcription Services, London, UK).
6.3.1.3 Analytical approach
Focus group transcripts and ￿eldnotes were managed with NVivo software (QSR International,
Doncaster, Australia). Two researchers read and re-read the transcripts2. An inductive (theory-
generating) approach was used, as recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). Each researcher
coded the transcripts individually, generating an initial coding frame, which was then discussed
and re￿ned. The transcripts were coded again, before a group of higher order themes was agreed.
Field notes were searched for evidence to support or contradict the focus groups, and for other
1Focus groups were led by Professor Nick Sevdalis, Dr Max Johnston, Dr Louise Hull, Dr Stephanie Archer, and
Ms Tayana Soukup.
2I conducted the analysis with Dr Stephanie Archer, Research Fellow.
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themes not covered independently by focus group discussions.
6.3.1.4 Safety and teamwork climate surveys
Physicians and senior nurses were surveyed at baseline, and again six months after HEADS-UP
introduction, using the safety and teamwork subsections of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire
(Sexton et al., 2006). Responseswere recorded on a ￿ve point Likert scale,with reverse scoring for
negatively worded items, and transformed to generate a score from 0-100 (Center for Healthcare
Quality and Safety, 2015). Perceived workload was assessed with the NASA Task Load Index,
on a visual analogue scale (Hart, 2006). Other survey items identi￿ed HEADS-UP participation,
whether respondents had reported concerns di￿erently as a result, and demographic data. The
full survey instrument, and appropriate permissions, are provided in appendix D.
The e￿ect of HEADS-UP was assessed in general linear models, incorporating mean team-
work or mean safety score as the dependent variable. HEADS-UP participation was de￿ned as
self-reported engagement in ￿ve or more brie￿ngs; workload, hospital and survey period were
the other independent variables. Survey analysis was conducted in SPSS v22.
6.3.1.5 Incident reports
All incident reports pertaining to the study wards, submitted through online reporting systems
during the study period, were analysed. The impact of HEADS-UP on the number of incident
reports for each study ward, the number relating to non-falls incidents, and the number sub-
mitted by sta￿ other than nurses were assessed. The reporter’s initial assessment of incident
severity, which is usually inaccurate, was not used (Macrae, 2016).
Numerical estimates of the HEADS-UP e￿ect on incident reporting were generated with
mixed-e￿ects models and GEEs models, as described in chapter 5. Poisson loglinear models
accounted for clustering of results by ward, and included covariates for season, time, median
monthly Charlson score, ward admissions, and junior doctors’ time in post [see 5.3.3.4]. Incident
reporting analysis was conducted in Stata/SE v14.1.
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6.4 Ethics, consent and permissions
Research and development authorities at both sites exempted the study from formal ethics
review. Participants signed their consent to the recording and research use of the focus groups.
The primary study was registered with the ISRCTN registry [see 4.5.8].
6.5 Results
The ￿nal dataset for this evaluation comprised 930 HEADS-UP brie￿ngs; 115 sta￿ surveys; 2,175
incident reports; 2 semi-structured focus groups with 15 sta￿ (junior doctors [n=3], nurses [n=8]
and managers [n=4]); and 44 pages of ethnographic ￿eld notes.
The qualitative impact of HEADS-UP will be described ￿rst, followed by the results of the
sta￿ attitudes surveys, and then the evaluation of changes in incident reporting.
6.5.1 Psychological safety, with a hard edge of accountability
6.5.1.1 Equal participation from di￿erent sta￿ groups
HEADS-UP was the ￿rst tool sta￿ had used to provide a formal communication structure for
routine work. Still, over the course of the study all sta￿ groups had participated in - and indeed
led - the brie￿ngs:
‘The physio[therapist]s or the OTs [occupational therapists] are also ￿agging things
up; that’s how we found it useful... The discharges that did not happen, anyone
[who] deteriorated, they ￿ag it up and then we all learn from what went wrong.’
(Senior nurse)
‘They [consultants] contribute as much as anyone else... so their voice is being
heard, because they su￿er from the same frustrations as all of us.’ (Service manager)
6.5 Results 161
‘It also highlighted issues to them [consultants], as well... Why that patient hadn’t
had a scan - so they could follow things through.’ (Senior nurse)
6.5.1.2 A non-judgemental forum to raise concerns and learn as a team
Perhaps because the di￿erent sta￿ groups were perceived as equal partners in the HEADS-UP
brie￿ngs, the brie￿ngs formed a psychologically safe environment in which problems could
be discussed openly, without fear of retribution. The style and timeliness of HEADS-UP feed-
back also contributed to a sense that HEADS-UP provided a non-judgemental forum for team
learning:
‘It was more of a constructive exercise, where everyone is then wanting the same
outcome, so it wasn’t like, “Oh this didn’t happen, I am angry at you”, it was more
like we are all actually in the same team and we all want the same thing to happen...
You all have the same end point and I think that is why it is quite safe to bring it
up, because it is not confrontational, and it is not personal against someone, it is
just what needs to be done.’ (Foundation doctor)
‘There were a few teaching sessions where things were raised, we went through
things like ECGs [electrocardiographs] that were missed, and then you had a col-
lective opportunity to think... It was a very good plot for learning, saying this
happened and let’s do some learning and try and prevent it happening again. That
is quite helpful.’ (Foundation doctor)
‘[A previous teaching session] was really kind of negative, this was kind of just
approached very di￿erently... It is very subtle, but the feeling about the feedback
that you get is di￿erent.’ (Foundation doctor)
This psychological safety was not limitless: there were still boundaries around what could
be discussed. Although the brie￿ngs did prompt teams to consider positive notes from the pre-
vious shift, they rarely did so. When they did record something positive, their re￿ections often
162 PCTS: mechanisms of action & qualitative impact
concerned the overall management of patient ￿ow, rather than speci￿c actions or diagnostic
processes that others could emulate:
‘It did sometimes feel like we were just reporting all the negatives, and it would
have been good for team morale to introduce some positives.’ (Foundation doctor)
‘What people do focus on is how many discharges you had, because that is what is
prominent - wherever you are. ‘We had seven discharges that day’, that would be
the sort of thing that went on it. But I am sure there are other things, that... could
quite easily go on there.’ (Senior nurse)
‘Maybe it’s just I am also still learning to ￿ag up what went well the day before,
because we are all good with, “Ah, this was frustrating yesterday...”’ (Senior nurse)
This re￿ected a reluctance to delve too deeply into any one teammember’s performance. Pro-
fessional identities were protected by assigning problems to other departments, acknowledging
procedural complications as foreseeable, or linking delays to under-sta￿ng. Thus, perceived
threats to professional identitywere largely de￿ected by a projection of blame onto other groups,
or attributed to circumstances beyond the team’s control. More introspective teams, with senior
support and increasing psychological safety, did record issues like diagnostic errors, in which
they had played a more overt role. However, even in those teams - where the brie￿ngs were
implemented with greatest ￿delity - there could be disputes as to whether certain problems
were really problems at all:
‘The senior nurse disagrees with medical teams’ perceptions that the site moves
[moving patients from one ward to another] were inappropriate. She thinks doctors
expect patients to remain on the acute medical unit even when they are stable...
She felt an inadequate handover perpetuated their concerns.’ (Fieldnotes)
Thus, whilst psychological safety was an important factor in helping sta￿ speak up about
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their concerns, certain topics remained o￿-limits, and psychological safety did not guarantee
agreement about what were reasonable concerns. These are important limitations.
6.5.1.3 A hard edge of accountability
The brie￿ngs did maintain a ‘hard edge’ for their e￿ectiveness. Team members regulated their
own behaviour, knowing that their actions (or inactions) might be ￿agged up at the next brie￿ng,
or in feedback. Junior doctors and nurses were both conscious of this internalised discipline
(‘panopticism’), acknowledging how it changed their own behaviour and how they could use it
to their advantage:
‘The group was more aware that if you perhaps missed something like that, it
may be brought up later at a HEADS-UP meeting... It made you more accountable.’
(Foundation doctor)
‘It certainly works for the VTEs [venous thromboembolism assessments, completed
by junior doctors]. There are days that we will have eight or 10 VTEs [to do], so if
I write there 10 and give the list to the doctor, the following day I will come and
there will be one or two, because they know the following day it will be mentioned
again, with the consultant.’ (Senior nurse)
‘If you didn’t then go and report the Datix [online incident report], then you would
get an email saying this was mentioned on HEADS-UP and no Datix was completed,
and so you had to go back...’ (Foundation doctor)
Although the brie￿ngs emphasised accountability, the teams did not always explicitly agree
exactly what would be done, and by when. This contributed to some di￿culty in keeping track
of the variety of issues they had raised; whether they had been escalated as planned; and if any
further action was required. Similar problems have been encountered in other interdisciplinary
initiatives, suggesting that teams may actually ￿nd comfort in systems that allow them to
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avoid accountability. Shift patterns that lacked continuity exacerbated this problem, as brie￿ng
leaders neglected to con￿rmwhat had been resolved from previous HEADS-UP brie￿ngs. Simple
adjuncts (like whiteboards) to carry over information from one day’s HEADS-UP brie￿ng to
the next may have been helpful:
‘I think it’s more [than] just raising the issue... Give me a more detailed timeframe,
resolution, how do you resolve it? Are you going to get back to me because it’s
important? And what will I expect?’ (Senior nurse)
‘It’s just being ￿agged, ￿agged countless times by di￿erent people, same issues, but
no-one is getting back as to what has been done...’ (Senior nurse)
Others had more positive experiences where, held to account, their colleagues con￿rmed
the outcomes of previous brie￿ngs:
‘You get more feedback, so you raise concern[s], and then maybe the next day the
same issue would crop up, and you actually then get feedback on what they are
doing about it, or who they have escalated to.’ (Foundation doctor)
6.5.2 Rapid resolution and meaningful managerial follow-up
6.5.2.1 Problems with the existing incident reporting system
Several sta￿ members drew comparisons between HEADS-UP and the pre-existing processes
for identifying and resolving ward-level problems. Previously, the hospital’s online incident
reporting system (Datix, London, UK) was considered the formal mechanism by which they
could record problems. Sta￿ did not ￿nd it easy to use the system for this purpose, and would
not persist with reporting recurrent problems. Issues were so commonplace that they were no
longer considered abnormal (‘normalised deviance’):
‘Some things sta￿ have just got so used to that they don’t Datix [report] it. So it’s
just become common practice...’ (Clinical risk manager)
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Managers had limited time to attend to the online reports that were submitted, and did
not ￿nd them useful for identifying underlying problems. Long processing delays meant that
even relatively simple problems were not reviewed for many weeks. As a result, reports that
described patient harm were prioritised; where no harm had occurred, little was done:
‘[Before HEADS-UP] you could go down there [to the ward] and you could see
people working very, very hard and you could also sense a lot of frustrations... but
you weren’t getting to what those frustrations were, and what those issues were.’
(Service manager)
‘On Datix it used to take weeks on end, whereas it might just be the hoist is broken,
whose responsibility is it to make sure it is sorted out?’ (Senior nurse)
‘The only way [learning] would have happened would have been directly from a SI
[serious incident]3... it has got to that point of being a SI before it is then addressed
and taught and learnt from.’ (Service manager)
6.5.2.2 Triage of minor issues and thematic identi￿cation of deeper problems
HEADS-UP helped identify a route for more rapid resolution of practical problems. It provided
an acceptable mechanism for sta￿ to log issues into which which they had immediate insight:
‘[HEADS-UP] highlighted little things, that could be sorted out quite quickly, it
made sure that somebody was allocated to deal with that on that day, or did you
follow that through, did that get sorted out? So everything bene￿ts, rather than
just going on and on and on, and it never happens. Things get sorted out quicker.’
(Senior nurse)
3Serious incidents are adverse events where the consequences to patients and families, or sta￿, are so great that
a heightened response is justi￿ed. These may include, for example: unexpected deaths; serious avoidable injuries;
or incidents that threaten public con￿dence in a healthcare service (NHS England, 2015).
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‘Things that have been reported on Datix that sometimes we have to investigate
in depth... [with] HEADS-UP, at least right then and there you can actually sort it
out immediately.’ (Senior nurse)
In some cases, where there was no realistic prospect of an immediate de￿nitive solution
to a problem, HEADS-UP was then used to con￿rm a plan for mitigation. For example, sta￿
raised the concern that the available magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment could not
accommodate their obese patients. This equipment could not be replaced at short notice, but
having escalated the problem, an alternative plan still needed to be found:
‘The bariatric patients that couldn’t have a MRI... They ended up having the ortho-
paedics [team] still start the patient on IV [intravenous] antibiotics... You have to
have a di￿erent plan, even if that investigation is not going to happen... So whether
or not it was [osteomyelitis, a serious bone infection], she’s on the right treatment
already...’ (Senior nurse)
The brie￿ngs, facilitation and feedback presented managers with clear, actionable topics for
them to address. They were then better prepared to handle incipient risks to service quality:
‘What I like about it is [that] it is instant and it is thematic very quickly, you
understand what the issues are... Here is an opportunity to dump them [your daily
issues] and suddenly a picture forms out of it... And not just here, but there, there,
there and there... And it hasn’t yet created a signi￿cant incident, but clearly there
is risk associated with it...’ (Service manager)
Not all managers were equally enthused. Where HEADS-UP had not provided data that ap-
peared directly useful for them, middle managers did less to hold their service areas accountable
for HEADS-UP performance [see chapter 8]. Still, the combination of more e￿ective actions
by frontline teams, and increased managerial involvement in at least some areas, led to a more
general sense that things had changed for the better:
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‘[HEADS-UP] would make it clear what was actually de￿cient. And then I think
things did start to change, and you did see the feedback coming through... So you
could de￿nitely see the evolution of it.’ (Foundation doctor)
‘There is a very broad range of stu￿ that comes out of HEADS-UP. I mean there are
things that get raised repeatedly, and then sometimes you get feedback on a kind of
wider level, something has changed, like they have changed the phlebotomy service
or they have changed, they have allocated a new tool or something like that. But
there is also the kind of day to day things within the team that start running better,
and I think you do start seeing those but it is harder to put a speci￿c, “this was
raised, this was done, there was an outcome.” It is a more kind of general change
as part of HEADS-UP.’ (Foundation doctor)
‘I don’t know if it is just HEADS-UP that has done it, but I do see improvements
happening every day... I had an eight-month gap o￿ the ward, and [when I returned]
I really did feel that the feel of the hospital had changed.’ (Foundation doctor)
6.5.3 Changing individuals: reversing normalised deviance, and catharsis
6.5.3.1 Reversing normalised deviance
Sta￿members described how HEADS-UP had changed their personal practice, prompting them
to proactively address issues they may have previously ignored. This reversed the normalised
deviance that had become ingrained:
‘You wouldn’t have identi￿ed that necessarily, because it is just part of... your daily
life in the NHS, but when it is put like this [with HEADS-UP], it is highlighted, you
have got an opportunity to really do something about it.’ (Service manager)
‘This particular patient is awaiting echo[cardiography] for the last three days... [I]
would now question why is it still not done... [When] I wasn’t doing it [HEADS-
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UP], I wasn’t seeing the importance... [Now] I tell the Matron, or I tell my Bed
Manager... or I go there myself... I go to the department and ask them, “This is
what’s happening, this is what I need.”’ (Senior nurse)
In addition, individuals used the information shared in the HEADS-UP brie￿ng to actively
coordinate their plans and decisions for the next shift:
‘After HEADS-UP, before we actually all leave, I will tell the physio[therapist] and
the OT [occupational therapist]: “These are your priorities for today, these are your
priorities for tomorrow.” So they already have a plan... Like I said, it gives you the
structure that you need.’ (Senior nurse)
Junior doctors also acknowledged how HEADS-UP brie￿ngs contributed to their decision-
making. More cognisant that problems were occurring repeatedly, and aware of pressures on
their colleagues, they adapted their practice:
‘The group as a whole became more “present” to [what] happens maybe a couple
of times in a week, and it was more in people’s minds... For example if the nursing
sta￿ are short that day... when you were going around, just having that in your
mind and thinking “No, we need to get all these blood tests done now”, you would
appreciate how the service could be best run. I think that made it more e￿cient.’
(Foundation doctor)
6.5.3.2 Catharsis
The improved information sharing, interdisciplinary coordination, and individual e￿orts to
share workload produced a more supportive team climate. In this atmosphere the HEADS-UP
brie￿ngs became unexpectedly cathartic:
‘You felt like you had got a lot o￿ your chest by doing it, and if you had a bad
day and nothing seemed to be going right because of so many errors that you
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came across, it all felt a bit chaotic and scatty, the next day you could say these are
the things that went wrong yesterday, and now I can clear that and start again...’
(Foundation doctor)
‘It is kind of a debrief as well, which is something you don’t really do in medicine
verymuch, especially on the doctors side. I know from having worked in psychiatry,
you debrief all the time, you don’t realise how useful it is and how much you learn
from it, but we don’t tend to. I suppose you see things and things annoy you and
you go home and you deal with it, and then you come back in the next day. So it
gives an element for that.’ (Foundation doctor)
‘It kind of makes you feel more heard, because otherwise you are just venting
your concern, but you don’t know if it has been actioned in any way. And then
you can provide the objective evidence to move forward, to change something.’
(Foundation doctor)
6.5.4 Proactive teams and a revealed gap in practice
6.5.4.1 Changes in incident management
The ease of HEADS-UP completion was a popular feature, compared to the multiple data re-
quired for an online incident report. Sta￿ did recognise that certain events discussed in HEADS-
UP brie￿ngs might need to be logged as formal incidents, for which the incident report format
was more appropriate. However, no team had an agreed list of speci￿c high priority events to
record. This meant that translation of HEADS-UP-recorded incidents into online reports could
be erratic:
‘If something comes up... then it prompts someone to say, “actually no, I think [a]
Datix [incident report] should be done about this”... and then you can gather that
(sic) data in the already established format.’ (Foundation doctor)
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‘Post-ERCP [endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography, an intervention as-
sociated with a high risk of infection in some cases] antibiotics had not been given...
The F1s [junior doctors] had not seen the report specifying they were needed. No
DATIX [incident report] was done, even though [the registrar] speci￿cally asked
if one should be completed...’ (Fieldnotes)
When incidents were reported, the HEADS-UP format provided a ready structure for incid-
ent investigators to start to collect relevant information. Issues were ￿agged up at the brie￿ngs
as the incident reports were submitted:
‘The people involved are already there, they are already able to explain to you,
“This is what actually happened from our end”... [gives example]... It’s easier for
you to do your incident [investigation] report already because as the investigator
you don’t have to call everyone.’ (Senior nurse)
The emphasis on clinical teams’ accountability also led to a more subtle change in incident
management, that was noted by middle managers:
‘Very often before it gets to me, it has been dealt with and sorted out, by the team
themselves, because it [HEADS-UP] helps them understand what is within their
power to deal with... In the past, pre-HEADS-UP, if it was reported on Datix and
I think to some degrees it still is, people think that is [the] end of the matter, “I
have reported it, it is no longer my responsibility.” But with HEADS-UP and Datix
together, there is a di￿erent approach... We have discussed it, we have taken on the
responsibility of this, we have done as much of this as we can, but here is the point
where it has to be escalated and we want to make sure something is done about
it, and this is our methodology for doing it. That is how it feels to me, anyway.’
(Service manager)
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6.5.4.2 A gap in practice, revealed
There was a wider recognition that the programme had revealed a gap in practice, one that
teams had been unaware of. Self-confessed sceptics conceded that they had found HEADS-UP
useful, even on wards where team function was already acknowledged to be good:
‘There is de￿nitely time, there is de￿nitely time to do it, there is de￿nitely a need
to do it, but... you only know that once you have done it.’ (Service manager)
‘I don’t think we would have known, unless we had done it, that there was a gap
there.’ (Senior nurse)
‘I am [in] A&E [Accident & Emergency department rotation] now, you kind of miss
[HEADS-UP] actually. You do kind of miss that opportunity.’ (Foundation doctor)
Similarly, HEADS-UP was revealing service provision opportunities that had not previously
reached board-level attention:
‘HEADS-UP ￿ndings informed the discussion [in the Trust morbidity andmortality
meeting, chaired by the chief executive], highlighting areas which needed faster
examination and transformation, and bringing genuinely new information... [This
was] useful in corroborating areas of intuitive concern, many of which had not
been formally addressed either in incident reports or top-down initiatives... [It
also] highlighted new targets for improvement.’ (Fieldnotes)
6.5.5 Organisational change
There were a number of speci￿c examples of tangible changes driven by HEADS-UP within the
study period, predominantly at hospital 1 [box 6.1]. These were described as ‘quick wins’ by
seniormanagers,with clinicians agreeing that theywere at least a relatively rapid organisational
response:
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‘We’ve been asking for this [equipment] for several years. This [HEADS-UP] only
took ￿ve months.’ (Consultant - Fieldnotes)
Box 6.1 Examples of service investment and organisational changes arising from HEADS-UP
Cost-neutral re-alignment of porter provision for radiology, doubling in-patient ￿ow for
X-rays;
Re-evaluation of phlebotomy service provision, ultimately generating a £20,000 invest-
ment in an expanded support service;
Additional phlebotomy training for nursing assistants, delivered internally;
Additional sonographer in echocardiography;
Intravenous infusion and nasogastric feeding pumps repatriated to central equipment
library;
Development of electronic referrals and electronic reporting for medical specialty con-
sultations, using existing electronic health record;
£5,000 investment in ketone meters for management of diabetic ketoacidosis;
Number of delayed therapy assessments incorporated into organisational status report.
Internal investment was not necessarily targeted speci￿cally to participating wards, how-
ever. For example, expansion of the phlebotomy service (identi￿ed through HEADS-UP as no
longer meeting patient needs) primarily bene￿ted non-participant wards, which were deemed
by senior management to be more in need of support. Nor was progress guaranteed by repeated
ward-level reporting. Changes to structures or processes were more likely when there was
an associated ￿nancial target; another organisational incentive aligning with improvement;
and when clinicians and managers agreed the need for change. HEADS-UP data then enabled
managers to make a convincing case for investment in service quality:
‘It empowers me then as manager for that area to go forward with a business case
with the evidence to say we need additional resource, this is the implications of
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it... And it works, so we have an additional [cardiac] sonographer... I think we saw
very quickly a reduction in delays once that was sorted.’ (Service manager)
However, progress proved challenging when a proposed change would impact work￿ow in
more than one clinical area. Additionally, some of the concerns raised by frontline sta￿ simply
could not be addressed by middle managers, general managers, or even board members. Poor
sta￿ng levels, for example, were felt keenly in clinical areas, but re￿ected a broader national
challenge. Creative workarounds and mitigation plans could only go so far in addressing a fun-
damental shortfall in sta￿. This was a source of frustration for teams completing the brie￿ngs:
‘The sta￿ng every single day was always... “we don’t have enough nurses”, so that
just kind of became a slightly pointless box. And we had seen it the day before, the
day before, the day before.’ (Foundation doctor)
HEADS-UP also identi￿ed issues like unsafe inter-hospital transfers, which - whilst amen-
able to change - would have required a degree of close collaboration between a network of
regional hospitals. The necessary cooperation and drive was not always forthcoming, even
when existing processes did not meet pre-agreed standards:
‘The Director of Operations is formulating an inter-hospital transfer agreement,
based on London-wide agreed standards, referring to multiple cases ￿agged by
HEADS-UP... She may need to invoke the Clinical Commissioning Group to sort
out local transfer issues.’ (Fieldnotes)
6.5.6 Safety & teamwork climates
115 surveys were completed; response rates were 71.8% (61/85) in phase 1 and 65.1% (54/83) in
phase 2. 97.7% safety and teamwork items were completed; demographic data were incomplete
in 14.8% (17/115) cases and HEADS-UP participation data in 3.5% (4/115) cases [table 6.1].
Unadjusted mean safety and teamwork scores were both higher after HEADS-UP participa-
tion, but not signi￿cantly so [table 6.2]. HEADS-UP in￿uenced adjusted safety and teamwork
Table 6.1: Survey respondents and completion rates
Phase 1 Phase 2
Professional background [n (%)]
Consultant physician 8 (13.1) 5 (9.3)
Junior physician 28 (45.9) 35 (64.8)
Senior nurse 15 (24.6) 7 (13.0)
No answer 10 (16.4) 7 (13.0)
Median time on the ward [months]
4-6 0-3
Ward specialty [n (%)]
Acute medicine 19 (31.1) 10 (18.5)
Gastroenterology & general medicine 13 (21.3) 11 (20.4)
Heart failure & general medicine 4 (6.6) 5 (9.3)
Geriatrics 16 (26.2) 14 (25.9)
Respiratory & general medicine 9 (14.8) 12 (22.2)
No answer 0 2 (3.7)
Participated in more than 5 HEADS-UP brie￿ngs [n (%)]
Yes 13 (21.3) 37 (68.5)
No 47 (77.0) 14 (25.9)
No answer 1 (1.6) 3 (5.6)
NASA-TLX (workload) score [mean (SD)]
13.2 (2.7) 12.8 (3.1)
Unscored safety and teamwork items [n (%)]
33/1647 (2.0) 37/1458 (2.5)
Unscored NASA-TLX items [n (%)]
21/366 (5.7) 18/324 (5.6)
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scores di￿erently over time at each of the two hospitals (p=0.021 for safety; p=0.004 for team-
work). Participants’ safety scores were lower in the early stages of HEADS-UP implementation
(i.e., at phase 1 for hospital 1, or phase 2 for hospital 2, where HEADS-UP was only embedding
into routine practice as the second survey period began). At hospital 1, after six months of
sustained implementation, participant safety scores increased above those of non-participants
(estimated marginal mean safety score 70.3 vs 61.0). Similar ￿ndings were observed for team-
work scores, with signi￿cant HEADS-UP-associated improvement over time only at hospital 1
(estimated marginal mean teamwork score 81.7 vs 70.0). At phase 2, 71.9% (23/32) of hospital
1 respondents agreed they had reported concerns di￿erently as a result of the programme. Of
note, higher workload scores correlated with lower safety scores (B= -1.52, 95% CI -2.59 – -0.44,
p=0.006) but not teamwork scores (B= -0.21, 95% CI -1.10 – 0.68, p= 0.64).
6.5.7 Submitted incident reports
6.5.7.1 Total incident reports
More incident reports were submitted in interventionmonths than controlmonths (18.8 incident
reports/month vs 15.5 incident reports/month). In the adjusted mixed-e￿ects model, HEADS-
UP had no intention-to-treat e￿ect on this outcome (IRR = 0.91, 95% CI 0.76 - 1.09, p = 0.305).
Implementation ￿delity signi￿cantly a￿ected the result (  2 = 14.80, p < 0.001). High ￿delity
HEADS-UP signi￿cantly increased monthly incident reports (IRR = 1.33, 95% CI 1.15 - 1.55,
p < 0.001). These ￿ndings were replicated in the GEEs secondary analysis (IRR for high ￿delity
HEADS-UP 1.34, 95% CI 1.19 - 1.51, p < 0.001).
6.5.7.2 High yield incident reports
In themixed-e￿ects analysis, similar improvements were seenwith high yield incident reporting
- whether de￿ned as non-falls incident reports, or increasing engagement by non-nursing sta￿.
Increases in high yield incident reportingwere identi￿edwith per protocol, rather than intention-
to-treat, analyses. For non-falls incidents, HEADS-UP overall did not increase reporting (IRR =
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* p value for model e￿ect of the interaction term HEADS-UP participation*hospital*time
** The upper bound of the 95% con￿dence interval for estimated marginal mean climate scores
was truncated at 100, the limit of the scale (Cowen and Ellison, 2006).
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0.91, 95% CI 0.73-1.13, p = 0.400). Implementation ￿delity was a signi￿cant factor (  2 = 16.50,
p < 0.001), with high ￿delity implementation signi￿cantly increasing non-falls reports (IRR =
1.41, 95% CI 1.18 - 1.69, p < 0.001).
For non-nursing sta￿ reports, the same pattern was identi￿ed. High ￿delity implementation
of HEADS-UP signi￿cantly increased engagement with incident reporting, with more reports
submitted each month by non-nursing sta￿ (IRR = 1.60, 95% CI 1.08 - 2.36, p = 0.019). Intention-
to-treat analysis identi￿ed no signi￿cant e￿ect when implementation ￿delity was overlooked
(IRR = 1.04, 95% CI 0.62-1.74, p = 0.878;   2 for implementation ￿delity 11.23, p = 0.004).
These results were robust to the secondary statistical approach, using GEEs. For non-falls
incidents, high ￿delity HEADS-UP increased monthly reports (IRR = 1.42, 95% CI 1.25 - 1.63,
p < 0.001). Non-nursing sta￿ reports also increasedwith high￿delity implementation (IRR = 1.54,
95% CI 1.07 - 2.23, p = 0.021). Intention-to-treat analyses showed no signi￿cant e￿ect (p = 0.313
and p = 0.795 for non-falls incidents and non-nursing sta￿ submissions, respectively). Imple-
mentation ￿delity was a signi￿cant factor in each case (  2 =30.79, p < 0.001 for non-falls incid-
ents,   2 = 11.44, p = 0.003 for non-nursing sta￿ reports).
6.6 Discussion
This mixed methods evaluation of the HEADS-UP intervention expanded on its impact on
patient outcomes, as described in chapter 5. The qualitative analysis suggested mechanisms
through which HEADS-UP exerted its e￿ects, as well as opportunities to re￿ne the intervention
for broader dissemination. Together, qualitative and quantitative data have provided empirical
support for most, but not all, of the study’s initial hypotheses [￿gure 6.1]. There was also
evidence of the anticipated virtuous cycle, in which tangible changes arising from frontline

























Figure 6.1: Empirical support for HEADS-UP study hypotheses
The ￿gure summarises whether the study’s hypotheses found empirical support [blue boxes], or were not supported (or only partially supported) by the data [dashed
red boxes]. The three proposed mechanisms of action for PCTS [blue circle] were supported by the data.
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6.6.1 Summary of ￿ndings
6.6.1.1 Mechanisms of action
The HEADS-UP brie￿ngs engendered participation from a broad range of clinical sta￿. This
generated a non-judgemental forum in which concerns could be raised, and interdisciplinary
learning could take place. A hard edge of accountability, of which both doctors and nurses were
aware, encouraged sta￿ to act on the issues that they had discussed. Minor issues were triaged
to rapid resolution, whilst HEADS-UP provided useful deeper themes for managers to pursue.
A lack of continuity between brie￿ngs limited the impact for some frontline sta￿, as did failures
to secure explicit agreement on the plan of action. Managers needed directly useful data before
endorsing the programme.
6.6.1.2 Individual and team e￿ects
Individuals found themselves attending to issues they would have previously ignored, revers-
ing the normalisation of deviance. Brie￿ngs took on a supportive, cathartic element, and teams
became more proactive in autonomously managing incidents. Participation in HEADS-UP per-
suaded sta￿ that similar programmes might be required for optimal interdisciplinary practice.
6.6.1.3 Organisational changes
HEADS-UP generated numerous, tangible developments, including cost-neutral service changes,
internal service investments, and training for individuals. Some concerns could not be resolved
at an organisational level, and re￿ected wider challenges that required regional or even national
coordination to resolve.
6.6.1.4 Safety and teamwork climates
HEADS-UP was initially associated with lower safety and teamwork climate scores, but the
scores signi￿cantly increased after sustained implementation. Similar temporal patterns have
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been seen with other improvement interventions (Muething et al., 2012). Signi￿cant improve-
ments were seen only at hospital 1, where a critical mass of wards had adopted the intervention.
6.6.1.5 Incident reporting
High￿delityHEADS-UP implementation increased total incident reports. Therewere signi￿cant
increases in high yield incident reporting, as judged both by non-falls reports and increasing
reports submitted by non-nursing sta￿. The intervention had no detectable e￿ect in intention-
to-treat analyses, which ignore the ￿delity of implementation.
6.6.2 Limitations
There was disproportionate access to the teams and individuals who engaged with the HEADS-
UP programme, as opposed to those who declined to meaningfully participate. This was the
case both for auto-ethnography, and attendance at the focus groups. These enthusiasts may
have had a more positive view of the programme than the wider group of eligible clinicians
and managers. Selection bias has hampered mixed methods evaluations in previous reports
(Goldenhar et al., 2013). The high uptake of quality improvement interventions by teams that
are already performing well, with less to improve, has also been noted in other studies (Rotter
et al., 2010).
However, the response rates to the surveys were high, suggesting that those results were
likely to be representative of the broader safety and teamwork climates. Additional attempts to
counteract any selection bias included leadership of the focus groups by researchers who had
not previously worked with programme participants, and a deliberate search for con￿icting
opinions in the group transcripts and ￿eldnotes.
Some of the detectable impact of the intervention may have been reduced by contamination
between groups. HEADS-UP-generated organisational support was not necessarily directed
to the areas that had ￿rst raised concerns, and participants’ incident reports may have been
targeted to areas other than the study wards. These elements of the intervention could not be
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controlled. Di￿erences in the degree of organisational commitment to HEADS-UP also limited
comparisons of its e￿ect at the two sites. It is unclear whether HEADS-UP is by de￿nition
better suited to smaller, district general hospitals, or whether its greater impact merely re￿ected
a higher number of participating wards.
Lastly, though HEADS-UP was delivered and evaluated in its own right (rather than in a
package of multiple interventions), it did have multiple components. The relative contribution
of each of these components (structured brie￿ngs, facilitation and feedback) is unclear from this
analysis. Managers and clinical leaders may be interested in the likely impact of an intervention
which is made still more frugal, i.e., reliant on frontline brie￿ngs alone.
6.6.3 Implications for further work
Future work should assess the importance of facilitation and feedback in the e￿ectiveness of
the HEADS-UP intervention. There are also opportunities to re￿ne the intervention further, as
sta￿ identi￿ed some components of the intervention that did not work well. Building on the
quantitative analysis in chapter 5, the data in this chapter lend further support to a broader
dissemination of PCTS strategies.
6.6.4 Conclusions
A coherent set of mechanisms of action underpin the apparent e￿ectiveness of PCTS. However,
its e￿ects are seen only with high ￿delity implementation. In the next chapter, I characterise the
study’s implementation context, variations in HEADS-UP implementation, and the facilitators




PCTS: an implementation evaluation
7.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I described how PCTS, as implemented in the HEADS-UP intervention,
established a non-judgemental interdisciplinary forum that was able to hold individuals to
account. It proved e￿ective in provoking certain organisational changes, as well as changes in
individual and team practice. These were re￿ected in improved safety and teamwork climates,
and improvements in meaningful incident reporting.
The e￿ects of the intervention were clearly dependent on the quality of its implementation:
this was apparent in both quantitative and qualitative analyses [chapters 5 and 6, respectively].
Understanding the extent to which implementation was successful, and why, contextualises
these results: perhaps a di￿erent implementation model might have proved more e￿ective. A
richer understanding of the speci￿c implementation challenges for PCTS is also an important
step towards a scalable strategy that can be usefully embedded in routine practice.
7.1.1 Characterising implementation
The quality, or success, of implementation is often conceptualised as implementation ￿delity, i.e.,
the degree to which a programme’s implementation adheres to its designers’ intentions (Peters
184 PCTS: an implementation evaluation
et al., 2013; Slaughter et al., 2015). This ￿delity can be detailed at both ‘implementer’ level (here,
frontline brie￿ngs and managerial use of the data generated by them) and ‘programmatic’ level
(the degree to which the programme’s implementation strategies were used as preconceived).
The World Health Organisation (WHO) de￿nes an additional seven implementation outcomes
(Peters et al., 2013), which provide a more comprehensive assessment of implementation. I draw
on these broader implementation outcomes in this chapter.
7.1.2 Describing context
The implementation and e￿ectiveness of any complex intervention are intricately linked to the
context in which that intervention takes place. Often de￿ned metaphorically, context might
best be thought of as a ‘garden, terrain or domain’, determining whether QI e￿orts ￿ourish
or wither (Bate, 2014). The Medical Research Council holds that context ‘includes anything
external to the intervention that may act as a barrier or facilitator to its implementation, or its
e￿ects’ (Moore et al., 2015). Though di￿cult to operationalise, context can be subdivided into
strategic, cultural, technical and structural elements. Inattention to any one of these components
reduces the likelihood of an intervention’s long-term success (Shortell et al., 1998). The history
of previous QI e￿orts also leaves an organisational imprint; this ‘temporal context’ too should
be recognised (Bate, 2014).
There have been attempts to quantitatively measure the various elements of context, and
the linkages between them. What is more important is the way in which people perceive that
context, and make sense of it, in a dynamic and adaptive landscape (Dijk, 2009; Bate, 2014).
Pettigrew et al. (2001) claimed that the real challenge was to examine ‘how and why constella-
tions of forces shape the character of change processes’, rather than ‘￿xed entities with variable
qualities’. Ethnography, participant interaction, and focus groups are recommended as key tools
for this type of investigation (Bate, 2014).
These methods help describe both the inner (organisational) context and the outer context
(factors beyond the organisation, such as social systems, laws and regulatory environments).
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Contextual in￿uences can also be grouped by the system level at which they they act: macro-,
meso- or micro-. These come together to generate contexts which are largely receptive (favour-
able) or non-receptive (resistant) to change e￿orts (Pettigrew et al., 1992). This overview of local
conditions establishes how context might a￿ect all change e￿orts, before considering individual
QI interventions and their speci￿c requirements.
Here, I re-analyse the auto-ethnography and semi-structured focus groups described in
chapter 6, seeking a better understanding of the implementation context; the facilitators and
barriers for PCTS as an improvement strategy; and comprehensive implementation outcomes.
These will be assessed with respect to hospital 1, which contributed the majority of the parti-
cipating wards to the HEADS-UP trial.
7.2 Aims
(i) To describe the context in which the HEADS-UP trial took place, identifying salient char-
acteristics that a￿ected the use of the intervention;
(ii) To characterise HEADS-UP ￿delity at implementer and programmatic levels during the
study period;
(iii) To identify speci￿c facilitators and barriers for PCTS; and
(iv) To evaluate other HEADS-UP implementation outcomes, as de￿ned by the WHO.
7.3 Methods
7.3.1 Data sources
As described in 6.3.1, ￿eldnotes from intensive auto-ethnography over the study period were
collated. In addition, two semi-structured focus groups were conducted in July 2015, assessing
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the qualitative impact ofHEADS-UP, aswell as sta￿ perceptions of its implementation. I will now
describe how the implementation components of the focus group topic guide were established.
7.3.1.1 Topic guide development
The focus group topic guide was informed ￿rst by Greenhalgh’s di￿usion of innovations model
(Greenhalgh et al., 2004). This model comprehensively describes factors in￿uencing the adoption
of innovative health delivery practices. Although the model has been widely used, it is not easily
applied to controlled trials, and not all elements are equally relevant (McMullen et al., 2015).
Amore recent report from theHealth Foundation - ‘Constructive comfort: accelerating change
in the NHS’ (Allcock et al., 2015) - was thought to be more directly applicable. ‘Constructive com-
fort’ synthesises numerous contextual frameworks, drawing on relevant literature, professional
testimony, and the Health Foundation’s own decade-long experience of funding improvement
programmes. It concludes that there are seven factors for successful change at any level of the
NHS, particularly for local organisations [box 7.1].
These success factors operationalise relevant features of the inner and outer context, trans-
lating similar components of other models for change in healthcare. However, to my knowledge,
the ‘Constructive comfort’ framework has not yet been empirically tested. The implementation
analysis topic guide [appendix D] therefore drew on this framework for two reasons. First, it
is an evidence-based tool that distils context speci￿c to change management in modern NHS
practice. Second, there was a novel opportunity to assess the utility of the framework itself.
7.3.2 Analytical approaches
As described in 6.3.1.3,￿eldnotes and focus group transcripts were managed in NVivo. Two com-
plementary approaches were used, based on an initial reading of the data by two researchers1.
For the ￿eldnotes, a deductive approachwas used, coding and aggregating evidence according to
the seven factors in the ‘Constructive comfort’ framework. This generated an understanding of
1I conducted the analysis with Dr Stephanie Archer, Research Fellow.
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Box 7.1 Seven evidence-based success factors for change in the health system (Allcock et al.,
2015)
Committed and respected leadership that engages sta￿
A culture hospitable to, and supportive of, change
Management practices that ensure execution and implementation
Capabilities and skills to identify and solve problems
Data and analytics that measure and communicate impact
Resources and support for change
An enabling environment which supports and drives change
the local implementation context, i.e., those factors likely to a￿ect any improvement endeavour
within it.
Similar deductive approaches were then used to evaluate implementation ￿delity. [Quantit-
ative measures of ￿delity, based on the frequency of brie￿ngs and the documentation of issues
within those brie￿ngs, were described in 5.4.2.] For programmatic ￿delity, a recently-published
panel of 73 implementation strategies (Powell et al., 2015b) was used to identify those strategies
that had been deployed during the study period. Fieldnotes and transcripts were then screened
for evidence of ￿delity to those strategies.
By contrast, the focus group transcripts did not map well to the ‘Constructive comfort’
framework. An inductive (theory-generating) approach was therefore used to analyse the focus
groups, as per the methodology described in the previous chapter (Braun and Clarke, 2006).
The researchers individually coded each transcript to generate coding frames, which were
subsequently re￿ned and re-coded, to produce agreed de novo higher-order themes. These
dual approaches (deductive and inductive) were brought together to summarise the WHO’s
implementation outcomes [table 7.1]2.
2Table 7.1 is reproduced, with permission, from: Implementation Research in Health: A Practical Guide.
Peters D, Tran NT, Adam T. What is Implementation Research, p.30, copyright 2013. Available from
http://www.who.int/alliance-hpsr/resources/implementationresearchguide/en/ (accessed 22/07/2016).




Working de￿nition Related terms
Acceptability The perception among
stakeholders that an inter-
vention is agreeable
Comfort, relative advantage, credibility
Adoption The intention, initial de-
cision, or action to try to
employ a new intervention
Uptake, utilization, intention to try
Appropriateness The perceived ￿t or relev-
ance of the intervention in
a particular setting
Relevance, perceived ￿t, compatibility, tri-
alability, suitability, usefulness, practicabil-
ity
Cost The incremental cost of
the delivery strategy. The
total cost of implementation
would also include the cost
of the intervention itself
Marginal cost
Coverage The degree towhich the pop-
ulation that is eligible to be-
ne￿t from an intervention
actually receives it
Reach, access, service spread or e￿ective
coverage [focusing on those that need an
intervention and its delivery at su￿cient
quality, thus combining coverage and ￿del-
ity], penetration [focusing on the degree
to which an intervention is integrated in a
service setting]
Feasibility The extent to which an inter-
vention can be carried out in
a particular setting or organ-
isation
Practicality, actual ￿t, utility, suitability for
everyday use
Fidelity The degree to which an in-
tervention was implemen-
ted as it was designed in
an original protocol, plan, or
policy
Adherence, delivery as intended, treatment
integrity, quality of programme delivery,
intensity or dosage of delivery
Sustainability The extent to which an inter-
vention is maintained or in-







The relevant data set included 930 HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, 2 semi-structured focus groups with
15 sta￿ (junior doctors [n=3], nurses [n=8] and managers [n=4]), and 44 pages of ethnographic
￿eldnotes. The results will be reported as follows: local context, as de￿ned by the ‘Constructive
comfort’ framework; implementation ￿delity; speci￿c facilitators and barriers for PCTS; and
other implementation outcomes.
7.4.1 Local context
The local context was one in which enthusiasm for change, and receptivity to it, were un-
dermined by a lack of improvement resources; the outsourcing of change management skills;
signi￿cant turnover of experienced sta￿; and an emphasis on standardisation and central control.
These factors will be discussed in more detail.
7.4.1.1 Resources and support
‘Constructive comfort’ asks whether there are su￿cient resources and support for improvement.
Yet, over much of the study period, there appeared to be insu￿cient health economy resources
for frontline teams to comfortably deliver standard care, let alone invest in change. This sus-
tained pressure was manifest in repeated hospital declarations of a ‘black alert’, indicating that
bed capacity had been exceeded, a￿ecting both elective procedures and emergency work. The
strain on sta￿ was at times immense, with clear implications for the quality of care they could
provide:
‘[The sta￿ member] disclosed severe stress due to workload, admitting tearful
breakdowns in front of other clinicians, and reiterated the desire to resign. It was
striking that an experienced, capable colleague had been brought to this level by
workload pressures...’ (Fieldnotes)
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‘If you told me I’d missed a microcytic anaemia [a laboratory abnormality that
may indicate a serious underlying condition, such as colon cancer], I wouldn’t be
surprised. You can’t keep up your [energy] levels for that many patients.’ (Registrar
- Fieldnotes)
‘A long-awaitedmeeting with A&E (Emergency department) and AMU consultants,
general manager and clinical director has been cancelled due to bed pressures. They
are battening down the hatches... The Trust is challenging the [regional] decision
to close nearby A&Es. This is a challenging environment for quality improvement,
to say the least.’ (Fieldnotes)
Sta￿ shortages, as described in the previous chapter [see 6.5.5], formed a constant backdrop
to ward care. These shortages persisted despite e￿orts to recruit additional nurses, nationally
and even internationally; there were also shortages of non-clinical support sta￿. Managers
too found themselves stretched. Senior clinicians and managers openly admitted that, with no
dedicated sta￿ to work on improvement, they had no slack capacity to attend to it themselves:
‘The general manager discussed how there is little improvement capacity in the
department. There are no funded or protected sessions, it’s all done ad hoc. A busi-
ness case for a support person or dedicated session could be looked on favourably.’
(Fieldnotes)
‘They need dedicated, paid time to do safety work - it is not something that can
be added on to an existing sta￿ member’s job description without something else
giving way.’ (Consultant - Fieldnotes)
The limited resources for QI work were further strained by competing priorities and long-
standing commitments. Preparation for an inspection by the CQC was particularly arduous,
the volumes of information needed for regulatory assurance requiring signi￿cant managerial
time. The opening of a new ambulatory emergency care centre also placed demands on the
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available managerial resources. In the face of these pressures, managers tended to invest their
time (and funds) in responding to current demands, rather than planning future improvements.
As the study period progressed, attention then turned to the forthcoming organisational merger.
Again, preparations for this were intensive, leaving clinicians and managers little option other
than to withdraw from other projects.
Nonetheless, QI investment was forthcoming at times. Where a case could be made that
patients and sta￿were poorly served by current arrangements, and that focal investment might
ease overall inpatient ￿ow, middle managers and board executives were receptive. Examples of
￿nancial commitments achieved through HEADS-UP are included in box 6.1. Indeed, at times it
seemed easier to marshall a ￿nancial investment (even in this setting) than a more fundamental
change in pathways or processes [see 7.4.1.2].
7.4.1.2 Capabilities and skills
With little time available to them for quality improvement, it was di￿cult to evaluate whether
senior sta￿ truly had the required capabilities and skills to deliver change. As they would
readily admit themselves, they were more preoccupied with day-to-day ‘￿re￿ghting’. Strategic
operational changes could not be dealt with by these overstretched permanent sta￿: change
management was outsourced to a striking extent. External contractors were employed to as-
sess inpatient ￿ow and discharge delays, establish novel care pathways, and deliver numerous
transformational changes at the interface between hospital and community.
These external contractors described extensive experience of change management, and
successfully achieved several of their goals. However, it is debatable whether their skill sets
contributed to the hospital’s overall receptiveness to change. The contractors’ remit was limited
to their pre-agreed projects, and they did not participate in routine governance, safety and
quality fora. Their skills and insight in pathway design and project management were not
available to those seeking improvements in escalation of care, or sepsis management. The
perception of a lack of improvement capacity suggests that these contractors were not seen as
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an improvement resource for clinical departments or managers [see 7.4.1.1].
When clinicians and managers faced di￿cult challenges, the project management skills and
interpersonal abilities deemed crucial in ‘Constructive comfort’ - such as con￿ict management
and negotiation - were not always evident. There was little internal support to help navigate
antagonistic reactions to change, for example. The hospital’s improvement team had more
experience in governance than QI per se:
‘There was a lot of resistance from these consultants, variously denying that this
was a signi￿cant problem, or that they should be expected to deal with it as a depart-
ment... I was surprised by the relatively passive stance of Dr X [senior clinician]
and Ms Y [senior manager]. It was unclear whether their passivity re￿ected blurred
ownership of the meeting, a pragmatic acceptance of their colleagues’ highly ant-
agonistic stance, or uncertainty about the importance of the proposed changes.’
(Fieldnotes)
For more junior clinical sta￿, a central clinical leadership programme introduced quality
improvement techniques, and the tools to deploy them. The programme had limited capacity,
accepting 10-15 applicants per year, most of whom were junior doctors. Although a small
number of allied health professionals also participated, there was no hospital-wide expectation
that sta￿ should be equipped with these improvement skills. The projects which participants
chose had nominal senior sponsorship; in practice, there was little coordination between the
projects and wider organisational priorities, and they had limited visibility. Other junior doctors
developed their improvement skills through schemes such as the Royal College of Physicians’




In the long build-up to the organisational merger, many senior sta￿moved to other institutions,
reducing the sense of coherent leadership at the hospital. The study period (December 2013 -
February 2015) saw three directors of nursing, three general managers for medicine, two deputy
general managers for medicine, two directors of workforce and development, and two divisional
directors. Other key middle managers and senior clinical managers also left the hospital, or
found themselves with additional responsibilities to cover departing colleagues [box 7.2].
With senior leadership in such ￿ux, it was di￿cult for them to engage with sta￿ on a
patient-centred vision for change. Many of the incoming leaders were external appointees,
building relationships entirely anew, and then moving on again. Even when long-standing sta￿
remained, a major preoccupation was operational stability during the merger period, whilst
new processes and procedures were established for the larger organisation. Paradoxically, the
merger - by de￿nition an enormous organisational change - was actually a stable focal point
for rapidly transitioning senior sta￿. Those senior leaders were less able to support discrete
ward-level programmes, even those that aligned with their own values.
7.4.1.4 Culture
Safety culture is pragmatically de￿ned in ‘Constructive comfort’ as ‘the way things are done
around here’: a ‘healthy’ culture harnesses sta￿ commitment to patient care with a positive
attitude to change. More formally, safety culture is the ‘product of individual and group values...
that determine the commitment to an organisation’s safety management’ [box 1.2]. Whether or
not organisational culture was healthy in this setting proved di￿cult to decide, not least because
di￿erent units within the organisation varied so widely in their attitudes. Signi￿cant variation
within hospitals has been widely documented elsewhere [see 1.5.1], and contrasts between
neighbouring teams - and between senior managers and frontline sta￿ - were prominent here.
Positive elements of culture were evident: senior clinical managers took clear pride in
Box 7.2 Senior sta￿ turnover during the study period
The following roles changed hands during the study period (or shortly after it), or were covered
by other sta￿ due to departures:
• Chairman (2);
• Director of nursing (3);
• Director of workforce and development (2);
• Medical director (2);
• Divisional director of surgery (2);
• General manager for medicine (3);
• Deputy general manager for medicine (2);
• Service manager for medicine (2);
• General manager for clinical support services (prolonged leave);
• Head of information governance (un￿lled post);
• Lead for incident reporting (un￿lled post);
• Matron for emergency care (role rede￿ned);
• Service manager for A&E (2); and
• Portering service manager (3).
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maintaining high standards. For example, an experienced matron made sure to support a new
nurse in her dispute with a junior doctor, insisting that high risk medications must be prescribed
diligently:
‘Verbal prescriptions for insulin... That’s not howwe do it here.’ (Matron - Fieldnotes)
Other teams worked to combine meaningful local audits with service development, drawing
on relevant regional publications for inspiration. Still others demonstrated great willingness to
re￿ect on their own practices as a department, and initiate trials of change. Yet these positive
traits did not permeate evenly throughout the organisation. Certain teams were consistently
di￿cult to engage in quality improvement e￿orts, and some middle managers had become
nihilistic about the possibility of improvement. When it came to the underlying reasons for
delays and ine￿ciencies, senior managers disagreed with the assessments of their colleagues
at the frontline, with a distinct lack of common ground:
‘We have two chances of getting [this done] - fat chance and no chance! We are
monitoring [this] on a daily basis but... the situation is far from ideal and we have
escalated up the chain - not that it has helped.’ (Support service manager - Fieldnotes)
‘The general manager’s perceptions of discharge delays are very di￿erent to the
ward teams’: when delays are appropriately escalated, her experience is that they
are rapidly resolved. Problems with wrong equipment, transport delays, etc., are
more likely to be issues with the wards’ requests than true problems with other
services...’ (Fieldnotes)
Cultural attitudes to risk taking depended not only on the team involved, but the speci￿c
proposal at hand. Major service changes, such as the creation of an ambulatory care centre,
were perhaps seen as inevitable developments, given increasing population demand. Changes
to clinical treatments or protocols may have been perceived as more threatening or risky;
their competing risks were more immediately ￿agged up. Whether one clinical risk was then
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considered more acceptable than the other was in￿uenced by the external environment, and by
historical factors.
For example, the hospital antibiotic protocol relied heavily on gentamicin, a nephrotoxic
drug; procedures to reduce or mitigate gentamicin toxicity had failed on several occasions,
resulting in preventable kidney injuries. This did not prompt a meaningful reassessment of the
alternatives to gentamicin, microbiologists valuing its advantages3 more highly. The ongoing
risk of further acute kidney injuries was seen as a justi￿able one.
Increases in C.di￿cile infections, a potential adverse consequence of a move away from
gentamicin, would be highly visible, clinically important, and ￿nancially penalised; they were
reportable infections identi￿ed through systematic surveillance. Preventable kidney injuries
were neither monitored in the same way, nor subject to equivalent regulatory or ￿nancial
censure4. In addition, the prioritisation of infection control above preventable kidney injuries
may have re￿ected previous successes in this area, which sta￿ were unwilling to jeopardise -
an element of temporal context:
‘Some years ago we were one of the worst Trusts in the country for C.di￿[icile]
and a lot of work went into devising and implementing an antibiotic policy with
narrow spectrum agents [to reduce the risks of hospital-acquired infections]. As
with a lot of treatment options, it is often a matter of exchanging one patient safety
risk for another... [Gentamicin] is an essential part of the antibiotic formulary, and...
I believe the junior doctors need support to prescribe [it] safely...’ (Microbiologist -
Fieldnotes)
Clinicians could also be quick to judge proposed changes that they perceived to be similar to
previous initiatives. Di￿erent teams recalled how ‘Lean’ QI interventions had been deliberately
3Advantages of gentamicin monotherapy, compared to other antibiotics, included limited resistance and lower
risks of hospital-acquired C.di￿cile infection.
4Interestingly, acute kidney injury was soon to become a priority in its own right in the NHS, the focus of a
national campaign - albeit without the punitive mechanisms or surveillance techniques used for hospital-acquired
infections [see https://www.thinkkidneys.nhs.uk/aki/ (accessed 18th July 2016)].
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discontinued by newly arriving organisational leaders. Pneumonia care bundles - designed and
launched with a local QI collaborative - had fallen out of use with a lack of organisational
support. This historical in￿uence presented a barrier to innovation, with authoritative sta￿
dissuading their colleagues from engaging in further change e￿orts.
Safety culture, then,wasmore a patchwork of di￿ering team attitudes and practices than any
one organisational characteristic. Safety attitudes and behaviours re￿ected externally imposed
priorities as well as internal motivations and values. Although there is an assumption of ‘a
shared mindset, common mission or values espoused throughout an organisation’ (Krein et
al., 2010), senior managers disagreed with frontline sta￿ on where improvement was needed.
Indeed, there were so many simultaneous changes to the senior leadership team during the
study period [see 7.4.1.3] that - even if an organisational culture were maintained - they had
little time to absorb its values, let alone enact them.
7.4.1.5 Management practices
Organisational structures and processes were well de￿ned. Each clinical division had a hierarch-
ical structure with explicit levels of responsibility and accountability. There were numerous
standard operating procedures, encompassing - amongst other things - handovers, ward rounds,
and the use of surgical safety checklists. When senior leadership required governance changes
to be disseminated through the various divisions, these changes were assigned to the general
manager and clinical director in each area to oversee, which they typically did promptly.
However, other facets of operational management were less rigorously executed. The hos-
pital intranet was di￿cult to navigate, with numerous links to out-of-date clinical guidelines.
Poor document management was highlighted as a concern by the CQC in the hospital’s 2014 in-
spection. In addition, safety and governance meetings - such as departmental mortality reviews
to identify preventable deaths - were often poorly attended. Although the issue was taken up
with repeat o￿enders, there appeared to be little appetite to resort to performance management
or meaningful sanctions. This reluctance may have re￿ected the tacit understanding that these
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clinicians had been asked to institute new procedures, for which they received no training
nor supportive resources. Castigating them for under-performance might have been unfair -
although many of their colleagues managed to do what they had been asked, despite the same
constraints. This approach did work to some extent: most clinicians were ultimately cajoled
into participating, or at least sending a representative in their place. Nonetheless, some clini-
cians vehemently resisted change; managers tended to work around this, rather than confront it
robustly [see 7.4.1.2]. This undermined the policies and procedures which had been so carefully
delineated.
7.4.1.6 Data and analytics
‘Constructive comfort’ asks whether detailed, timely data are available at all levels of the local
system, as well as sta￿ with the skills to interpret them. The hospital had a small central team
of information analysts: much of their time was taken up with routine reporting, formulating
patient safety scorecards and hospital mortality reports. They were also asked to provide data to
support new hospital initiatives (such as the development of an ambulatory care centre), often
at short notice. The data provided by this central team were typically aggregated to hospital
level, whether for patient safety (e.g., venous thromboembolism, falls, and pressure ulcers) or
mortality (SHMI, HSMR, and crude mortality). Information sources included the hospital’s
own data warehouse, and the healthcare information company CHKS, with which the hospital
had a contract. Information analysts would attend the hospital’s safety forum and mortality
review meeting to discuss their ￿ndings with senior leaders. Aggregated hospital statistics were
graphed to show trends over time, typically with a three month delay to allow for coding and
the recording of relevant outcomes. Senior sta￿ were familiar with statistical process control
charts, and the concepts of common cause and special cause variation.
By contrast, more speci￿c ward-level data were manually generated by ward teams them-
selves, typically on an ‘audit day’ taking place once eachmonth, and then reviewed atmonthly di-
visional meetings. Similarly, any data required for speci￿c unit-level improvement programmes
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were generated by the sta￿ involved; there was no direct interaction with the central informa-
tion team. These data were tabulated, with no graphical indication of trends over time or control
limits. Most ward managers and clinicians had not been formally introduced to those concepts
[see 7.4.1.2].
There was a clear distinction, therefore, between the data and analytical skills available to
senior leadership, and those available to frontline sta￿ and ward leaders.
7.4.1.7 Enabling environment
There was considerable emphasis on standardisation and central control, both from the external
bodies to which hospital leaders were held accountable, and within the hospital itself. Key
institutional priorities were established in negotiations with the local Clinical Commissioning
Group, whose expectations appeared (at best) stringent. Visits from other arm’s-length bodies,
such as the Trust Development Authority,weremore supportive. Nonetheless, the consequences
of failure (as judged by these external bodies) were readily apparent, several regional chief
executives having resigned in the wake of critical regulatory reports.
The hospital was expected to focus on patient safety issues which were largely externally
mandated, such as venous thromboembolism and pressure ulcers. There was little room for the
hospital to establish (or ￿nd resources for) other priorities. Whether intentionally supportive
or not, external bodies made multiple demands of the hospital, be they statistical performance
updates requiring validation, or a thorough regulatory inspection. There appeared to be little
headspace for hospital leadership to carve out improvement priorities and plans of their own
volition.
Within the hospital too, teams were expected to comply with initiatives launched by the
senior leadership team. There was limited provision to support ‘bottom-up’ improvement ideas,
through the clinical leadership programme [see 7.4.1.2]. In the absence of systematic support
for sta￿-driven improvement, these ideas often gained little traction. Some ward leaders did
experiment with changes more informally, usually within the parameters of the hospital’s wider
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priorities; for example, individual surgical wards developed their own routines to review pres-
sure ulcer assessments and care plans at the beginning of a shift. Although experimentation
was not deliberately encouraged per se, success stories were disseminated through safety and
quality improvement fora. Overall, there was perhaps greater con￿dence that strong central
messages and standardised procedures would contribute to improvement, more than delega-
tion and ward-level empowerment. This may have re￿ected the senior leadership’s dominant
familiarity with governance structures above other ways to implement QI [see 7.4.1.2].
7.4.2 Implementation ￿delity
7.4.2.1 Implementer level: brie￿ng ￿delity
As described in chapter 5, ward teams varied considerably in how often they used HEADS-UP,
and how extensively [see 5.4.2]. They also di￿ered in adapting their work￿ow for the inter-
vention. Two wards incorporated HEADS-UP into an existing interdisciplinary meeting; two
wards adopted a joint daily HEADS-UP brie￿ng; and two wards duplicated brie￿ngs to accom-
modate attendance by multiple medical teams. Brie￿ng attendance was dictated by existing
interdisciplinary practice, with only doctors and senior nurses consistently expected to parti-
cipate. Individual sta￿ members’ participation was dependent on their on-call commitments
and patterns of leave.
Brie￿ngs were heavily in￿uenced by pre-existing team dynamics. Consultants’ engagement
was largely consistent with their previous participation in institutional quality improvement
initiatives. Some showed no inclination to be involved; others were proud of how HEADS-UP
had been embedded in their ward work:
‘Our new mantra is HEADS-UP-DATIX [incident reporting] in the same breath.’
(Consultant - Fieldnotes)
Nurse-led brie￿ngs varied in style: some were reluctant to pursue follow-up actions, believ-
ing it unnecessary. Others consistently required their teams to act on the discussion, and were
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su￿ciently enthusiastic to ask for help introducing HEADS-UP to new clinical areas, beyond
the study protocol. In some cases, teams would go well beyond the limits of the pro forma
provided, documenting extensive discussions on numerous continuation sheets. In low ￿delity
brie￿ngs, by contrast, sta￿ completed the HEADS-UP proforma summarily, or with only part
of the team present, and did not explicitly share information:
‘The ward manager waved the pro forma at doctors in a friendly way, asking “any
problems you were aware of?”, rather than going through each category... She sub-
sequently completed some further details on the pro forma on her own, including
patients awaiting discharge and some who had clinically deteriorated... She sug-
gested to me that the rest of the team were already aware of these issues, or that
they did not require any speci￿c action.’ (Fieldnotes)
Despite this variability, the quality of HEADS-UP brie￿ngs was commended by the CQC,
the independent regulator of health and social care services in England, in November 2014.
This was (from the study’s perspective) an unplanned, impartial evaluation of HEADS-UP
implementation, the CQC inspectors observing HEADS-UP brie￿ngs and describing them as
‘outstanding practice’, their highest accolade:
‘Sta￿we spoke to were all aware of the scheme andwere very positive about it... We
observed [HEADS-UP] being used and sta￿ were con￿dently highlighting issues.’
(Care Quality Commission ￿nal report)
7.4.2.2 Implementer level: managerial ￿delity
HEADS-UP data were increasingly incorporated into organisational risk management and gov-
ernance processes. The programme was invited to contribute regularly to the hospital’s mor-
tality review group, chaired by the medical director and the chief executive, and to the division
of medicine’s quality and risk group, chaired by the general manager.
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Some middle managers were able to use robustly-generated ward data to support ongoing
plans for service development and investment, and to develop new strategies outright. This
formed a virtuous circle in which these managers, seeing the bene￿ts of the intervention, in-
creasingly displayed their commitment to it [as hypothesised; see ￿gure 4.5]. Others - hybrid
managers as well as pure managers [see box 8.1] - did little to hold their service areas account-
able for HEADS-UP performance, perhaps believing that the programme aligned poorly with
their existing priorities, or would not prove directly useful for them. On occasion, HEADS-UP
generated data speci￿c enough to raise concerns, but not su￿ciently detailed to allow further
investigation. This was a source of some frustration for managers who were actively reviewing
the data.
Discussions with senior managers revealed other con￿icts and tensions. With limited time
and resources, those managers wanted to validate ward sta￿ reports more thoroughly before
committing themselves to action. One senior leader was also concerned that HEADS-UP would
reduce the number of formal incident reports submitted, the National Reporting and Learning
System having already ￿agged a very low reporting rate compared to other institutions of
similar size:
‘I would like to get some feedback on [these issues] ￿rst... Currently they are
only perception[s], and following investigation it may be that the risk changes, or
the issue is solely around communication of processes already in place.’ (General
manager - Fieldnotes)
Boardmembers questioned how best to detect a meaningful signal amongst the noise of sta￿
reporting (whether through formal incident reports or HEADS-UP), and how then to prioritise
the allocation of limited resources for improvement. They foresaw a challenge in maintaining
and strengthening a culture of safety, if additional resources to resolve valid sta￿ concerns were
not ultimately forthcoming.
At the same time, the possible value of the data was appreciated, multiple senior managers
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enquiring if the programme could be rolled out to more units simultaneously. Towards the end
of the study period, board members were su￿ciently invested in the programme to want to
establish if and how it could be sustained [see 7.4.4.7].
7.4.2.3 Programmatic ￿delity
A summary of implementation strategies, and the study’s ￿delity to them, is shown in table 7.2.
Programmatic implementation challenges might be classed in three groups: contextual chal-
lenges, di￿culties speci￿c to the intervention, and tensions between implementation and eval-
uation.
7.4.2.3.1 Challenges from context First, challenges stemmed from the local context. For
example, the adequacy of programme resources, building an improvement coalition, and train-
the-trainers strategies were limited by the absence of an established improvement infrastructure
with adequate resources, skills and stable leadership. Inadequate programme resources, and
the lack of an existing framework for QI, particularly impacted on the delivery of feedback.
Formal presentations were delivered to three ward teams at regularly scheduled quality meet-
ings. Scheduling clashes, or the absence of an appropriate forum, precluded regular presenta-
tions for the remaining three ward teams.
In mitigation, sta￿ on all study wards were sent regular summary emails, and individuals
were given opportunistic feedback in person throughout the study period. Where feedback
could be delivered formally, it appeared welcome, sta￿ proactively rearranging presentations
that had been postponed due to service pressures:
‘There is a real value in having [someone] external review and feedback theHEADS-
UP information.’ (Consultant - Fieldnotes)
Where wards did not have an existing quality forum, the programme was reliant on the
e￿orts of ward and service managers to help with ongoing training and data dissemination.
The degree to which they did so varied considerably:






Matched funding from hospital and
PSTRC
Funding may have been inadequate for
the programme’s needs, given the exist-
ing improvement infrastructure
Audit & feedback HEADS-UP usage data provided to
teams in person & by email
Timely data provision limited by
manual collection & variable existing
quality fora
Build a coalition Partnerships cultivated with clin-
ical and non-clinical sta￿




Clinical teaching sessions, using
HEADS-UP-identi￿ed concerns &
incidents to promote its use






programme design & delivery
Tension between delivering the innov-
ation & evaluating it
Facilitation Additional support and
troubleshooting for daily brie￿ngs;
follow-up for the concerns raised
Limited access to team members who




Canvassed willingness to introduce
HEADS-UP in the early stages of
implementation
Some of the planned early adopters’ ac-
tual involvement was limited by their
prolonged leave and ward changes
Involve executive
boards
Senior executives gave their sup-
port, and reviewed HEADS-UP im-
plementation data through existing
quality & safety governance struc-
tures
Stepped implementation meant that
HEADS-UP was not fully embraced as
an institutional imperative until later
in the study period
Promote adaptab-
ility
Elements of the brie￿ng adapted for
each clinical area
Proprietary format of the pro forma’s




Gradual roll-out of HEADS-UP to
multiple units
Stepped wedge schedule had to adapt




Ward managers & service man-
agers introduced to HEADS-UP,
and asked to introduce it in turn to
their teams
Variable acceptance of this responsibil-
ity
Abbreviations: PSTRC - Patient Safety Translational Research Centre
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‘We were not being told of the feedback, so I didn’t really get what was happening...
I was just asked to ￿ll out the form with the doctors, with the OT [occupational
therapist] and the physio[therapist]; that was it. When I [moved ward]... I had the
full training, it was explained to me properly, so it was di￿erent and then after a
month you get your feedback...’ (Ward manager)
7.4.2.3.2 Challenges from the intervention itself A second set of barriers to program-
matic ￿delity were due to features of the intervention itself. The proprietary format of the
brie￿ng pro forma restricted wards to make only intermittent changes, whereas rapid iterations
would have been more helpful. Similarly, the paper data collection of the intervention made
rapid data feedback more di￿cult.
7.4.2.3.3 Challenges from a tension between implementation and evaluation Third,
the tensions between rigorous evaluation and e￿ective implementation were manifest. The
study’s internal validity required limited contamination between the control and intervention
groups. However, this may inadvertently have stopped wards from learning from each other,
which is considered an e￿ective way of promoting good implementation. The stepped imple-
mentation meant that HEADS-UP was not fully embraced as a departmental imperative until
later in the study period, limiting executive involvement. It seemed that a critical mass of parti-
cipation was required at ward level, which this gradual implementation plan delayed:
‘There is a tension again between how useful this is to the hospital (which wants
it to be on all wards immediately for data generation) vs the scienti￿c [study]
concept...’ (Fieldnotes)
7.4.3 Facilitators and barriers for PCTS
Four superordinate themes emerged from the focus group discussions: (i) existing processes for
identifying and managing concerns; (ii) the reception for HEADS-UP; (iii) pre-requisites and
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facilitators for its meaningful use; and (iv) barriers.
7.4.3.1 Dissatisfactionwith pre-existing processes helped generate an acceptable and
appropriate intervention
7.4.3.1.1 Formal incident reporting system Fewmanagers had time to coordinate mean-
ingful incident investigation and follow-up. Managers were overwhelmed by unilluminating
reports, and so prioritised incidents which had already caused signi￿cant harm. Little was done
to address problems at an earlier stage, or to resolve issues for which sta￿ had devised a work-
around. Even for serious incidents, the time lag before subsequent action could be considerable.
As a result, the sta￿ submitting reports felt markedly detached from their colleagues who gener-
ated the response. Conversely, incident managers perceived an abrogation of responsibility on
the part of the ward team, who themselves took little action to address what they had reported:
‘[The incident report] just goes o￿ into cyberspace... You feel like you are doing it
for somebody else, it is just￿gures, for things to bemarked, for eventually somebody
to put that all together and to come up with a solution that I won’t be a￿ected by.’
(Foundation doctor)
‘If it was [web] reported... People think that is [the] end of the matter, I have
reported it, it is no longer my responsibility.’ (Service manager)
7.4.3.1.2 Concurrent informal system for managing concerns Sta￿ preferred to escal-
ate certain concerns verbally. This was an entirely separate, informal system for managing
concerns, which sta￿ would deliberately choose to use instead of web reporting. Their choice
was in￿uenced by the nature of the incident, time pressures, and the immediate availability of
someone to talk to, as well as the awareness that web reports were subject to process delays.
Multidisciplinary teams capitalised on this informal system to generate learning, using
existing meetings for feedback or teaching, but only erratically. Again, this learning tended to
be precipitated only by the most serious incidents, after a patient had come to harm:
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‘I would only perhaps raise concerns... or ￿ag something up to one of my con-
sultants, if it was of such a severity, a serious incident or it impacted seriously on
patient care. I think one to one, face to face conversation you expect something
back, and you will approach somebody who you felt had the power to actually do
something about that... If it was something I was concerned about, you are more
likely to have that informal conversation rather than expecting something from a
[web report].’ (Foundation doctor)
HEADS-UP therefore o￿ered several advantages. It was an alternative route to identify sta￿
concerns that were not well recorded with the formal web report system; it proposed better use
of the existing informal mechanisms through which concerns were escalated; and it moved the
initial nidus of conversation about action back to the teamwho had ￿rst reported the issue. Both
frontline and managerial sta￿ were conscious of their dissatisfaction with existing reporting
mechanisms, and the intervention’s explicit goal to make better use of frontline knowledge
resonated with them. Clinical sta￿ were often interested to hear more about HEADS-UP after
early presentations: ‘We need that here’ was one such reaction.
7.4.3.2 The reception for HEADS-UP: signi￿cant reservations, mitigated by positive
experiences
Despite its acceptability, HEADS-UP represented another intervention in a long line of QI
initiatives. Conscious of the resource and opportunity costs, and under intense service pressures,
many sta￿ reacted cautiously or negatively to its introduction in practice, with signs of intense
change fatigue:
‘Initially it was like, “Oh God, what are we doing now?”’ (Ward manager)
‘How long are we doing this for?’ (Charge nurse - Fieldnotes)
Sta￿ were sceptical how HEADS-UP would bring about change, or the type and extent of
that change. However, the wards that overcame their initial hesitation found their perceptions
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of HEADS-UP altered quickly, and incorporated it into their normal work￿ow – even to the
point where sta￿ felt that removing it again might be di￿cult:
‘Actually, when we got into it, it became routine, it took ten minutes really... To
go through the form, decide what was happening, who was doing what, any other
issues, how can we address this, and it is done.’ (Ward manager)
‘I think [our ward] was very good, because it was very formalised, everyone knew
what time it was going to happen, and more or less all the time everyone was there,
including physio[therapy] and OT [occupational therapy].’ (Foundation doctor)
‘I think you would have a hard job taking [HEADS-UP] away from some places
now.’ (Foundation doctor)
7.4.3.3 Facilitators and pre-requisites for meaningful use
Box 7.3 summarises the factors a￿ecting HEADS-UP implementation, as identi￿ed by focus
group participants. In addition, high performing units tended to have several characteristics
clustered together that supported HEADS-UP:
• An existing, regularly scheduled interdisciplinary quality forum for feedback;
• The explicit senior expectation that HEADS-UP would be incorporated into daily practice;
• A history of engagement with quality improvement interventions;
• Empowered nursing sta￿; and
• Sub-teams that collaborated rather than working in isolation.
The facilitators and barriers will now be outlined in more detail.
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7.4.3.3.1 Training and expectation setting Sta￿ in low-￿delity areas perceived greater
training requirements than those in high-￿delity areas, who found the brie￿ng requirements
easier to navigate. Without protected time for team training, teams that were already well
placed to adopt HEADS-UP (through structures, practice or personality) largely retained that
advantage through the study period:
‘It is very self-explanatory what each part entails, so as long as someone is going
through and leading the discussion through it, it works.’ (Foundation doctor)
An agreed start time, dedicated multidisciplinary attendance, and a speci￿c focus on ac-
countability helped establish an appropriately formal brie￿ng tone. This established collective
responsibility and a shared purpose, mitigating any changes in leadership style from one day
to the next. Where HEADS-UP was used best, it was underpinned by a senior clinician’s expli-
cit expectation that it would be done reliably. However, a lack of agreement about reporting
priorities hindered the translation of brie￿ng-identi￿ed concerns into formal incident reports.
7.4.3.3.2 Facilitation and feedback Althoughmeaningful HEADS-UP brie￿ngs depended
on local ownership, there was a need (as one risk manager put it) for a dedicated programme
facilitator ‘to bang the drum a bit’. This was important to maintain sta￿ engagement with the
programme, but also speci￿cally to identify and link key points arising from HEADS-UP in
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di￿erent areas. However, this may have inadvertently blurred the responsibility for addressing
the safety issues that were then identi￿ed. An important component of the facilitation role
ultimately involved follow-up with clinicians, managers, and executives to explore how these
safety concerns could be addressed:
‘I’d say it would have to be one person rather than a person in each area, to be able
to spot those themes coming through and to be able to collate all the information...
[Web reports] sometimes [go] to ten di￿erent people... and everyone is trying to
do their own thing in their own department.’ (Foundation doctor)
Feedback to participating clinical teams was widely acknowledged to be important, re-
inforcing clinicians’ commitment to the programme. Opportunities to re￿ect on episodes of
good performance (positive deviance) were welcomed, the teams recognising that they did not
routinely do so:
‘I think people forget they can learn equally as well from things that went well and
things that haven’t gone well, and we are missing potentially an opportunity to
learn from... “Why did it go well? Can we replicate that and spread that?”’ (Service
manager)
Many sta￿ members were eager for HEADS-UP to continue, but were conscious that it
might lose relevance if supportive facilitation and feedback were not maintained. Senior man-
agers were more optimistic that HEADS-UP was su￿ciently embedded to continue without
a dedicated lead. No further resources were obtained to support it; instead, local champions
were nominated in each area. Frontline brie￿ngs were still continuing several months after the
study period formally ended, albeit with concerns about reduced e￿ectiveness in the absence
of a robust mechanism for issue escalation and resolution:
‘They’re still using it religiously.’ (Consultant - Fieldnotes)
7.4 Results 211
7.4.3.3.3 Organisational support The piecemeal introduction of HEADS-UP was a prag-
matic choice, recognising the evaluation bene￿ts of a stepped wedge study and the small study
team’s logistical constraints. Nonetheless, ￿delity might have been improved by a simultaneous
roll-out to all of the intervention units, appropriately resourced, building a more collaborative
participant community. This was recognised by sta￿ as well as the research team [see 7.4.2.3.3]:
‘In retrospect, in hindsight, I think as an organisation we could have supported its
implementation more... I think if other organisations were implementing it, then
they can look and learn from us, to say actually it really is of value and it is worth
supporting from the very beginning, don’t let it just trickle in, come in with a big
bang, make it happen.’ (Service manager)
7.4.3.4 Barriers to PCTS
7.4.3.4.1 Sta￿ng and service pressures Consistent multidisciplinary attendance at any
team meeting was a major challenge. Sta￿ng shortages and intense service demands could also
compromise meaningful interdisciplinary discussion, even after the HEADS-UP brie￿ng had
started. In some cases, however, ward nurses demanded these meetings be prioritised:
‘You will have to put your foot down at times... The locum [doctor] has no choice
but to stay with me until [HEADS-UP is] ￿nished [laughs]. Same with my OT
[occupational therapist] and physio[therapist]... We won’t ￿nish until everyone
has put out their opinions. [On another ward] however, I’ve noticed our physio
and our OT, because they are short [sta￿ed]... will try to leave earlier... So I will
say to them, “No you have to wait, I need to speak to you... because it’s already
￿agged up that these particular patients [were] not discharged yesterday.”’ (Ward
manager)
Shift patterns also played a role in determining what clinical sta￿wanted to focus on during
their time at work. Sporadic shifts, providing less continuity of care, pushed sta￿ to focus on
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more immediately pressing patient care issues. Discussing pervasive service problems seemed
less relevant during these nomadic appearances on the ward:
‘I’d be days o￿ and then doing nights on the weekend... The thing about [short]
sta￿ng... or if there’s any delays in phlebotomy or in echo[cardiography] or any
services, I don’t really – I didn’t really mind that, I was more in to the deterioration
of the patients or why were they not discharging... So those were the things that I
looked at.’ (Ward manager)
7.4.3.4.2 Interdisciplinary norms Counterproductive interdisciplinary norms (e.g. tardy
attendance at existing team meetings) challenged HEADS-UP implementation. One registrar
reported being told not to attend pre-existing meetings on his ward as they were of ‘no educa-
tional value’. However, a more productive interdisciplinary structure could even mitigate the
di￿culties of sta￿ng shortages and high intensity workload. How existing meetings were run
a￿ected both HEADS-UP, and the workload for the remainder of the day:
‘Nurse X’s handover could take 45 mins to get through all the patients. People
would get upset if she made them do HEADS-UP after that.’ (Ward manager)
‘So [medical sta￿] missed the discussion on a lot of the patients... and then that
causes just a knock-on e￿ect. I don’t think they value the [existing] meeting and
then ironically they’ll be the ￿rst to complain that they weren’t told about some-
thing.’ (Risk manager)
7.4.4 Other implementation outcomes
Thematic strands from these analyses can be drawn together, to describe each of the imple-
mentation outcomes de￿ned in table 7.1.
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7.4.4.1 Acceptability
Managers and clinicians were dissatis￿ed with the e￿ectiveness of the formal and informal
systems for managing concerns. HEADS-UP o￿ered improvements in information recording
and follow-up, making better use of existing mechanisms for escalating concerns.
7.4.4.2 Adoption
Managers and senior clinical leaders were keen to employ HEADS-UP. Frontline sta￿ were
interested in the potential bene￿ts, but expressed intense change fatigue.
7.4.4.3 Appropriateness
Themethodology and goals of the HEADS-UP programme resonatedwith clinical sta￿, although
some were sceptical how it would bring about change in practice.
7.4.4.4 Cost
This was not formally assessed.
7.4.4.5 Coverage
Frontline sta￿ coverage was restricted by existing practice, which primarily limited brie￿ng
attendance to doctors and senior nurses. Not all sta￿ received all feedback modalities, and
managerial access was constrained by sta￿ turnover and major competing priorities.
7.4.4.6 Feasibility
Sta￿ used HEADS-UP brie￿ngs up to 100% of working days each month. Frontline teams were
able to complete timely brie￿ngs, and incorporate them into normal work￿ow.
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7.4.4.7 Sustainability
Brie￿ngs were better institutionalised than feedback and facilitation. Managers planned to
maintain the programme by placing HEADS-UP brie￿ng percentages in ward-level nursing
scorecards, and establish ward champions and ward responsibility for data collection. Frontline
brie￿ngs were ongoing well beyond the end of the study period, but ward sta￿ expressed some
concerns about their continued e￿ectiveness, given the lack of an overall programme lead.
Although a HEADS-UP facilitator was generally acknowledged to be helpful, continuation
of this role was made di￿cult by uncertainty about the post-merger organisational governance
structure. Dedicated consultant time for governance and quality improvement was funded, but
no candidate was immediately forthcoming. The place of HEADS-UP in the new, larger, post-
merger organisation was ultimately unclear. However, the obstetrics division, which already
had a clearer structure for governance and safety, did introduce their own version of HEADS-UP
with consultant leadership.
7.5 Discussion
This evaluation explored the implementation of PCTS at hospital 1, where the majority of the
study wards were located. Features of the local context in￿uenced the capacity for implementa-
tion, with varying ￿delity at brie￿ng, managerial and programmatic levels. Auto-ethnographic
￿eldnotes and semi-structured focus groups identi￿ed speci￿c facilitators and barriers for this
novel safety strategy, and the programme’s other implementation outcomes. These suggest op-
portunities to improve implementation in other contexts, to augment the programme’s e￿ects.
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7.5.1 Summary of ￿ndings
7.5.1.1 Local context
Local enthusiasm for change was hampered by extreme service pressures, and few speci￿c
resources for improvement. At a senior level, which was in a state of ￿ux, change management
had been largely outsourced. The improvement e￿orts of junior sta￿ were not systematically
coordinated. Data management and analysis were concentrated at higher organisational levels.
Rather than having a single culture, teams adopted di￿erent standards and attitudes to
change, dependent on the innovation itself, historical institutional challenges, and the success or
failure of previous initiatives. Close oversight by hospital regulators and commissioning bodies
limited the organisation’s ability to establish its own priorities. This in turn was re￿ected in a
relatively top-down management culture.
7.5.1.2 Implementation ￿delity
Brie￿ng implementation was predicated on existing interdisciplinary work￿ow. Consultant en-
gagementwith the brie￿ngs variedwidely; similarly, there was a spectrum of nurse engagement,
to which pre-existing di￿erences in team dynamics and handover skills may have contributed.
Independent regulators were impressed by the quality of the brie￿ngs they observed.
Implementation ￿delity on the part ofmiddlemanagersmay have depended on the perceived
personal relevance of HEADS-UP data. Senior managers were conscious of the need to validate
concerns and prioritise the allocation of limited resources, but were eager to see HEADS-UP
adopted on more units.
Eleven implementation strategies were used. Programmatic ￿delity to these strategies was
constrained by contextual factors, challenges inherent to the design of the intervention, and
tensions between implementation and evaluation.
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7.5.1.3 Facilitators and barriers for PCTS
Dissatisfaction with pre-existing processes helped sta￿ to perceive HEADS-UP as an acceptable
and appropriate intervention. Due to an intense change fatigue, it was still received warily, but
wards that overcame their initial hesitation then embraced it in their normal work￿ow. These
wards tended to have strong senior backing for HEADS-UP, alongside an existing interdiscip-
linary quality forum, a history of engagement with QI interventions, empowered nursing sta￿,
and sub-teams who worked together rather than as entirely separate entities.
Facilitation, feedback, and appropriate organisational support were highlighted as import-
ant for the programme’s success. Speci￿c training, and establishing expectations for the brie￿ng,
were suggested to improve ￿delity. Excessive clinical workload, counterproductive interdiscip-
linary norms, sta￿ng issues, and inconsistent shift patterns all jeopardised potentially useful
brie￿ngs.
7.5.1.4 Other implementation outcomes
PCTS was a largely acceptable and appropriate intervention in this setting, which sta￿ were
willing to adopt - although frontline sta￿ were initially more sceptical than their managers.
Brie￿ngs proved to be feasible additions to existing interdisciplinary work￿ow.
However, the intervention’s coverage and sustainability were more challenging. Although
the incorporation of HEADS-UP into existing work￿ows eased its adoption, the design of those
same work￿ows restricted brie￿ng attendance, and the delivery of feedback. Access to ma-
nagerial sta￿ was constrained by sta￿ turnover. Brie￿ngs were sustained at ward level, but
the merger reduced managerial engagement, precluding a long-term plan to sustain the pro-
gramme’s facilitation. The cost-e￿ectiveness of PCTS was not assessed.
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7.5.2 Limitations
Both data sources for this evaluation were reliant on access to the sta￿ (managers and clinicians)
who implemented the HEADS-UP programme. It proved easier to gain access to those who
engaged with it; the evaluation may less accurately represent the views of those who did
not. Implementation outcomes may be contested: quantitative measures are poorly developed
(Lewis et al., 2015), and the number of related terms attached to each WHO de￿nition re￿ects
the complexity of the concepts. The evaluation may therefore have been particularly prey to
con￿rmation bias; the blurred line between researcher and study participants is a consistent
challenge for this model of research (Marshall et al., 2014).
I took several steps to counter any inherent bias. Focus group moderators were briefed,
but had not previously worked with the participants; transcripts were coded independently by
two researchers prior to analysis; and emergent themes were grounded within the experience
of the focus groups and supplemented by auto-ethnography, rather than vice-versa. Although
auto-ethnography can only be ‘accurate’ in the sense that it is one person’s document of record,
I feel that it provides a meaningful perspective on the implementation experience over the study
period. The richness of the data mitigates their potential ￿aws. Integration of research sta￿
with clinical teams is not only unavoidable in this setting; indeed, it is vitally important, if those
teams are to feel comfortable discussing failings in care (Wong et al., 2015).
Two complementary analyses (inductive and deductive) were required, as focus group dis-
cussions were not readily mapped to the ‘Constructive comfort’ framework, as had been planned
originally. There are several possible reasons for the apparent mismatch. ‘Constructive comfort’
is an ambitious document, specifying policy-level levers for change as well as novel advice for
local change management. It describes success factors ‘for change at any level of the health
system, but particularly locally in organisations’ (Allcock et al., 2015). However, assessing these
factors (e.g., organisational leadership, culture, and quality improvement capacity) still requires
a broad, pan-organisational view that frontline sta￿may not be privy to: focus group discussions
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largely centred on microsystem observations. ‘Constructive Comfort’ may be more relevant to
policy-level changes than local quality improvement programmes, or it may be that discussants
need to include the senior organisational leaders who are better able to re￿ect on its components.
Another possibility is that this framework, like Greenhalgh’s di￿usion of innovations model,
is less well suited to the trial setting than to routine changes in practice (McMullen et al., 2015).
Future studies should take this into account,when selecting a theoretical basis for their empirical
work. Øvretveit (2014) has previously recommended other frameworks to explain context. For
complex, multiple component interventions (like PCTS), Øvretveit cited Damschroder’s ‘Con-
solidated framework for implementation research’ (Damschroder et al., 2009), and the PARiHS
model (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2013). An earlier version of the PARiHS model had the advantage
of a validated instrument for QI context assessment in the NHS, the Context Assessment Index
(CAI) (McCormack et al., 2009).
7.5.3 Implications for future work
For complex interventions like PCTS to achieve their maximum e￿cacy, more comprehensive
implementation campaigns are typically needed. For example, in an intervention to improve
handovers, Starmer et al. (2014) used a two-hour training workshop; a one-hour simulation
session; a computermodule for independent learning; a faculty development programme; direct-
observation tools for immediate participant feedback; and campaigns for process and culture
change, with dedicated promotional materials.
This evaluation found substantial opportunities to improve the ￿delity, coverage and sus-
tainability of the HEADS-UP intervention. These de￿cits could be addressed by broadening the
intervention, to include a wider range of implementation strategies. Speci￿cally, implement-
ation might be more e￿ective with additional components for team training; optimisation of
work￿ow and brie￿ng participation; establishing more formal expectations for the brie￿ng and
managerial follow-up; and digitisation to eliminate the manual element of data collection. An
7.5 Discussion 219
example of an electronic application to ease HEADS-UP data collection5 is shown in appendix E.
This would allow greater focus on e￿ective facilitation, which was ￿agged repeatedly as an
important component of the intervention. More structured approaches could also match imple-
mentation strategies to the identi￿ed barriers and facilitators for PCTS (Powell et al., 2015a).
Implementation e￿orts are often overlooked when trial e￿ects are generalised to the real
world: trials typically establish interventions’ e￿cacy, not e￿ectiveness. The HEADS-UP trial
was designed to be a more pragmatic study of PCTS e￿ectiveness (Loudon et al., 2015). Non-
etheless, this evaluation suggests how the intervention could be optimised further, without
compromising its real-world utility. A further evaluation of the updated intervention would
be warranted: reliance on the quantitative and qualitative results achieved so far [chapters 5
and 6] would be premature. Whether the intervention could have been better optimised prior
to its assessment in any trial is discussed further in chapter 10.
7.5.4 Conclusions
The design and introduction of HEADS-UP achieved several key implementation goals. Other
implementation outcomes were heavily in￿uenced by existing interdisciplinary practices and
the local context, which the implementation model had not fully addressed. Managerial commit-
ment to the programme was an important aspect of implementer ￿delity, determining which
safety and quality concerns would be resolved, and how. In the next chapter, I explore how
managerial engagement in QI might be improved.
5The app was designed with Matthew Harrison, Senior Designer at the HELIX centre, and implemented for iPad
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The model of alignment
8.1 Introduction
In chapter 7, I described how the novel safety strategy of PCTS achieved several desirable
implementation outcomes, such as feasibility, appropriateness, acceptability, adoption, and - to
an extent - ￿delity. The programme did not produce changes in structures or processes in a
linear fashion, however. Rather, there were unpredictable advances, particularly when clinicians’
and managers’ interests directly aligned.
The degree to which managerial engagement in QI a￿ects programme outcomes has not
been widely explored. More often, the di￿culties of scaling up QI programmes are attributed
to problems with clinical engagement, or the broader context in which the programme takes
place. Neither clinical engagement nor context is well de￿ned (Taitz et al., 2012; Nilsen, 2015),
yet the two often become de facto explanations for QI failure. Moreover, the numerous complex
models examining context and QI might overwhelm researchers and clinicians [see 7.1.2]: there
is limited ‘how-to’ support for those actually implementing change (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011;
Taylor et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2012; Dixon-Woods et al., 2013; Harvey et al., 2015). Here, I
The work described in this chapter has been published as: Pannick S, Sevdalis N, Athanasiou T. Beyond clinical
engagement: a pragmatic model for quality improvement interventions, aligning clinical and managerial priorities.
BMJ Qual Saf 2016; 25:716-25. DOI: 10.1136/bmjqs-2015-004453
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discuss whether the dominant focus on clinical sta￿ has been misplaced, and propose a novel,
pragmatic model for the development and selection of e￿ective, durable QI interventions.
8.2 Aims
The aims of this chapter are:
(i) To explore de￿nitions of clinical engagement;
(ii) To discuss speci￿c challenges of clinical engagement in QI;
(iii) To describe the role of managerial sta￿ in QI implementation; and
(iv) To generate a pragmatic model of aligned clinical and managerial incentives in the pursuit
of QI.
8.3 Methods
This chapter draws on a selective narrative review of publications describing clinical and ma-
nagerial engagement in hospital improvement e￿orts. The review was not intended to be a
systematic one; rather, it was guided by the previous discussions of context [see 7.1.2], and
informed by the auto-ethnography and implementation evaluation of the HEADS-UP study
[see 6.3.1.1 and 7.4]. Given the substantial changes in healthcare management in the United
Kingdom over the past 30 years (Gri￿ths, 1983), the review focuses on more recent literature.
This generates themes of greater relevance to modern NHS practice.
Pertinent publications were initially identi￿ed in governmental reports, health services
research journals, quality and safety journals, and specialist reports from charities such as the
King’s Fund and the Health Foundation. Hand searches of their reference lists, and exploration
of similar work by those authors, were then augmented by topic suggestions from academics in
the ￿eld. A similar approach was taken in a recently published narrative review with equivalent
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scope (Ocloo and Matthews, 2016). A novel model to explore clinician-manager alignment in
QI was then produced, again drawing on the practical experience of implementing a novel
intervention. Finally, this model was retrospectively applied to the HEADS-UP study, to test its
utility.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 Engagement: a reciprocal commitment from sta￿ and their organisa-
tion
There is no universal de￿nition of engagement: it may be an attitude, behaviour, an outcome
— or all three (MacLeod and Clarke, 2011). Schaufeli et al. (2002) describe engagement as an
employee’s positive motivational state, characterised by ‘vigour, dedication and absorption’. A
broader, more cooperative, position is that engagement is a two-way phenomenon,with an onus
on the organisation to establish conditions encouraging engagement and the opportunities for
it to be manifest.
Clinical engagement, then, involves sta￿ actively contributing ‘within their normal working
roles to maintaining and enhancing the performance of the organisation, which itself recognises
this commitment in supporting and encouraging high quality care’ (Spurgeon et al., 2011).
This working de￿nition makes it clear that real engagement is a very di￿erent entity to sta￿
acquiescence, for which it is often confused (Clark, 2012; Milliken, 2014).
In QI, however, clinical engagement has been summarised simply as sta￿’s ‘active involve-
ment’, with no recognition of the possible dialogue between clinicians and those seeking to
improve their performance (Wilkinson et al., 2011). That no organisational contribution is
expected may go some way to explaining why clinical engagement has been problematic. Al-
though there is speci￿c literature pertaining to physician engagement, in this discussion (unless
speci￿ed otherwise) I group clinical healthcare professionals together. QI interventions are typ-
ically interdisciplinary, and securing greater engagement of a single sta￿ group is not an end
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in itself, only a step towards an ‘organisational culture where all sta￿ feel valued and involved’
(Clark, 2012).
8.4.2 Clinical engagement can be improved by co-design, local modi￿cation
and strategic selection of QI interventions
Healthcare professionals have been reluctant to involve themselves in QI initiatives. This is
especially apparent in periods of sustained organisational turbulence, but is a long-standing,
multifactorial and international problem (Wilkinson et al., 2011). Doctors are disproportionately
hesitant to participate in safety behaviours like incident reporting, and active resistance from
senior sta￿ remains the most common barrier to the successful implementation of interdiscip-
linary safety checklists (Evans et al., 2006; Farley et al., 2008; Lingard et al., 2008; Fourcade et al.,
2012; O’Connor et al., 2013; Treadwell et al., 2014; Russ et al., 2015). The narrative of ‘automatic’
clinical resistance to new initiatives, or ‘change fatigue’, is seemingly widely accepted within
the QI literature. Circumventing this fatigue is considered a major triumph, even fundamental
to QI success. With few exceptions, local QI breakthroughs are attributed to good clinical en-
gagement; conversely, failures are seen only through the prism of inadequate clinical buy-in
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; Dixon-Woods et al., 2013).
Not all interventions are subject to the same clinical disengagement barrier, however: some
programmes might have lower thresholds for participation (Taylor et al., 2011; Øvretveit, 2011;
Øvretveit et al., 2011). Conversely, problems with the introduction of a speci￿c improvement
strategy do not necessarily indicate a wider reluctance to change practice. The intervention’s
characteristics, at least in part, determine its reception.
Iterative co-design of the HEADS-UP intervention with physicians, to maximise its face
validity, mitigated much of their expected resistance [see 8.4.6]. The process of co-design may
also (in itself) improve sta￿ ownership of the intervention. Other strategies may also have im-
mediate appeal: interventions that used peer facilitation, wider reporting options and feedback,
or engaging whole teams to identify problems all seemingly fell on fertile ground (Weingart
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et al., 2000; King et al., 2006; Schuerer et al., 2006; Evans et al., 2007; Nabors et al., 2011; Sujan
et al., 2011; Lear et al., 2013; Nabors et al., 2014; Dijkema et al., 2015; Provenzano et al., 2015).
Even when QI strategies do not appeal intuitively to clinicians, generating clinical engage-
ment need not prove an insurmountable challenge. De￿ning the ‘soft periphery’ of a QI pro-
gramme —the elements that should be ￿exibly adapted to optimise the programme’s acceptance,
without invalidating the entire intervention — is key (McMullen et al., 2015). Making the e￿ort
to appropriately modify QI tools for the context in which they will be applied (e.g., creating
separate versions of surgical safety checklists for di￿erent specialties) then makes those tools
much more palatable for clinicians.
In fact, local adaptation is the most commonly cited factor a￿ecting checklist implementa-
tion, more so even than resistance from speci￿c clinicians (Russ et al., 2015). This re￿ects each
organisation’s responsibility to create the opportunities for meaningful engagement: active
clinical involvement is more likely when QI tools have been purposefully tailored, and when
there is protected time for training to use them (Wilkinson et al., 2011; Russ et al., 2015). In con-
trast, unmodi￿ed checklists are unlikely to be used as intended, nor improve patient outcomes
— regardless of hospitals’ reported compliance (Leape, 2014; Urbach et al., 2014).
While co-design and local modi￿cation do improve the adoption of QI interventions, the
￿nancial and opportunity costs of pre-existing e￿orts represent a major challenge to any new
initiative. Relentless organisational change, with little sense of an overall strategic direction,
also contributes to a general ennui. Clinicians, believing that each ‘fad’ will soon be replaced
with another, feel there is ‘little point in investing heavily in any one initiative’ (Wilkinson
et al., 2011). The strategic selection of a limited number of QI interventions, appropriate to the
organisation’s capacity to implement them, is therefore crucial (Burnett et al., 2010; Harvey
et al., 2015).
Experts have identi￿ed 22 patient safety strategies with a su￿cient evidence base to recom-
mend their widespread adoption: organisations may choose to focus on these ￿rst, with a view
to their speci￿c local needs (Shekelle et al., 2013a; Shekelle et al., 2013b). However, if organisa-
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tions are to select only the QI targets that they have the capacity and willpower to pursue, other
potentially valuable initiatives need be deferred in the interests of preserving engagement and
momentum. Regulatory bodies have an important role here: they should give institutions the
time and space to develop these focused improvement strategies (Jones and Woodhead, 2015).
It may seem odd to decry the slow pace of improvement, and yet advocate a more deliberate,
institution-speci￿c approach. With space for self-determination, however, organisations that
strategically shape their QI attempts go on to see wider bene￿ts, tackling deep cultural issues
that go unaddressed with more haphazard approaches (Jones and Woodhead, 2015).
8.4.3 Beyond clinical engagement: the role of managers in QI
Improving clinical engagement is only part of the solution to ine￿ective QI: ‘administrative
engagement is equally important, or disillusionment... ensues’ (Milliken, 2014). Quality of care
is not a leading priority for many hospital boards, however (Jha and Epstein, 2010; Jha and
Epstein, 2013; Parand et al., 2014). Although board-level attention to quality issues has been
associated with clinical quality, how this commitment translates, in practice, into front-line
action remains unclear (Jiang et al., 2009; Jha and Epstein, 2010; Birken et al., 2012; Jha and
Epstein, 2013).
A recent survey study provided a key insight: board and middle management practices
are linked, and correlate strongly with hospital performance on clinical quality metrics (Tsai
et al., 2015). Certain board characteristics were speci￿cally linked to middle management styles:
board attention to quality was associated with management practices that monitored it, and the
use of quality metrics at board level corresponded to good operational management and target
setting. If good management is truly associated with clinical quality, the role of managers in QI
deserves further attention.
Yet managerial participation in QI interventions is often assumed, rather than analysed
in detail. Although senior hospital executives may participate constructively in collaborative
safety programmes, active managerial involvement usually goes no further than the ‘expres-
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sions of support’ described in many QI reports (Parand et al., 2013; Reames et al., 2015). More
detailed evaluations describe di￿culties recruiting executives to work with QI teams, even as
part of major safety initiatives (Dixon-Woods et al., 2013). When they do engage, managers
have a di￿erent outlook on quality and safety programmes to clinical sta￿, perceiving di￿erent
components of the programme to be valuable and holding more positive views of the overall
results (Parand et al., 2011). Meaningful input from managers is important for the design, mon-
itoring and evaluation of QI interventions; simply obtaining their permission to proceed is not
enough.
There is little published work on the role of managers in QI, the majority of which relates
only to senior (board-level) managers, rather than the middle managers under their supervi-
sion (Birken et al., 2012; Parand et al., 2014). Importantly, most improvement initiatives fail to
specify how they engage these middle managers, with whom front-line sta￿ interact directly
and regularly. Middle managers are a particularly heterogeneous group, with diverse profes-
sional backgrounds, often promoted on the basis of a technical skill set rather than any speci￿c
leadership or management ability (Federico and Bonacum, 2010; Birken et al., 2012). Many
have ‘hybrid’ clinical and administrative duties, with an inherent tension between those roles
[box 8.1] (Doherty et al., 2010; Buchanan, 2013). Their decisions are necessarily ‘constrained,
contested and political’, but favour knowledge drawn from experience rather than research
￿ndings (Walshe and Rundall, 2001; Dopson et al., 2012; Edwards et al., 2013).
Little more is known about the cognitive biases that a￿ect middle managers’ judgements,
but enthusiasm for QI is not automatic. For example, they may feel the operating costs of
QI programmes are not justi￿ed by any potential future bene￿ts (Morgan et al., 2015). There
remains a pressing need for research into how healthcare managers balance their multiple ￿scal,
statutory and service responsibilities (Parand et al., 2014).
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Box 8.1Middle managers, hybrid managers and pure managers
Middle manager
‘Any manager two levels below the CEO and one level above line workers & professionals’ (Huy,
2001)
Hybrid manager
A manager whose role combines clinical & managerial responsibilities
Pure manager
A manager whose responsibilities are entirely managerial, with no clinical workload
8.4.4 In￿uencing middle managers to facilitate e￿ective QI: status, incent-
ives and resources
It appears, then, thatmanagers contribute to organisational quality; that their active involvement
in QI has been taken for granted rather than proven; and that their decision-making relating
to QI is likely to be complex, with con￿icting priorities that are not easily resolved. Yet middle
managers, in particular, are uniquely placed to facilitate e￿ective QI. They have the power to
accelerate or impede the implementation of innovations, mediating organisational messages
for front-line sta￿, but also upwardly in￿uencing their seniors to draw attention to the high-
level support needed for speci￿c QI programmes (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997; Birken et al.,
2012; Birken et al., 2015). Acting as information brokers, translating organisational strategy into
actionable tasks, and promoting innovative practice, middle managers can convince clinical
sta￿ to prioritise QI implementation among numerous competing demands (Birken et al., 2012).
Harnessing middle managers’ ability to broker organisational and front-line attention to
a QI programme may prove essential to its success: proactive commitment from middle man-
agers does in￿uence e￿ective QI implementation (Birken et al., 2013). Although many advocate
a clinician-led, ‘bottom-up’ approach to improvement (Braithwaite et al., 2009), sta￿-driven
initiatives that do not align well with strategic priorities have only limited impact or longevity
(Proudlove et al., 2008; Rycroft-Malone et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2015). Clear tensions emerge
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when QI e￿orts are delegated entirely to clinicians without support for their direction and goals
(Morgan et al., 2015). Without more senior support, front-line sta￿ are unable to marshal the
resources required to spread change, and managers have an important role to play in navigating
cross-departmental obstacles (Parand et al., 2014; Stewart et al., 2015). Managers who e￿ectively
facilitate QI, without micromanaging it, are well appreciated by front-line sta￿. The subsequent
pace of change may be slow, but a combination of top-down and bottom-up implementation
results in a lasting impact (Stewart et al., 2015).
Senior managers play a role in determining middle managers’ commitment to QI. These
senior managers should directly emphasise QI as an organisational priority, incentivise QI com-
mitment in performance reviews, and— vitally—make the necessary resources available (Birken
et al., 2015). In addition, encouraging middle managers to leverage the human resources and per-
formance reviews at their own disposal also improves their commitment to QI implementation.
Interestingly, a performance-related human resources management framework for clinicians
has recently been described and implemented, encountering little of the expected physician
resistance (Trebble et al., 2015). Transparent negotiation of QI goals at each organisational level
may therefore be feasible and necessary for high quality implementation.
8.4.5 A model of alignment for successful QI
I suggest that neither clinicians nor managers can make meaningful QI progress in isolation:
their collaboration is fundamental to sustainably embedding practice innovations. The choice
of a QI intervention, and its implementation model, both need coordination between clinical
and managerial teams. I have discussed, in the preceding sections, how each group might be
motivated to take part in this process. Yet their e￿orts need to be aligned, if QI is to form a
signi￿cant part of their workload, and not be overwhelmed by other priorities (Tsai et al., 2015).
I highlight some examples of QI programmes in which the degree of collaboration between
front-line and managerial sta￿ may have contributed to the ultimate outcome [table 8.1]. In
trials reporting signi￿cant improvements, investigators ensured there was adequate managerial
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participation — or took on managerial roles themselves — to complement clinical involvement
(Pronovost et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2009; Haugen et al., 2013; Haugen et al., 2015). Similarly,
implementation and spread of a QI intervention in a real-world setting was best accomplished
with the co-leadership of top-level administrators and front-line champions (Stewart et al.,
2015). Where managerial engagement was lacking, interventions did not improve outcomes
signi￿cantly, or systems defects did not prove amenable to the e￿orts of clinical teams alone
(Bion et al., 2013; Dixon-Woods et al., 2014b; Urbach et al., 2014).
With this in mind, I propose a simpli￿ed model for successful QI interventions (￿gure 8.1).
This model emphasises, foremost, that QI interventions aiming to change healthcare providers’
practice should aim to meet the aligned needs of sta￿ at multiple levels in the organisation.
Failing to coordinate these interests renders interventions susceptible to failure, regardless of
enthusiasm and engagement at the other organisational levels. In fact, the degree to which an
intervention recognises, makes use of, or con￿icts with existing sta￿ priorities is fundamental
to its success, and should not be considered in the accompanying implementation strategy only.
This pre-emptive consideration of where an intervention is likely to garner support, and the
con￿icts that need to be resolved to allow wholehearted participation, re￿ect the ‘practical
wisdom’ thought to be a critical element of successful QI (Dixon-Woods, 2014a).
Throughout this review, and reinforced by the practical experience in the HEADS-UP study,
I identi￿ed speci￿c facilitators that coordinate clinical, middle management and senior manage-
ment participation in QI. To build a useful model, I then separated these factors into incentives
(establishing each group’s QI participation as a core expectation of their work) and actions
(speci￿c actions by that group that make QI implementation more e￿ective). I also highlight im-
portant barriers to aligned QI, again identi￿ed from the narrative synthesis. For facilitators and
barriers, I focused deliberately on modi￿able factors, with a view to building a valid model that
has immediate application in practice. Importantly, the inclusion of managers as core members
of the QI team may augment what is actually ‘modi￿able’: changes that remain frustratingly
out of reach for clinical QI teams may fall within the remit of an expanded clinical-managerial
Table 8.1: Managerial collaboration in selected QI interventions
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Figure 8.1: The model of alignment. Alignment of sta￿ interests in QI is facilitated by deliberate incentives, the recognition of
competing priorities and barriers to involvement [dotted boxes], and actions to address them.
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group (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014b).
How could this model be used in practice? Prospectively, clinicians and managers jointly
establish and prioritise the challenges facing their service. Multidisciplinary tools systematically
collect data relevant to front-line care delivery problems (from sta￿ and patients) (Sheard et al.,
2014; Pannick et al., 2015). Teams then assess and rank the apparent safety threats, e.g., with
streamlined versions of tools like Healthcare Failure Modes and E￿ects Analysis or Hierarchical
Task Analysis (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014b; McElroy et al., 2016). These tools inform the strategic
selection of high priority targets for local improvement e￿orts.
Interventions are co-designed or adaptedwith clinicians,with a focus on the quality strategies
for which e￿ectiveness and implementation evidence is strongest. Clinicians’ participation is
supported, recognised and rewarded, perhaps as part of a formal performance management
process. Middle managers coordinate alignment of the improvement e￿orts with organisational
goals, and are themselves heavily incentivised to see QI facilitation as a core role of their own. In-
￿uencing their supervisors to attract organisational support and resources for QI e￿orts, middle
managers’ interest in quality is further reinforced by protected board time for quality issues,
and board-level use of quality metrics. Board members may need to robustly engage with other
stakeholders in the local healthcare economy to generate (and protect) an institution-speci￿c
quality strategy.
The model can also be used retrospectively, to describe how interventions were implemen-
ted in practice, and to explain their e￿ects. I now use the model to describe the HEADS-UP
intervention in a di￿erent light, highlighting mutable in￿uences on sta￿ over the course of the
trial. De￿nitive progress on a number of key issues occurred only when front-line sta￿ and
middle managers agreed the need for change.
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8.4.6 Applying the model of alignment to analyse HEADS-UP implementa-
tion at the primary study site
8.4.6.1 Strategic selection of quality improvement (QI) target and intervention
Poor engagement with incident reporting was an organisational concern. However, there was
little capacity to enact an improvement programme. No other goals were set aside to prioritise
the HEADS-UP programme. As an experimental intervention, the e￿cacy of HEADS-UP and
its implementation strategy was unknown.
8.4.6.2 Incentives and actions for front-line clinical sta￿
Front-line sta￿ expressed initiative fatigue at the beginning of the study, but the face validity of
the HEADS-UP tool (and its co-design) mitigatedmuch of their expected resistance, andHEADS-
UP was incorporated into normal work￿ow. QI participation was not formally rewarded, but
some junior clinical sta￿ were able to exploit their involvement in HEADS-UP to help with
career progression. Others re￿ected that they found HEADS-UP useful for their own practice
and that it improved the quality of interdisciplinary care for their patients, which may have
been perceived as a bene￿t or reward.
8.4.6.3 Incentives and actions for middle managers
Middle managers were not personally incentivised to participate in HEADS-UP, although an
endorsement by the CQC during the study period prompted senior managers to designate a
greater focus on the programme. Where HEADS-UP generated information to bolster middle
managers’ existing business plans and develop new ones, those managers coordinated sta￿-
identi￿ed opportunities for service developmentwith linked organisational priorities. They gave
HEADS-UP their personal backing, encouraging its use, although no additional resources were
available to accompany this support. In contrast, middle managers for whom HEADS-UP was
less directly useful did less to hold their service areas accountable for HEADS-UP performance.
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HEADS-UP piggybacked onto existing sta￿meetings and governance structures: no protec-
ted time was made available for involvement in dedicated training, analysis or feedback. Middle
managers’ time and attention was strictly limited, and competing priorities (eg, a forthcoming
merger) often precluded meaningful progress with this QI intervention.
Interestingly, resolution of the persistent issues raised in the HEADS-UP brie￿ngs appeared
to depend less on each one’s inherent safety threat, than on agreement between clinical sta￿
and managers of the need for change.
8.4.6.4 Incentives and actions for senior managers
The organisation focused heavily on clinical quality, investing in external consultants to help
develop new clinical services and improve the e￿ciency of existing ones. Board members also
dedicated substantial time to clinical quality issues. In fact, clinical quality was the focus of
numerous committees and subcommittees, with a complex, devolved governance structure.
However, the regulatory environment did not allow for a self-determined quality strategy, with
quality priorities established largely by the local healthcare commissioning body and a national
quality inspectorate. Board-level meetings were awash with clinical quality metrics, among
which the ‘softer data’ emerging from the HEADS-UP brie￿ngs had a less certain place. As
the organisation moved to merge with another institution, fewer resources were available for
continuous QI in the interim.
8.5 Discussion
8.5.1 Summary of ￿ndings
An emphasis on clinical engagement in QI, rather than the managerial structures needed to
support it, may have limited the ability to replicate QI successes. Clinical engagement can
be optimised with deliberate intervention design, but a degree of reciprocal change at the
organisational level is also required - if improvement is to be sustained. Managerial participation
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in QI interventions is not typically emphasised in their published reports, but there is increasing
evidence of its importance. Speci￿c incentives and actions for clinicians and managers at each
organisational level may improve the implementation of strategically-selected QI interventions.
8.5.2 The novel contributions of this model
I feel the proposed model of alignment is a useful, novel concept for a number of reasons. First,
it emphasises the need to go beyond clinical engagement. Second, it highlights the role of non-
clinical sta￿ in sustaining e￿ective QI. Most importantly, it integrates separate literature streams
on clinical and managerial in￿uences on QI, lending itself to the prospective design of interven-
tions as well as the retrospective analysis of why they achieved their goals or not. Interestingly,
multilevel interventions (explicitly addressing patient, professional and organisational factors,
for example) show the most consistent improvements in process and clinical outcomes (Pinnock
et al., 2015). The model of alignment suggests how a similarly multifaceted approach might be
incoroporated into the design of any new QI intervention. Other authors have recently raised
concerns about ‘colliding’ QI interventions, conceived in isolation but e￿ectively competing in
a limited marketplace (Pendharkar et al., 2016). This model encourages a broader analysis of
the environment into which any new QI intervention is launched.
I hope this model will prove useful for future interventions, which need to more explicitly
link their assumptions with underlying theory (Davido￿ et al., 2015). Critics of implementation
research have argued that its theories are no more helpful than common sense (Oxman et al.,
2005; Bhattacharyya et al., 2006). Yet common sense is itself an informal, ‘lay’ theory, relying on
implicit assumptions that are di￿cult to challenge (Nilsen, 2015). This review o￿ers something
di￿erent: a focal point for the design and evaluation of future attempts to improve healthcare
delivery. The extent to which QI aligns the interests of front-line sta￿ and their managers has
not previously been explored in this way.
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8.5.3 Limitations
The model does not negate the value of existing models, which remain well placed to structure
QI reporting and evaluation (Taylor et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2012; Harvey et al., 2015). The
model of alignment was derived from a narrative review of the literature, drawing on prior sys-
tematic reviews (Wilkinson et al., 2011; Parand et al., 2014), and tested retrospectively against
the experience of implementing a single intervention. It requires more empirical validation,
particularly in the prospective design of novel interventions. Lastly, though parsimony is ne-
cessary for a ‘good’ theory of context (Davido￿ et al., 2015), the model of alignment may be too
simplistic for some analyses.
8.5.4 Implications for future work
This review sets out in some detail how the organisational contribution to QI, and readiness
for it, are important contributors to clinicians’ engagement. Organisational improvement cap-
ability therefore in￿uences the results of QI programmes, both directly and indirectly. This
was recognised by the Health Foundation, which has now issued a checklist for organisational
leaders seeking to build and sustain improvements1. A similar emphasis on establishing the or-
ganisational structures to support QI (including aligned incentives for improved performance),
and a speci￿c organisational commitment articulating the managerial role in QI, was described.
The need to ground QI programmes in an appropriate organisational structure is therefore
better established. This has implications for the introduction of complex, novel safety strategies
like PCTS. In the last chapter, I suggested that a broader range of implementation strategies
would improve the e￿ectiveness of PCTS: these implementation strategies largely targeted the
use of the brie￿ngs at ward level [see 7.5.3]. By contrast, the work in this chapter suggests that
further improvements to PCTS would be seen with more fundamental organisational changes.
A degree of organisational development is likely to be a pre-requisite for successful PCTS
1The checklist is available at http://www.health.org.uk/sites/default/￿les/Organisational%20checklist.pdf (ac-
cessed 15th June 2016).
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implementation. This would represent a distinct change of approach in QI - in the UK, at least -
which has been more proactive in developing stand-alone interventions than the organisations
adopting them.
The next generation of guidelines for QI reporting will emphasise narrative understanding
(Davies and Ogrinc, 2015), and this should extend to fuller descriptions of whether clinical and
managerial priorities coincided (or collided) within the context of the intervention. Although
there are few hard barriers to either group’s participation in QI, competing demands force
clinicians and managers to rationalise their e￿orts, and in some cases consciously relinquish
other priorities. Developing e￿ective and sustainable QI interventionsmay depend on our ability
to align the two groups’ divergent interests.
8.5.5 Conclusion
Harmonising managerial and clinical e￿orts to improve performance may be challenging. Non-
etheless, this foundational alignment is potentially a robust strategy to support the sustained
implementation of QI interventions. The role of patients in these ward improvement e￿orts
is not clear. In the next chapter, I explore medical inpatients’ views of the metrics commonly






In the last chapter, I found that the alignment between clinical and managerial interests in￿u-
enced the implementation of improvement interventions on medical wards. The two groups
- clinicians and managers - may have very di￿erent priorities. Clinicians may consider them-
selves solely responsible for the delivery of clinical care, and its immediate outcomes; pure
managers [see box 8.1] may focus on patients’ timely access to a service, or its ￿nancial stability.
Despite their varying incentives, both groups typically need to engage for meaningful progress
on any performance measure.
One way to establish common ground for clinicians and managers is to de￿ne key outcomes
which then become priority targets for collaborative improvement. Compared to more subspe-
cialised teams, ￿nding these key outcomes may be more di￿cult for medical wards. With such
variety in their workload, operationalising quality is challenging [see 1.5.3]. Moreover, the most
commonly collected ward outcomes are not particularly a￿ected by changes in the delivery of
interdisciplinary team care (ITC) [see 3.5.1.2 and 3.5.1.3].
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In this chapter, I ask how patients might help establish the key outcomes for medical wards.
Patients can be involved in this process in two ways. First, they can help de￿ne the priorities for
quality measurement, i.e., the domains that outcome measures should seek to capture. Second,
patient-reported outcomes andpatient-reported experiences are themselves importantmeasures
of the quality of care (Nelson et al., 2015). Here, I explore patients’ ideas about care quality on
the ward, and their attitudes towards the quality measures already publicly displayed there.
Most studies of how patients might use performance metrics explore their use in elective
decisions, such as hypothetical choices between healthcare facilities or providers (Damman et
al., 2012; Elbel et al., 2014; Byham and Madathil, 2015; Damman et al., 2015). Similarly, sponsors
of public outcome reporting hope to inform consumers’ choice of provider, even if consumer-
directed report cards are typically ill-suited for this, and few consumers use them in this way
(Sinaiko et al., 2012; Shaller et al., 2014). With few choices between acute providers, inpatients
and their carers are highly unlikely to use performance measures as would typical ‘consumers’.
The ward setting is the context which least resembles the purchase of goods or services in a
competitive marketplace: lessons from consumer engagement e￿orts outside of healthcare may
be of little relevance. Indeed, even patients who are comfortable accessing complex information
resources at home should be treated as ‘situationally-impaired’ in the hospital environment
(Morris and Karlson, 2011). The physical debilitation of an acute illness, and the emotion accom-
panying new diagnoses, could further impede information processing, and intense anxiety can
lead to active information avoidance. Alternatively, provision of the right information, in the
right context, could potentially improve the participation of patients and carers in care, perhaps
even improving their outcomes (Shaller et al., 2014).
The interview study described in this chapter is based on the research question ‘What meas-
ures of medical ward performance are meaningful for patients and their carers?’ I hypothesised
that patients and carers would prioritise information relating to their daily care above gen-
eric metrics of previous ward performance; that the metrics which would resonate most with
them would be those perceived to be ‘actionable’; and that the value of ward metrics could be
9.2 Aims 243
improved by contextualising them with action plans and follow-up information.
9.2 Aims
The aims of this chapter are:
(i) To describe current practice in the public display of ward performance metrics in an NHS
setting;
(ii) To identify the aspects of ward care that relate to patients’ and carers’ perceptions of a
‘good ward’; and
(iii) To explore patients’ and carers’ perceptions of formal metrics of ward care quality.
9.3 Methods
9.3.1 Establishing current practice in the display of performance metrics
Ward information displays in the acute medical wards and geriatric wards at a tertiary hospital
in London were assessed with a standardised instrument. This documented the position of ward
displays; the performance measures included in them; how those measures were de￿ned; the
context provided (in terms of previous performance, a target, or an acceptable benchmark);
and whether any actions were suggested for patients. Free text notes recorded any adjacent
information or advice also on the display boards.
Examples were photographed with a digital camera. These images provided insights into
the time and priority that the displays were a￿orded in practice: images are powerful conduits
for the feel and texture of environments (Rose, 2014). Visual materials ‘reveal what is hidden in
the inner mechanisms of the ordinary’, providing perspective on everday practices (Rose, 2014).
This ‘visual sociology’, or visual research method, also allows the researcher to re￿ect on what
they encounter in their ￿eldwork. In doing so, photographic meaning is constructed; one must
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be aware that photos are not themselves unmediated or unbiased, but dependent on the viewer
(Schwartz, 1989). As with auto-ethnography, these documents of record are not undisputed
[see 7.5.2]. Rather, their value lies in triangulation with other data, in this case the objective
categorisation of their contents, and interviews with patients and carers. The use of the photos
in the interviews themselves is described below.
9.3.2 Semi-structured interviews
9.3.2.1 Topic guide development
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with general medical inpatients and their carers
at this tertiary hospital. The interviews were based on a topic guide, co-developed with local
patient and carer representatives1, who in turn canvassed their patient and carer networks
for opinions and feedback. The topic guide [see appendix F] included demographic details,
patterns of recent admissions, and questions such as ‘What information would you need to
decide whether a ward was good or not?’ Initial drafts of the topic guide included the modi￿ed
information-seeking sub-scale of the Autonomy Preference Index (API) (Ende et al., 1989; Simon
et al., 2010). This scale establishes the degree to which the patient feels they should be informed
about their diagnoses and treatments. The topic guide was re-evaluated after the ￿rst three
interviews, resulting in the removal of the API information-seeking subscale, which could not
be readily completed by participants in this context. Participants found it di￿cult to distinguish
the intent of the API questions, which focused on their own experience and illness, from the
broader theme of the interview, i.e., the general performance of the ward. In any case, inpatients
have consistently been shown to have a high desire for information (Ende et al., 1989; Wilkinson
et al., 2008; Chung et al., 2012).
1The topic guide was co-developed with Fran Husson (patient representative) and Margaret Turley (carer rep-
resentative) from the NIHR Imperial PSTRC.
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9.3.2.2 Photo-elicitation
During their interviews, participants were shown laminated copies of the photos described
above [9.3.1]. Photographs were used to examine ward practice with the participants and delve
deeper into their own views. Using photographs as interview stimuli in this way has been
termed photo-elicitation (Harper, 2002). Photo-elicitation can reduce misunderstandings and
power di￿erences between researcher and participants (Robinson, 2002), increase engagement,
and lessen the extent to which the interviews are governed by the participants’ moods (Collier,
1957).
9.3.2.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Participants (patients and carers) were aged 18 years or more, and able to provide informed
consent. Patients were excluded if they were physiologically unstable, had major cognitive or
communication di￿culties, or did not speak English.
9.3.2.4 Data collection
Ward managers and charge nurses were informed that the study was taking place. Ward sta￿
(doctors, nurses, physiotherapists and occupational therapists) were asked to suggest patients or
carers whowould be physically capable of taking part in an interview. The interviews took place
at patients’ bedsides, between February and May 2016, using a similar methodology to a recent
study with hospitalised medical patients (Tobiano et al., 2016). Interviews were audiotaped, and
then transcribed verbatim, with informed consent.
9.3.3 Data analysis
Interview transcripts were managed in NVivo (QSR International, Doncaster, Australia). Two
researchers read and re-read the transcripts2. An inductive (theory-generating) approach was
2I conducted the analysis with Dr Stephanie Archer, Research Fellow.
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used, as recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006), and described earlier in chapter 6. Each
researcher coded the transcripts individually, generating an initial coding frame,whichwas then
discussed and re￿ned. The transcripts were coded again, before a group of higher order themes
was proposed. A third round of analysis - individually, and then with consensus - con￿rmed the
validity of these metathemes and the aggregation of coded transcript fragments within them.
9.3.4 Sample size
Recruitment continued until thematic saturation was achieved. Thematic saturation was oper-
ationalised here as the point in data collection and analysis when new information produces
little or no change to the coding schema. Development of this coding schema was discussed at
three stages, and recruitment ceased when both researchers agreed that little new information
was emerging.
Relevant literature was consulted to con￿rm that this decision was appropriate. Although
a relatively large sample was initially envisaged, thematic saturation can occur within the ￿rst
twelve interviews; basic elements for metathemes can be found even within the ￿rst six inter-
views (Guest et al., 2006). The participant sample was necessarily somewhat heterogeneous
- general medical inpatients being de￿ned by their location rather than any speci￿c shared
characteristic - which may increase the sample size required. Nonetheless, the two researchers
agreed that the dataset held su￿cient ‘information power’, i.e., su￿cient information relevant
to this study and its goals (Malterud et al., 2015). The adequacy of the sample size was there-
fore con￿rmed both by repeated reassessments of the emerging data, and by guidance from
previously published work.
9.3.5 Ethical approval
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the Westminster Research Ethics Committee
(16/LO/0196) and the hospital’s joint research compliance o￿ce (16SM3129) [see appendix F].
Participants were provided with information sheets about the study, and given the opportunity
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to ask questions, before being asked to give their written consent.
9.4 Results
The results will ￿rst describe current ward practice in performance metric displays, and the
interview participant demographics. The two overarching themes from the interviews will then
be discussed: the key components of high quality care, and perceptions of the quality metrics
on display.
9.4.1 Current practice in the display of performance metrics
9.4.1.1 Choice and location of performance metrics
Performance and quality metrics on public display included measures of hand hygiene and
cleaning, hospital-acquired infections (MRSA and C.di￿cile), nurse sta￿ng, pressure ulcers,
falls, and patient feedback. Wards typically dispersed these measures across at least two display
boards, which were usually found in di￿erent locations. Although each ward displayed all
the quality measures listed, wards varied in their display choices. For example, some wards
included sta￿ngmetrics on their ‘patient information board’ [￿gure 9.1]; others included patient
feedback (responses to the ‘Friends and Family Test’3) in this location, displaying sta￿ng levels
elsewhere.
A common ￿nding was that individual display boards contained combinations of messages
for patients (e.g., visiting hours, nutrition support, and NHS eligibility criteria) and sta￿ (e.g.,
the results of a recent organisational engagement exercise). There was little to indicate which
information was directed to each group. Possessive pronouns (our and your) and pronouns (we
and you) were used interchangeably, within the same display, to refer to both patients and sta￿
[￿gure 9.1]. Quality and safety boards were located at the entrance to the ward, or adjacent to
the nurses’ station; no performance information was visible from patient beds.
3The mandated ‘Friends and Family Test’ asks the question ‘How likely are you to recommend our service to
friends and family if they needed similar care or treatment?’ (NHS England, 2014b).
Figure 9.1: Typical ‘patient information board’, including sta￿ng metrics, messages to sta￿, visiting hours and patient instructions.
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9.4.1.2 Representations of quality
9.4.1.2.1 Hand hygiene and cleaning Performance measures for hand hygiene and clean-
ing were displayed as percentages achieved in the last audit. De￿nitions of the numerators and
denominators used to calculate the percentages were not provided.
9.4.1.2.2 Sta￿ng Nurse sta￿ng levels for the current shift were displayed in a table, com-
paring - at each level of seniority - the numbers of sta￿ required with those actually on duty.
The roles and responsibilities of sta￿ at di￿erent grades were listed [￿gure 9.2].
9.4.1.2.3 Hospital-acquired conditions Wardperformancewith respect to hospital-acquired
infections, pressure ulcers and falls was displayed in each case as the date of the last recorded
event [￿gure 9.3]. De￿nitions of each performance measure, or how they were assessed, were
not provided.
9.4.1.2.4 Patient feedback Patient feedback was displayed as a star rating, summarising
themost recent results of thatward’s ‘Friends and Family Test’. The star ratingwas accompanied
by the percentage of patients who agreed they would recommend the ward to family or friends
who needed similar treatment. Examples of previous patients’ comments were also given. The
percentage required to achieve each star rating was not provided [￿gure 9.4].
9.4.1.3 Contextualisation of quality data and patient engagement
All quality measures were displayed as a single, static measure of performance, i.e., the most
recent result available. In no case were previous results given, that would have indicated a
performance trend over time. Norwas there any indication of a performance target, or acceptable
benchmark. No patient-actionable information was given for any of the performance measures,
other than a suggestion to speak to a senior nurse for more information about sta￿ng on
the ward. Where performance or available resources might be taken to be sub-optimal (e.g.,
Figure 9.2: Shift-by-shift sta￿ng levels, comparing numbers required to numbers present
Figure 9.3: Hospital-acquired problems, displayed as the date of the last recorded event
Figure 9.4: ‘Friends and Family Test’ results displayed as a star rating
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fewer sta￿ on shift than expected), there was no indication of a mitigation plan to reduce the
likelihood of harm. Monthly quality and safety priorities for the ward could include processes
that would improve performance metrics (e.g., ‘MRSA compliance’). However, these priorities
were not explicitly linked to previous performance, nor were they necessarily displayed near
to the relevant metric.
9.4.2 Interview participant demographics
Fourteen participants were interviewed - nine patients and ￿ve carers. 50% of participants
(patients and carers) were female. Nine interviews took place on the acute medical wards
and ￿ve on medicine for the elderly wards. Interviews lasted a median of 23 minutes (range
11-48 minutes). Patients had a median age of 75 (range 57-86), with a median length of stay
of approximately ￿ve days; their admissions were most commonly due to disorders of the
cardiovascular system or abdominal complaints. 71% of participants spoke English as a ￿rst
language. Half of the patients depended on family or community support, and one-third of them
had undergone other hospital admissions in the preceding six months.
9.4.3 Perceptions of quality in this setting
Interview discussions centred on two overarching themes: key components of high quality ward
care for patients and carers on medical wards, and their perceptions of existing quality metrics
[￿gure 9.5]. The key components of high quality care will be discussed ￿rst: communication,
sta￿ attitudes, and hygiene.
9.4.3.1 Communication
9.4.3.1.1 Appropriate updates for patients and carers High quality communication
with sta￿ about individual treatment plans was greatly valued. Recognising that they were
entirely dependent on sta￿ to keep them abreast of forthcoming investigations, treatments and


































Figure 9.5: Thematic map for patient and carer interviews
The thematic map shows the two overarching themes from the patient and carer interviews: components of high quality care, and
perceptions of quality metrics. These are broken down into subthemes.
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‘So what I would suggest is more attention from the side of the doctors, because if
they come, they talk to each other, but they never tell you what’s going to happen...
I say always that [when] you see your doctor and when he comes to visit you, make
it clear to you what he is telling to his colleague.’ (Patient 2)
‘[What’s important is] simply having sta￿ that communicate with the patient... If
you want an example of a good nurse, you would choose [nurse X]... If the patients
interact with him, he responds immediately. It does not mean that he is running
around like a fool for everyone... [If] he is asked a question, he tells you that he has
recognised the fact that you have asked the question. He responds to it by saying, if
he does not know the answer, then he will ￿nd out for you. And then he does what
he says he is going to do, and he ￿nds out for you... Every human being simply
needs to know where the goalposts are... And be kept informed. And as long as
you are [informed], then you do not have any reason to complain.’ (Patient 3)
As treatment plans would frequently change, often for reasons outside of their teams’ con-
trol, sta￿were merely held accountable for keeping patients updated as much as was reasonably
possible. There was an expectation of an update within an appropriate timeframe, the duration
of which depended on the precision of previous updates, and allowing for hospitals’ unpredict-
able workload:
‘I know it is not always possible that de￿nitive information is available. But as long
as you are informed to the ability that they can inform you. You cannot have any
gripes about that. If someone says to you, “Look, you may go home tomorrow”,
I am big enough and ugly enough to know that it may be the day afterwards, or
the day after that. And I can make that judgement. But if someone says to you,
“We are going to take you to MRI [magnetic resonance imaging] at 2pm”, I would
expect someone to come within a certain timeframe of 2pm to take me to MRI. It
is simple. They have informed [me] that is what is going to happen... In the same
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respect, I am not stupid enough to think - or precious enough to think - that I am
the most important thing that is happening here. And if something happens in the
meantime, and there is some form of emergency, and so on and so forth...’ (Patient
3)
9.4.3.1.2 Information sharing within teams Participants also re￿ected on the value of
e￿ective information sharing within the multidisciplinary team. As much as it was important
for patients and carers to be told about changes, so too their views and concerns needed to be
shared with professionals. For them, the ability to speak to one team member, and have that
conversation disseminated to the rest of the team, was a key feature of good performance:
‘I have found you’ll be speaking to one person - and it could be a nurse or a doctor
or anybody else - and at the end of the day, everybody knows what I’m talking
about... So you can communicate with [just] one person. Sometimes [in] other
hospitals, you go to the doctor or the sta￿ doesn’t know what has happened to you
and what has to be done, whereas here you speak to one sta￿ and it’s passed [on]...
It’s a vital thing.’ (Carer 1)
‘The communication is really good. So all of the nurses and doctors tell each other
what’s happened...’ (Carer 2)
‘This ward [team] works all together... They all seem to know what each other’s
doing.’ (Carer 3)
The majority of the comments about how information was used and shared within teams
came from carers, rather than patients. This perhaps re￿ected the role of carers in the ward
environment, where they are frequently an important information source for the interdiscip-
linary team - for example, regarding the readiness of the home environment for the patient’s
return. Carer-provided information is therefore important for the overall coordination of care
and treatment planning; how teams dealt with that information was clearly valued.
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9.4.3.2 Sta￿ attitudes and competence
The general approach of the ward to its patients and carers was, to some extent, manifest in its
rules and how they were policed. Strict enforcement of visiting hours was not felt appropriate,
or welcoming:
‘They’re much more relaxed now about visitors and visiting times... Once upon
a time, it was all very strict, and that is so nice, that it’s much more relaxed now.’
(Carer 5)
Beyond those rules, however, was the much deeper impact of sta￿ behaviours and individual
interactions. Sta￿ attentiveness, or ‘service’, in￿uenced whether patients felt they were on a
good ward. Considerable attention was paid to how sta￿ went about their work, not just what
they did. Delivering care in a positive manner distinguished high performing wards. Adjectives
like ‘jolly’, ‘respectful’ and ‘helpful’, or ‘abrupt’ and ‘wishy-washy’, were not so much seen as
individual personality attributes, as they were features of work performance:
‘[A] good ward is to be helpful to patients, being more human than a machine, you
understand?’ (Patient 2)
‘I think it’s the attitude of people [that makes a good ward]. It’s the main thing.’
(Patient 6)
‘A good ward is... helpful sta￿ with a smile on their face.’ (Carer 1)
‘If you see a gloomy face it doesn’t help. Attitude is very important.’ (Carer 2)
The manner of care delivery - rather than the resources available for it - de￿ned the care
experience to an extent, and could even in￿uence patients’ own actions:
‘The personal factor is that you can get into a ward environment, [with] the same
situation, the same support... but you found that the personal factor is not the same.
There is a di￿erence.’ (Patient 2)
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‘Even the cleaners who come and clean around, they would say good morning to
you... It makes a di￿erence... It does mean that I’m on a ward with people that
are nice, and if I did have a problem, I would be able to approach them. Because
sometimes people can be very hostile and you don’t want to approach them, you
know... It’s mainly down to the sta￿ again, it’s down to the sta￿.’ (Patient 4)
However, with the potential for signi￿cant change between one shift and the next (even in
the same setting), the concept of a fundamentally ‘good ward’ could be challenged:
‘There’s a di￿erence from night and day. Sometimes you ￿nd the night, they are
lovely people. Sometimes you ￿nd the night, they’re problem people.’ (Patient 2)
‘Where it changes more than anything else is at night, when you have a complete
change of sta￿. Sometimes the night sta￿ that come on are absolutely fantastic,
and are very engaged. But sometimes they are entirely the opposite. It is like, “Well
we are just here to get you through until the morning, when the people that are
looking after you come back.”’ (Patient 3)
With such dramatic ￿uctuations in the perceived quality of care, averaged measures of care
appeared less relevant. This posed a challenge for ward metric displays [see 9.4.5.1.1].
9.4.3.2.1 The impact of workload and sta￿ng levels Practices changed from one shift
to another, as well as attitudes. This re￿ected pragmatic di￿erences in workload and sta￿ng
levels, as much as it did a new set of sta￿ members:
‘They try to keep the patient as clean as possible, but this happens at night. The day
people don’t bother (laughs)... You see, during the day there’s lots of movement,
lots of tra￿c, so doing it in the night, everything is quiet, everything is sleepy, so
they can spend the time cleaning you and looking after you a lot more...’ (Patient 2)
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There was an understanding that the quality of care received by any one patient was de-
termined (at least in part) by the general workload on the ward. Allowances were made for this:
the fact that sta￿ might be stretched did not cause them to be judged unfavourably. Even open
displays of inappropriate behaviour could be excused:
‘Because what I have seen is everything going good, you know. Each time they’re
giving you everything... Only when they’re very busy they’re running here and
there. So I don’t mind.’ (Patient 1)
‘Sometimes I see the ward, where they’re a little bit understa￿ed, when things get
busy obviously, so there’s a lot of pressure put on the sta￿, you know it’s under-
standable... Obviously they can’t come straightaway when you ring the buzzer...
You can see that they’re actually very tired people, they needed a good rest, and
that’s why the whole thing gets on top of them, they’re overworked.’ (Patient 4)
9.4.3.2.2 Sta￿-sta￿ interactions One contrasting view was that a focus on sta￿ng levels
was in fact unwarranted, the appreciation of junior sta￿ and healthcare assistants by other sta￿
being a more pressing concern for high quality care:
‘[You might think] the more sta￿, the better the person feels, and that is not how I
feel... Everything depends on the lower level[s] of sta￿ we’ve got working in the
ward... and their position [should be] respected by the doctors and the more senior
people... On one or two occasions, there was somebody who I felt was not being
appreciated... They did all [sorts of tasks], and nobody seemed to recognise that
they were doing something like that... I would absolutely disagree that numbers
are the solution. I don’t believe that for a minute.’ (Patient 7)
More generally, interactions between sta￿were keenly observed. These interactions directly
in￿uenced perceptions of the quality of care. Indirectly too, inferences about care quality could
be drawn from how sta￿ turned to each other for support, or the leadership on the ward:
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‘The way that the sta￿ themselves interact with each other... You can instantly see
whether they are happy working in the place where they are, and that radiates
through, again, to the patients.’ (Patient 3)
‘If they have a good nurse in charge, who’s doing a good management job of the
other nurses and healthcare assistants, student nurses or whatever, then that will
mean that hopefully they will function well as a team. So you’ve got to ensure
there’s a good quality nurse in charge on the day and night shifts. I know within
an hour whether I’ve got a good nurse in charge or not. [It’s] crystal clear. It’s just
bloody obvious.’ (Patient 8)
‘Two nurses were having a ￿ght with each other, and that’s not very good for the
rest of us. And of the course the supervisor was asking them to be quiet, because
they were shouting and screaming at each other.’ (Patient 4)
Sta￿ did not need to be at loggerheads for patients to be concerned about unproductive work-
ing relationships. Over-familiarity could be equally concerning, although cultural expectations
of sta￿ behaviour did vary, with patients and sta￿ from di￿erent backgrounds:
‘It is almost like they were a bunch of friends working together. So no one was
checking on [us] - no one was trying to keep the standard raised. It was like “We
can get through this doing the absolute minimum.”’ (Patient 3)
9.4.3.2.3 Sta￿ competence Just as attitudes, workload and team ethos could vary from
one shift to the next, patients perceived variations in the technical competence of sta￿. This
was important because the idea of ward quality was very much bound up with the care that
individuals had received, rather than being an abstract concept that would a￿ect all patients
equally. Personal histories of preventable adverse events, or successful treatments, in￿uenced
judgements about ward quality, recognising that sta￿ were fallible, and that junior sta￿ were
less able to form a de￿nitive diagnosis or treatment plan:
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‘You have doctors - sometimes they have knowledge of what they’re doing and
sometimes they don’t. They could make mistakes. Not just the nurses, but also the
doctors. I tell you, one nurse here... [describes swollen hand and thrombophlebitis
resulting from a misplaced intravenous cannula].’ (Patient 2)
‘You realise in this situation you don’t have [an experienced doctor coming to you]
and looking at your situation face to face, but you have all these young students
who are trying to ￿nd out what the best situation is. Eventually you get annoyed
with them - because although they are doing very much, for you it’s very little
(laughs).’ (Patient 2)
‘[Am I on a good ward?] Well, the medical team are doing the necessary tests...
I’ve got con￿dence they’ve thought through the issues and are coming up with a
treatment plan.’ (Patient 8)
The prioritisation of the personal experience of care above aggregate summaries of ward
performance is discussed further in 9.4.5.1.
9.4.3.3 Hygiene
Hygiene standards were held to be important for two reasons. First, good hygiene was de facto
evidence of a ward that was providing safe care,with little unwarranted risk of infection. Second,
it served as a deeper marker of sta￿ pride, diligence and attention to detail, all of which were
reassuring:
‘I just recently came from India, and two relations were in hospital there, and
there’s no comparison. The hygiene - there’s nothing there, so to enter a hospital
is frightening... Here, there’s no problem like that. You just enter happily and you
know that you will be looked after, [without] infection which is quite dangerous...
We’re not worried that much...’ (Carer 2)
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‘The cleanliness aspect, I think, is... more important than possibly people realise...
It sets out a marker if you like... if the mindset of the ward is, you know, “We are
proud of the place that we work in.” So it is a fairly good marker of how that ward
will actually be.’ (Patient 3)
Nonetheless, the display of hygiene metrics within the wardwas still somewhat problematic,
particularly as the reportedmeasures could clashwith the personal experience of care [see 9.4.5].
9.4.4 Bene￿ts of existing quality metrics
Potential bene￿ts of the quality metrics on display included an increased understanding of sta￿
performance, and opportunities for patients and carers to use the information.
9.4.4.1 Increased understanding of sta￿ performance
Real-time information on sta￿ng levels was felt to be helpful, in that it provided meaningful
context for sta￿ performance. Sta￿ attitudes, and actions, would often be viewed in a more
positive light when it was clear that overall sta￿ng levels were low. Sta￿ng data also helped
set realistic expectations of the care patients might receive:
‘When I’m getting poor service on a particular day, at least I can see that there
might be a good reason for it... I would be more understanding, if I had to wait
twice as long for help, if I knew that there was only half the number of sta￿ there
should be.’ (Patient 8)
‘When I saw the amount of sta￿ that you’re suppose to have on the ward, there were
not half the sta￿. So the other sta￿ that turned up were constantly busy, running
back and forth, and you can see how much stress they were [under]. But they were
doing a good job... You can see the nurse who has turned up is doing a really good
job.’ (Carer 1)
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In addition, results indicating good performance could have a positive e￿ect on visitors:
‘Lots of ￿ve star results make you feel happy and secure, which is good... I certainly
don’t mind seeing them.’ (Carer 5)
This latter phenomenon showed that quality measures were not only a re￿ection of previous
performance, but could actively a￿ect ongoing judgements about care. This is explored further
in 9.4.5.4.1.
9.4.4.2 Patient and carer use of quality information
Patients and carers might also use quality data to modify their own actions, or prompt them to
seek more information. This would particularly be the case if speci￿c advice and guidance were
provided alongside the quality metric. Infection control data appeared particularly resonant,
participants recognising that sta￿, patients and carers might all help uphold hygiene standards.
Feeling that they could do something helpful, participants focused on their own hand hygiene,
hoping that sta￿ would ‘do the same’ (Carer 2):
‘[Handwashing data] should be aimed at everybody. Everybody... Obviously, yes,
the sta￿ are going to be dealing with you. Patients as well because we all touch
things.’ (Patient 4)
‘[If quality displays showed a recent infection], we’d be more careful when we
came in... You would be thinking of wearing masks and gloves and things like that,
because we don’t want to catch it, and especially the patient could die or catch it.
Because they are at their last stages. They are so weak...’ (Carer 2)
The ability of patients and carers to engage with quality metrics was helped, in some cases,
by at least a vague understanding of the medical terms used in quality displays:
‘Because that’s in the press [MRSA rates], I suppose people do want to know that,
don’t they? All of this you read in the papers of people being in hospital - they
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went in with one thing and they came out with that... You don’t want to get worse.
They’re meant to be making you better.’ (Patient 5)
However, the medical terminology was not clear to all, and the potential for patients and
visitors to engage with quality metrics was considerably limited by a number of factors. These
will now be discussed in more detail.
9.4.5 Limitations of existing quality metrics
Patients and carers identi￿ed the following limitations to their engagement with existing quality
metrics: their prioritisation of personal experience and judgement; problems with the practical
delivery of the information; and unintended consequences of quality reporting.
9.4.5.1 Prioritisation of personal experience and judgement over published ￿gures
Patients and carers, still in the process of receiving care, felt little need for measures that ul-
timately related to previous performance. Their ongoing experiences of care were not only
adequate to form a judgement about service quality, but would override any other evaluation
arising from a formal metric. In that light, performance metrics (whether objective measures,
or derived from other patients’ feedback), became irrelevant:
‘Why would I be interested? By the time I would have got around to seeing one
of those [quality metric] boards, I would probably have formed my own opinion
anyway... Put it this way. Whatever those ￿gures are, when I go into that toilet, I
wash the seat before I sit down on it. I would not care if that said 1000%... We have
a personal judgement of that... I would have seen [those hand hygiene ￿gures]. But
how much notice I took of them? ...I can tell you, from my experience, how many
people use that [hand gel] at the end of the bed...’ (Patient 3)
‘I think you’ve just got to look around yourself and see what sort of service they
have.’ (Carer 1)
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‘I use my own judgement. If I’m satis￿ed: that’s it.’ (Patient 9)
Reported quality metrics could clash with an individual’s experience of care. In addition,
they were not necessarily helpful in predicting future experiences. Even near-real-time updates
in sta￿ng levels would not necessarily help patients anticipate what care they would receive.
With these discrepancies in mind, there were questions about what purpose the metrics actually
served:
‘It [the sta￿ng metric] does not mean a thing... One of the sta￿ came in, in the
evening, and said, “There is one less of us tonight.” But theywere better that evening
than the night before, when there were more of them... The numbers really do not
tell the whole story.’ (Patient 3)
‘It’s not only in hospitals. I mean, you do a Skype call and you get an assessment
afterwards. You walk into a place and you can press how many stars you thought
it [merited]. Absolutely everyone has just gone mad. But I don’t mind assessments.
What I do mind: what are they for, exactly?’ (Carer 5)
9.4.5.1.1 Inpatients have a necessarily self-centred view of care quality There was
also an understanding that quality metrics, which summate overall performance, masked im-
portant variations in care. From an individual’s perspective, the personal receipt of excellent
care was the priority, whether or not it re￿ected a typical standard of care on that ward. There
was therefore a con￿ict between the importance of an ‘average’ standard, and what had been
received at the individual level, which may have been much better or much worse. For that
reason, other patients’ experiences were held as less relevant:
‘Most people’s experience in hospital is an entirely sel￿sh or self-contained one.’
(Patient 3)
‘My cousin died... [because] the hospital put the food pipe in the lungs.... So the
rating there [the “Friends and Family Test” result]? I can’t compare that.’ (Carer 2)
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There appeared to be a distinction between what care quality meant to patients and carers,
and the domains that quality metrics were purporting to measure. Indeed, some disputed that
quality metrics were capable of having much meaning for patients:
‘To actually completely quantify that [service calibre] would be very, very di￿cult.’
(Patient 3)
‘If we want information, we ask for it and we get it. As long as [my relative] is
alright and getting looked after, I’m not really bothered about nothing else. If she’s
getting well looked after, the nurses are lovely, their care is great... that’s all we are
concerned about.’ (Carer 3)
‘As long as we are happy that she’s had her one-to-one person, like the Sister, when
they take over, introduce themselves to her... We don’t check none of that, no... No,
[it’s not for relatives and patients].’ (Carer 4)
This alluded again to the general feeling that qualitymeasures were of limited use to patients
and their carers, whose inward focus in this setting was natural.
9.4.5.2 Quality metrics for sta￿ use, not patients’
Nonetheless, the potential value of some quality metrics for organisational use was acknow-
ledged. Knowing that the organisation was responsibly using quality metrics for improvement
was itself an important consideration:
‘I think [patient feedback] is [important] both [for patients and hospital sta￿]...
Because it makes me as a patient have a bit more faith in the hospital... People
taking notice.’ (Patient 4)
In practice, though, participants felt that sta￿ had to have ownership of the data. The organ-
isational responsibility for quality improvement could not be delegated away from sta￿, even
to fully engaged patients and carers:
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‘One would hope the information was displayed, and if some of the scores were
low... sta￿ would recognise that to pull their socks up... If their performance isn’t
as good as it should be, sta￿ have got to up their game.’ (Patient 8)
‘In my opinion, [the information] is for the sta￿. [So] that they can see how they are
doing. Because this is not something that the patient is actually in control of. The
hospital sta￿ are in control of whether they have washed their hands... A patient
would like to assume that that had all been happening anyway... It is not something
that you... should be thinking about, “Are they washing their hands?”. Because if
you are thinking about that, I would not come in in the ￿rst place.’ (Patient 3)
One patient described how he perceived some quality metrics to have little chance of gen-
erating improvement - based on the manner in which those data were collected. Seeing any
sort of quality data immediately disregarded by frontline sta￿, as they were collected, was
disheartening:
‘The nurses don’t know what to do with it. I had two [surveys] this morning, one
for the food, which was low level, nobody was interested in that... The lady who
did the food [survey] did it on a piece of paper, and I knew that piece of paper
would be 50% likely not to get through. And then the nurse who’d seen me do it
said, “That’s not important.” That’s what I want to avoid... Then half an hour later,
somebody came to do the [“Friends and Family Test”]... [They] had this iPad, and I
could see she was taking it seriously doing it... There’s no point in being very keen
on something if nobody can administer it, and people say, “That’s not important,
don’t worry about that.” That’s useless.’ (Patient 7)
There was further frustration that the display of various quality metrics might imply that
patients could act on them - choices that were not actually available. This is discussed in more
detail in 9.4.5.4.2.
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9.4.5.3 Problems in information delivery
9.4.5.3.1 Inadequate contextualisation The meaning of the quality metrics on display
was often unclear. Without a context, de￿nition, comparator, trend or benchmark [see 9.4.1.3],
patients struggled to ￿nd the relevance of a single ￿gure:
‘Obviously as a member of the public I want the minimum, but I have nothing to
compare it with. So if you [say], “We’ve not had one [infection] for three years”, I
can’t compare that with anything. So it doesn’t mean anything to me...’ (Carer 5)
‘That [single ￿gure] doesn’t mean anything. That doesn’t inform. It could be an
increase... but it could be [a] decrease.’ (Patient 2)
‘I am not asking for a whole year of stats. But if you are going to start giving
statistics, give a reference point... Otherwise, that [￿gure] actually means nothing.’
(Patient 3)
Some of the performance metrics on display also assumed a familiarity with medical terms,
or the methodology used to calculate di￿erent values for performance, concepts that were quite
foreign to patients and carers:
‘That is not very clear to a layperson, what it means... I wouldn’t have looked at it
twice because it’s not clear enough for me to understand.’ (Carer 5)
‘It’s not very clear, that one [hygiene ￿gure]. It doesn’t give you a lot of information
[about how they calculated it].’ (Patient 4)
9.4.5.3.2 Legibility and access Font size, colour contrast, and heading clarity, could all be
improved, given the patient and carer age group. Information was only available in English,
limiting engagement from those speaking it as a second or third language.
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Performance displays were not visible from patient bays. With patients spending the ma-
jority of time in bed or in their own bay, there were missed opportunities to help them engage
with information that some would have found quite helpful:
‘You are bound to watch them day by day or hour by hour [from your bed space],
and that’s the best publicity, I can assure you (laughs).’ (Patient 2)
9.4.5.4 Unintended consequences of quality reporting
9.4.5.4.1 Qualitymeasureswere not a neutral re￿ection of previous care, but a￿ected
judgements about ongoing care The display (or absence) of quality data could actively in-
￿uence how ongoing care was perceived, despite the preference for experiential judgements
above reliance on quality metrics [see 9.4.5.1]. The absence of baseline data, trends or com-
parators in quality displays [see 9.4.5.3.1] raised suspicions that poor performance was being
concealed, and that only positive data were aired:
‘Let us face it... you have got your 100% ￿gure there. Would you put up a 20% ￿gure?
... What would you be doing? You would be ruining the con￿dence of the patients...’
(Patient 3)
Seeing negative information could negatively in￿uence perceptions of the quality of care -
even if, up until that point, the patient had been quite satis￿ed. Interestingly, this was a concern
raised by patient and carer representatives during the development of the interview topic guide.
Indeed, the very e￿ort to improve quality could portray current performance in a more negative
light than was intended:
‘To give you an analogy. When I went in 1991 to Jamaica, [I saw] a full size billboard
at the side of the road saying, “Be nice to tourists!” The mere fact that the board is
there (laughs)... It is a bit of an impossible situation.’ (Patient 3)
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9.4.5.4.2 Without an element of choice, the display of performance reports emphas-
ised the lack of control in this setting Comparisons were drawn with other settings in
which quality data were often provided: restaurant ratings, car purchases, and so on. In each
case, the ability to act on those data seemed crucial. Although there would be a preference to
be admitted to an area with good performance evaluations, in reality, patients and carers had
no choice over the matter. Nor did they see other ways to act on the information provided:
‘It would be great if I’m admitted and I’m given a choice of ￿ve wards, and I would
say, “Well, how do I know which one’s which, which one’s best?” My next question
would be, “Can you give me the audits of those wards to showwhich has the highest
rating?” and I would go to that... If there’s no choice, then it’s all academic.’ (Patient
8)
‘Once you are here, you are here. It is not as if I could say, “Look, excuse me, you
guys are crap, take me down to theWellington [private hospital] (laughs).”’ (Patient
3)
‘There’s not much you can do. You know there is a rating which is not really good,
but what can we do? ... There’s not much in your hand to do anything about it.’
(Carer 2)
‘Well, other than clean the wards, there’s not a lot we can do is there? What else
can you do?’ (Carer 4)
The ‘Friends and Family Test’ question was found to be particularly challenging, given that
these patients had no choice in arriving on the ward in the ￿rst place, nor could subsequent
patients exercise a preference to get there:
‘It is not as if I could say, “Okay look, you are going to be ill next week. Make sure
you get into that ward.” ... It does not relate. I am only in this ward because they
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have not moved me to another one... To recommend someone go to a hospital, it is
almost wishing them ill. I ￿nd the concept bizarre...’ (Patient 3)
‘Would I recommend a ward? How can you recommend a ward?... I mean, that’s
a daft question, because... they put you in the place you need to be, don’t they?’
(Patient 5)
Indeed, such were the service pressures on hospital admissions that the idea of choosing a
ward seemed faintly ridiculous:
‘[Recommend the ward?] They’d be lucky to get in.’ (Carer 5)
9.5 Discussion
This study described the display of ward-based performance metrics in NHS medical wards, and
the degree to which those metrics correlated with patients’ and carers’ perceptions of what it
meant to provide high quality ward care. Patient and carer expressions of quality on the medical
ward were not well aligned with existing ward metrics, which speci￿cally assessed hygiene
(and infections) but not sta￿ communication, attitudes or competence. Whilst there may be
clear practical opportunities to improve the delivery and presentation of ward metrics, there
are more fundamental challenges. Patients’ and carers’ reliance on their individual experiences
above other measures, the poor correlation between individual care quality and aggregated
metrics, and the lack of opportunities to use data, all pose signi￿cant hurdles to patient and
carer engagement with quality data.
9.5.1 Summary of ￿ndings
9.5.1.1 Current practice in performance metric display
Metrics for hand hygiene, cleaning, infections, pressure ulcers, falls, nurse sta￿ng and patient
feedback were all displayed in the ward environment. Whether these metrics were intended for
272 Patient-prioritised metrics
patients or sta￿was not necessarily clear. The metrics used a variety of methodologies, but each
one provided only an isolated measure of performance, with no reference to previous results or
an acceptable target. No patient-actionable information was provided, and ward improvement
priorities were not linked clearly to performance evaluations.
9.5.1.2 Perceptions of high quality in this setting
The key elements of high quality ward care for patients and carers appeared to be:
1. Communication - between patients/carers and sta￿, and sharing information e￿ectively
within the multidisciplinary team;
2. Sta￿ competence and sta￿ attitudes, which were seen not so much as personal attributes
as they were features of ward performance; and
3. Ward hygiene, both as an essential part of good care and as a marker of sta￿ pride and
attention to detail.
Only one of these elements (hygiene) was clearly re￿ected in the publicly-displayed ward
metrics. Although ‘Friends and Family Test’ responses may re￿ect perceptions of sta￿ attitudes
and communication to some degree, it is too generic a question to speci￿cally measure these pri-
orities. With respect to these two elements of care, marked di￿erences in performance between
one shift and the next challenged the idea of a ‘good ward’: rather, patients and carers might
describe good or bad shifts.
9.5.1.3 Patient & carer perceptions of existing metrics
Sta￿ng metrics could help patients and carers place sta￿ performance in context. There were
some opportunities to act on quality data, particularly in terms of handwashing, in which all
those present on the ward could participate. Limited quality reporting - particularly where no
previous performance or trend was given - had the potential to negatively in￿uence perceptions
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of care. Quality data were not particularly accessible for patients and carers, nor was their
presentation entirely comprehensible or legible for them. Quality metrics were perceived to be
for sta￿ use, patients and carers having no way to meaningfully use them, which emphasised
their lack of control in this setting.
The greatest barriers to inpatient and carer use of quality metrics were conceptual ones.
These groups were more likely to rely on their ongoing individual experiences to make judge-
ments about care quality, rather than any objective or aggregate measure of previous perform-
ance. A deliberately inward view of care quality (downplaying others’ experiences, and average
standards, in comparison with one’s own experience) also limited patient and carer engagement
with these measures.
Overall, there was support for the hypotheses that personally-relevant information would be
prized above averaged measures of ward quality, and that actionable and contextualised metrics
would be held more valuable. However, with major barriers to patient and carer engagement
with ward quality metrics, a greater focus on how sta￿ use the data might be more appropriate.
Many of the patients and carers in this study held that opinion.
9.5.2 Novel contributions of this work
To my knowledge, this is the ￿rst study to compare the display of performance metrics in the
medical ward with patient and carer perceptions of high quality care. Previous studies have
explored the provision of individualised information to engage inpatients in decisions about
their own care (Wilkinson et al., 2008), or the use of service-level performance data to inform
outpatients’ selection of providers. This study combined the two concepts, describing the use of
service-level data available to current inpatients and their carers. This group were neither able
to exercise informed choices, nor to themselves use the data to directly improve performance -
the two pathways by which Berwick et al. (2003) proposed that measurement might lead to QI.
A sustained sta￿ focus on patients’ and carers’ expressed priorities, as de￿ned here, might be
a more meaningful outlet for their engagement in this setting. Other authors have described
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how patients may not be willing to participate directly in improving the safety and quality of
their care, even for the elements of it that they prioritise (Berger et al., 2014).
These ￿ndings build on a body of work exploring patient priorities and involvement in
the acute hospital setting. Boyd (2007) surveyed patients recently discharged from English
hospitals, similarly ￿nding that communication, patient-professional interactions, hygiene and
the technical delivery of care were their main priorities. The proportion of medical patients in
Boyd’s sample was not reported; nonetheless, this study suggests that Boyd’s ￿ndings - which
excluded current inpatients - were not unduly a￿ected by recall bias. My ￿ndings also suggest
an explanation for patients’ relative indi￿erence to service-level performance and change, as
described in patients’ experiences of handovers between consultants (Wray et al., 2016). E￿orts
to engage and involve patients in service changes should respect, and even capitalise on, the
self-centred lens of care quality which was identi￿ed here.
Patient and family engagement have been a focus for new healthcare models internationally
(Flott et al., 2016). In the United States, for example, around half of surveyed institutions already
routinely include patients and families in root cause analysis, facilitate their unrestricted access,
and allow patients to directly activate a rapid response team (Herrin et al., 2016). In the UK,
progress has been more limited: patient experience improvements have been seen as a nursing
responsibility, with more limited involvement from medical directors and other executives
(Raleigh et al., 2015). The manifest di￿erences between patients’ and carers’ expressed priorities,
and what was publicly measured and displayed, may have re￿ected this detachment (Jones et al.,
2016).
9.5.3 Study limitations
With a relatively small sample from a single site, the ￿ndings of this study may not be widely
generalisable. This is a common criticism of detailed interview studies, which necessarily in-
volve deeper investigation at the expense of a larger sample. Nonetheless, there is evidence that
the group of interviewees was a representative one. The patient and carer priorities elicited
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here matched the aspects of care previously rated as most important (Boyd, 2007). Participants
included older, frail patients, and a signi￿cant proportion did not speak English as a ￿rst lan-
guage. Patients in these demographics are most at risk for experiencing adverse events, but are
often excluded from safety and quality research (O’Hara and Lawton, 2016).
Hospital practice at this one study site may not have re￿ected standard UK practice. How-
ever, my personal working experience (of six London hospitals, not including the one assessed
in this study) is that limited attention to the delivery and presentation of ward quality metrics
has been the rule, rather than the exception. The inappropriate use of ‘static’ performance
measures, showing only the last data point, is widespread (Anhøj and Hellesoe, 2016). Although
speci￿c hospitals have made well-publicised investments in public displays of ward quality
metrics, this has been the result of a unique local commitment rather than any coordinated
systemic e￿ort (Brooks, 2016). Nonetheless, alignment of patient priorities and measurement
e￿orts may well be di￿erent in those exceptional centres.
One possible limitation of this study is the uncertainty of the intended audience for the
qualitymetrics. Arguably, the inaccessibility andmisalignment of themetrics would be rendered
moot, if they were in fact intended for sta￿ (rather than patient) consumption. There are three
reasons why this is not the case:
1. Any confusion over the intended audience for the data is likely to lessen the impact
of those data. Indeed, displays of performance data should explicitly state their target
audience - and their intended purpose (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2014).
With sta￿- and patient-directed information closely intermingled, neither group was
likely to derive much bene￿t.
2. Many of the presentation ￿aws highlighted by patients (lack of context, baseline data,
targets or trends) would render the data equally invalid for sta￿ consumption.
3. There is a central government mandate to display shift-by-shift ward sta￿ng metrics in
clinical areas, with the speci￿c requirement that those metrics are accessible to patients,
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families and carers (NHS England, 2014c). It is likely that this policy has spillover e￿ects,
in that sta￿ will assume that other performance data should also be displayed to patients.
It is also possible that relevant data (better aligned with patient priorities) were collected,
but not displayed on the study wards. Clearly, there are other repositories for quality metrics.
However, there is little evidence that this was the case: the measures promoted at a national level
are more often aggregates of the measures identi￿ed here, rather than entirely di￿erent tools.
For example, the NHS ‘Safety Thermometer’ is a composite measure of pressure ulcers, falls,
catheter-associated urine infections and venous thromboembolism (NHS Quality Observatory,
2016). In terms of patient experience data, the annual NHS inpatient survey does speci￿cally ask
about communication and sta￿ attitudes - but results are aggregated at the hospital level, with
no ward-level feedback (Care Quality Commission, 2016). Similarly, the American Hospital Con-
sumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) patient experience survey
generates hospital-level scores: attempts to derive ward-level data are speci￿cally discouraged
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016[b]).
9.5.4 Implications for future work
This study has several implications for future work. Firstly, existing displays of ward quality
metrics serve an uncertain purpose. Their intended audience should be made clear, and they
should be optimised for that audience. Patients and carers should be involved in the design of
those displays to ensure that they meet their needs. Given that these groups may not be familiar
with the various aspects of care quality, providing a plain language framework to describe
quality indicators is likely to be helpful (Hibbard et al., 2010).
Second,metrics for communication quality would complement existingmeasures, and better
align patient and sta￿ priorities. The quality of information transfer between patients and
sta￿, and of information dissemination within interdisciplinary teams, could both be assessed
formally. The results of this study suggest that these assessments might best be done on a shift-
by-shift basis (rather than as a repeated point prevalence study, which is the methodology for
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the NHS Safety Thermometer). Changes in care quality occur from one shift to another. Ideally,
these results would be displayed in near-real time with health information technology, for
maximum impact (Dowding et al., 2015). The impact on the overall burden of quality reporting
should be borne in mind [see 1.5.3.4].
9.5.5 Conclusion
Current quality metrics on display in the medical ward setting (primarily relating to adverse
events and complications) may not be prioritised by patients and their carers. This is an im-
portant counterpoint to the ￿ndings of the systematic review [chapter 3], where preventable
complications of care were suggested as possible performance measures for the ward. Metrics
for ward-level communication and attitudes would better re￿ect patients’ and carers’ dominant
concerns. As quality measures proliferate, patient- and carer-prioritised metrics should inform









In this concluding chapter, I reiterate the aims of the thesis and how they were addressed. The
key ￿ndings of the studies are summarised, before a discussion of their relative methodological
strengths and weaknesses. I propose some implications of this work for clinical practice, policy
and future research, and some concluding remarks on this doctoral research.
10.1 Thesis aims
The overarching goal of the thesis was to better understand the implementation of interdiscip-
linary care on the general medical ward, and identify e￿ective strategies for its improvement.
Part I [chapter 1] set out the arguments forwhy this researchwas warranted. The three principal
aims of the thesis were:
1. To categorise and evaluate existing improvement strategies for the medical ward;
2. To design, implement and evaluate a novel interdisciplinary intervention to improve
medical ward care; and
3. To identify new medical ward improvement targets from organisational and patient per-
spectives.
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The thesis was structured to answer each of these aims in turn. In part II [chapters 2-3],
a narrative review established the major categories of improvement intervention for medical
ward care; a systematic review then evaluated the higher quality evidence for ITC interventions.
Part III drew on this literature to design [chapter 4] and evaluate [chapters 5-7] a novel ITC
intervention,with amixedmethods analysis incorporating quantitative and qualitative methods.
Finally, part IV [chapters 8-9] described an organisational model of clinician-manager alignment
derived from a focused literature review, and an interview study to elicit patient and carer
priorities on medical wards.
10.2 Summary of ￿ndings
The key ￿ndings will be discussed as they relate to each thesis aim.
10.2.1 Aim 1: Categorise and evaluate existing improvement strategies for
the medical ward
10.2.1.1 Five dominant categories of improvement intervention
The narrative review identi￿ed ￿ve common targets for medical ward care improvement inter-
ventions: sta￿ng levels and team composition; interdisciplinary communication and collabora-
tion; standardisation of care; early recognition and treatment of the deteriorating patient; and
local safety climate [chapter 2]. Many of these interventions had good face validity, and were
reported to successfully improve ward care. However, the methodology used to assess them
was often inadequate.
10.2.1.2 Limited e￿ects of interdisciplinary team care interventions
The systematic review focused on a subset of higher quality studies that described the e￿ects of
ITC interventions [chapter 3]. Most ITC interventions did not a￿ect length of stay, readmissions
or mortality rates. There was some evidence that improved ITC might reduce preventable
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complications of care and adverse events. Appropriately nuanced metrics (such as unnecessary
length of stay) might be the most appropriate outcomes for this type of intervention. The
review’s ￿ndings were tempered by the high risk of bias in the majority of the included studies.
10.2.2 Aim 2: Design, implement and evaluate a novel interdisciplinary in-
tervention in this setting
10.2.2.1 Prospective clinical team surveillance - intervention design, pilot period and
study power
PCTS consisted of a structured interdisciplinary brie￿ng (HEADS-UP), identifying clinical and
administrative problems, allied with cycles of facilitated ward-level and organisational feedback
[chapter 4]. PCTS was piloted on a single medical ward in late 2013, with su￿cient evidence that
a formal trial of the intervention would be feasible. PCTS was then evaluated in a prospective,
stepped wedge, cluster controlled trial. The intervention was progressively introduced to seven
medical wards, from two hospitals, between December 2013 and February 2015. The study had
between 75%-100% power to detect a 2%-14% absolute risk reduction in its primary outcome,
eLOS.
10.2.2.2 PCTS e￿ects on patient outcomes and processes of care
Using generalised linear mixed-e￿ects models, high ￿delity PCTS implementation signi￿cantly
reduced eLOS [chapter 5]. An apparent increase in eLOS in the intention-to-treat model did
not account for the signi￿cant impact of implementation ￿delity, and may have re￿ected un-
measured confounding factors later in the study period. There was some evidence that PCTS
increased the rate of escalation events (emergency calls, referrals to the ICU outreach service,
and ICU transfers). PCTS had no e￿ect on complications of care, 30-day readmissions, or a
composite of in-hospital death/death or readmission within 30 days of discharge.
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10.2.2.3 Mechanisms of PCTS action, qualitative impact, and e￿ects on incident re-
porting
PCTS established a non-judgemental interdisciplinary forum,with a hard edge of accountability,
as identi￿ed in focus groups and ethnography [chapter 6]. This reversed normalised deviance,
and encouraged teams to proactively address problems. Brie￿ngs’ e￿ectiveness were hampered
by a lack of continuity from one day to the next, and failures to explicitly agree a plan of action.
Cost-neutral service changes, internal service investments, and training were all generated by
the intervention, but not necessarily targeted to areas that had ￿agged concerns. Sustained
PCTS implementation signi￿cantly improved safety and teamwork climate scores on the Safety
Attitudes Questionnaire. In further mixed-e￿ects models, high ￿delity implementation signi￿c-
antly increased total incident reports, non-falls reporting and reports submitted by non-nursing
sta￿.
10.2.2.4 PCTS implementation
PCTS implementation was analysed against the Health Foundation’s ‘Constructive comfort’
framework, and with inductive analysis of ￿eldnotes and focus groups [chapter 7]. Local en-
thusiasm for change was hampered by extreme service pressures, few speci￿c resources for
improvement, senior sta￿ turnover, and concentration of improvement skills away from the
frontline. Programmatic ￿delity was constrained by the context, challenges inherent to the inter-
vention itself, and tensions between implementation and evaluation. PCTS facilitators included
training, expectation setting, facilitation, feedback and organisational support. Implementation
barriers included inadequate sta￿ng, service pressures, nomadic shift patterns, andmaladaptive
interdisciplinary norms. PCTS was a largely acceptable, appropriate and feasible intervention
in this setting, although coverage and sustainability were more challenging.
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10.2.3 Aim 3: Identify novel improvement targets from organisational and
patient perspectives
10.2.3.1 Clinician-manager alignment
A focused narrative review identi￿ed clinician-manager alignment as a novel focus for organ-
isational QI e￿orts [chapter 8]. A longstanding emphasis on clinical engagement, rather than
the managerial structures needed to support it, may have limited the ability to replicate QI
successes: reciprocal organisational change is also needed. A model of sta￿ alignment at di￿er-
ent organisational levels described speci￿c incentives and actions at each level, to optimise the
implementation of strategically-selected QI interventions.
10.2.3.2 Patient and carer perspectives on medical ward quality metrics
Metrics for hand hygiene, cleaning, infections, pressure ulcers, falls, nurse sta￿ng, and patient
feedback were on display in the ward environment [chapter 9]. Their intended audience was
not clear, and there was no reference to previous results or targets. These metrics addressed one
of the priorities identi￿ed in interviews with patients and carers (hygiene), but not their other
concerns (high quality communication and sta￿ attitudes). Patients and carers acknowledged
some opportunities to act on quality data themselves, but there were considerable limitations
with the data as currently displayed. Conceptual barriers to the use of the data by patients
and carers included: (i) their reliance on their own judgements, above objective or aggregate
measures; and (ii) a deliberately inward view of care quality, downplaying others’ experiences
in comparison with their own.
10.3 Thesis limitations: a critique of methodological choices
The limitations of each individual study were discussed in the relevant chapter. Here, I will
present a broad critique of the thesis’ key methodologies. I discuss the literature reviews, the
286 Discussion
evaluation format for PCTS, and the choice of outcome measures.
10.3.1 Literature reviews: narrative, systematic, or realist?
The ￿ndings of the narrative and systematic reviews [chapters 2 and 3, respectively] were
somewhat discordant. Much of the evidence identi￿ed in the narrative review suggested that
medical ward ITC interventions were likely to be e￿ective, whereas the systematic review found
otherwise. There are a number of possible explanations for this discrepancy.
The systematic review restricted its analysis to higher quality study designs. Given that
publication bias and inadequate study designs plague the QI literature [see 1.2.6], it is possible
that ITC interventions are truly less e￿ective than lower quality study designs would suggest.
The systematic review results would therefore supersede the results of the narrative review,
and those of other reviews which similarly included low quality study designs (Bhamidipati
et al., 2016).
An alternative interpretation is that, given the complexity of these interventions - alter-
ations to team composition, team practice, or both - a systematic review methodology was
inappropriate. Would a ‘realist’ evaluation have served the review’s goals better? Realist evalu-
ations, seeking complex interactions between context, mechanisms, and outcomes, might bring
more nuanced conclusions: what works, for whom, and in what settings. Editorials have com-
mented that few ITC interventions have proposed a causal pathway (or mechanism) for their
e￿ect, that there is signi￿cant variation in the design of these interventions, and that their goals
will necessarily di￿er with local priorities (O’Leary et al., 2016). A realist approach (identify-
ing speci￿cally where, and how, interdisciplinary interventions might be e￿ective) could be
appropriate.
Yet there are clear arguments that it would be a problematic to forsake quantitative evalu-
ations in QI (Dixon-Woods, 2014a). Systematic reviews have an important role here, not least
because the over-estimation of ITC interventions’ bene￿ts hampers their implementation. Set-
ting unattainable targets, based on exaggerated estimates of e￿ectiveness, can damage and
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undermine team commitment to what are still valuable interventions (Mosher and Kaboli, 2015).
Administrators may also be dissuaded from making necessary service investments, because of
a mistaken belief that ITC adjustments alone may achieve their organisational goals. Whether
those goals are su￿ciently sensitive to changes in ward team care can now be questioned. Other
authors have now taken up the call for more careful attention to outcome selection in teamwork
interventions (Mosher and Kaboli, 2015; Madigosky and Schaik, 2016). These conclusions would
not have been as apparent from a realist review.
10.3.2 PCTS evaluation: evaluability assessment, formative evaluation, or sum-
mative evaluation?
Interventions like PCTS are complex, both in terms of theirmultiple interdependent components,
and their deployment in systems that adapt to context and produce non-linear responses (Shiell
et al., 2008). In view of this complexity, appropriate evaluation methodologies should re￿ect the
maturity of the intervention, and the evaluation resources available. Around 95% of complex
interventions are not fully developed at the time of evaluation (Leviton, 2013). This hinders
the interpretation of evaluation results; prematurely labelling interventions as ine￿ective can
sti￿e innovation, and evaluation itself is not without costs. Evaluation experts therefore advise
holding o￿ from summative evaluation (evaluation of the merit of an intervention) until it is
most likely to be helpful. Instead, onemight￿rst choose a formative evaluation (using evaluation
to improve the intervention) or even an evaluability assessment (Leviton, 2013).
In this section, I will describe the trade-o￿s inherent in the PCTS evaluations [chapters 5-7].
I will discuss whether PCTS was ready to be evaluated, and whether an evaluability assessment
would have been bene￿cial; how the PCTS evaluation ultimately contained both summative




Evaluability assessment is a pre-evaluation activity, designed to maximise the chances that any
subsequent evaluation will produce useful information (Leviton et al., 2010):
‘[Evaluability assessment judges] whether the programme is ready to be managed
for results, what changes are needed to do so, and whether the evaluation would
contribute to improved programme performance.’ (Shadish et al., 1991)
Evaluability assessment protects programmes from being evaluated against unrealistic goals,
emphasising the need for a well-established, realistic programme logic, backed by su￿cient
resources (Leviton et al., 2010). The key judgement of an evaluability assessment is plausib-
ility analysis: the likelihood that outcomes are achievable given the programme’s timeframe,
resources, activities and context. Evaluability assessment can indicate that full evaluation is
inappropriate; that there is a need to adjust activities and resources (a programme develop-
ment function); that formative evaluation would be merited; or suggest summative evaluation
questions and methods.
Should PCTS have been subjected to an evaluability assessment rather than the more de￿n-
itive quantitative and qualitative evaluations of chapters 5 and 6? There were opportunities
to optimise PCTS further: a Delphi consensus process (Jones and Hunter, 1995) might have
established the most important items for a PCTS brie￿ng, before the local pilot. Facilitation
expertise too could be improved: not all facilitators are equal, with a proposed facilitation
pathway from novice to expert (Harvey and Kitson, 2016). Feedback did largely adhere to the
recommended principles of timeliness, solution-￿nding, signposting to relevant resources, and
non-judgemental delivery [see 6.5.1.2] (Reynolds et al., 2016). Nonetheless, with inconsistent
data dissemination by ward sisters and service managers [see 7.4.2.3.1], a more reliable mech-
anism to deliver feedback would have been preferable. An evaluability assessment may have
identi￿ed these opportunities earlier, and could have signposted how a formal stakeholder
agreement on the purpose of the programme would be helpful.
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However, there were good reasons too why an evaluability assessment was not required.
The study protocol outlined a robust programme logic, supported by the experience of the pilot
period. It was therefore plausible that PCTSmight a￿ect the study’s outcomes - andwith an auto-
ethnographic study design, there was no separate need to ‘scout the programme reality’ to see if
it matched payers’ expectations (Leviton et al., 2010). A key driver for evaluability assessment is
the cost-e￿ectiveness of a full evaluation: this was not a concern here, evaluation requirements
having already been establishedwithin an approved programme budget. Ultimately, evaluability
assessments sift out interventions with little chance of improving outcomes, and those delivered
in insu￿cient doses to do so. The results of chapters 5 and 6 suggest that the decisions to proceed
with implementation and evaluation were - on balance - reasonable ones.
10.3.2.2 An evaluation with formative and summative components
In practice, most evaluations have both summative and formative elements, with measures
of e￿ectiveness as well as knowledge to inform future iterations of an intervention (Health
Foundation, 2015). It is important to reiterate that the quantitative and qualitative evaluations
here had important formative components. The results indicate the e￿ects of this iteration of
PCTS, with signi￿cant learning too about how it might be improved. Although a controlled trial
is more often seen as a summative evaluation, HEADS-UP brie￿ngs, facilitation and feedback
would warrant further development before a wider roll-out. The quantitative, qualitative and
implementation evaluations showed how PCTS proved e￿ective when implemented at high
￿delity. Future PCTS development would focus on increasing the likelihood of high ￿delity
implementation, particularly in those teams with less favourable histories of QI engagement,
or maladaptive interdisciplinary norms.
10.3.2.3 Pragmatism vs e￿cacy
The HEADS-UP study was a deliberately pragmatic one, designed to produce results that would
be broadly applicable to wider practice. The published narrative review and study protocol both
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highlighted the need for a rigorously-tested interdisciplinary ward intervention that hospitals
could implement without major service upheaval (Pannick et al., 2014; Pannick et al., 2015). The
PRECIS-2 tool helps position a trial on the spectrum from explanatory to pragmatic1 (Loudon
et al., 2015): HEADS-UP scores highly on pragmatism.
This pragmatism comes at a cost: an imperfect intervention. Greater investments in the
organisational resources and expertise needed to deliver the intervention (e.g., establishing
dedicated feedback sessions rather than adding to existing meetings) may have increased the
e￿ect of PCTS. Similarly, there was no attempt to assess organisational readiness for change, nor
to create a more receptive environment in which QI e￿orts could take hold2. Had PCTS been
evaluated in a setting better prepared for it, e￿cacy may have increased - but that result would
be less applicable to routine practice, where implementation e￿orts are commonly hindered
by resource constraints. Other authors have voiced concerns about the ability to replicate
explanatory reports of high intensity, multifaceted team care interventions in selected centres
(Colligan et al., 2015; Wong et al., 2015). This trial prioritised results that would predict real
world e￿ectiveness, above an idealised demonstration of the intervention. Any ￿aws in the
programme’s design and implementation should be reviewed in that light.
10.3.3 Study outcomes: validity and accuracy
There was a clear rationale for the selection of each of the PCTS study outcomes [see table 4.1].
However, these outcome measures were potentially constrained in their validity and accuracy.
10.3.3.1 Valid measures of interdisciplinary team care
Study outcomes had good face validity as measures of the quality of care, or as balancing
measures to monitor unintended consequences of PCTS [see 4.5.4]. Few had been speci￿cally
validated as measures of ITC, however, which the intervention was designed to improve. The
1PRECIS-2 domains are (participant) eligibility; recruitment; setting; organisation; ￿exibility (delivery); ￿exibility
(adherence); follow-up; primary outcome and primary analysis (Loudon et al., 2015).
2Tools to evaluate organisational context in the NHS include the validated Context Assessment Index (CAI), and
the more recent Health Foundation organisational QI checklist [see 8.5.4].
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systematic review [chapter 3], which ran concurrently with the HEADS-UP study, raised con-
cerns about the limited sensitivity of some of these outcome measures to changes in ITC. The
imperfect relationship between quality and quality metrics is a longstanding concern in health
services research [see 1.5.3], and it was not feasible for a study of this scale to collect other
patient outcome measures outside of routine datasets.
In mitigation, patient outcomes were supplemented with the detailed qualitative (survey
and auto-ethnographic) analysis to provide deeper insight into the ITC changes that were
taking place. The primary outcome (eLOS) also had supportive evidence for its as use as an
ITC outcome, both from the systematic review and from work demonstrating the relationship
between ward team behaviours and unnecessary length of stay (Leykum et al., 2015). Further
research into medical ward outcomes is discussed later in the chapter [see 10.4.1.1].
10.3.3.2 Accuracy of administrative datasets
Patient outcomes and risk adjustment were established from routinely collected administrative
datasets. These datasets are generated by local administrators (coders),who peruse clinical notes
to identify relevant diagnostic and procedural labels. Few clinicians are regularly involved in
this process, and the accuracy of the national hospital episodes statistics (HES) database has
been questioned (Spencer and Davies, 2012). Again, alternative methods for the identi￿cation
of patient outcomes, diagnoses and adverse events (such as medical record review) were not
feasible here, given the resources available.
However, discharge coding accuracy has improved in recent years, and routinely collected
data have been deemed su￿ciently robust to support both research and managerial decision-
making (Burns et al., 2012). Further, in establishing the local ward-level datasets, raw data
underwent an additional level of veri￿cation and cleaning (beyond that normally expected
prior to national database submission). I also considered enhanced measures to optimise admin-
istrative data for risk adjustment, such as a ‘lookback’ period to identify pre-existing diagnoses
from previous admissions. These were ultimately discounted, because of the risk of introdu-
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cing an unknown bias against patients with comorbidities who had not had a previous local
admission (A. Bottle, Senior Lecturer in Medical Statistics, Imperial College London - personal
communication, 27th May 2014).
In summary, the important methodological choices in the thesis included the use of a sys-
tematic review rather than a realist review; summative and formative evaluations instead of
an evaluability assessment; and patient outcomes drawn from administrative datasets. These
choices were informed by resource limitations and the prioritisation of results that would
usefully inform real world practice. Whilst the strengths of alternative methodologies are ac-
knowledged, di￿erent choices would have involved other trade-o￿s (Portela et al., 2015). These
tensions are di￿cult to resolve in improvement research.
10.4 Implications for research, clinical practice andhealth policy
Having recognised its methodological limitations, the work described in this thesis has a number
of implications for future research, clinical practice and health policy.
10.4.1 Avenues for further research in interdisciplinary ward care
There are two distinct streams of academic work which this thesis could underpin in the future.
First, there are candidate patient outcomes for the measurement of interdisciplinary care quality
on the medical ward. Second, a more speci￿c model of ITC e￿ectiveness can now be constructed
for this setting.
10.4.1.1 Outcome sets for interdisciplinary ward teams
Chapter 5 reported the need for a better-de￿ned set of quality metrics for ward-level ITC. There
are strong arguments why these quality metrics should be outcomes, not process measures:
process measures receive little attention from patients, do not distinguish between providers,
and consume organisational resources (Porter et al., 2016). Preventable complications of care,
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adverse events, and unnecessary length of stay are currently the best candidates for validation
as objective ITC outcomes on medical wards. These outcomes should be complemented by a
validated patient-reported measure of ITC quality, which evaluates sta￿ attitudes and informa-
tion provision - the priorities highlighted in chapter 9. Inpatients are able to ￿ag these concerns:
indeed, these are the safety domains they cite most frequently when asked (Giles et al., 2013).
Structured collection and feedback of these ITC outcomes would provide ward teams with valu-
able, patient-centred measures for improvement. This is an important topic for further study,
as previous e￿orts to identify teamwork-sensitive quality measures in medicine found only
process measures, not outcomes (Sorbero et al., 2008).
10.4.1.2 Building a comprehensive model of interdisciplinary ward team e￿ective-
ness
ITC, as I have envisaged it, is not only teamwork. Systems theory suggests that team e￿ective-
ness depends on complex interactions between team inputs, team processes, and their outputs,
‘teamwork’ occurring in the process phase3 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2005).
Expanding on the de￿nition used in chapter 3 [box 3.1], a model of ITC e￿ectiveness should
therefore incorporate (i) the practices (structures) that establish the ward team and de￿ne the
opportunities for its members to interact; (ii) the team processes that ‘teamwork’ is usually
thought to entail; and (iii) the patient-facing behaviours that arise from them to a￿ect outcomes.
Other groups have started to explore speci￿c relationships between the ITC model’s di￿er-
ent components, without testing or validating the entire construct. For example, using organ-
isational theory, McIntosh et al. (2014) identi￿ed various organisational predictors (structures)
of sta￿-rated inpatient medical care coordination (team process), without analysing outcomes.
Some of these organisational and unit structures have been adopted as routine practice (Kim
3Although there is no consensus on what constitutes ‘teamwork’ (Valentine et al., 2015), the term generally
refers to ‘behavioural processes that people use to accomplish interdependent work, and/or the a￿ective, cognit-
ive, and motivation states that emerge during the course of that work’ (Ilgen et al., 2005). Behavioural processes
include communication and coordination; examples of emergent states are mutual respect and psychological safety
(Valentine et al., 2015).
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et al., 2014).
The generic IntegratedHealthCare TeamE￿ectivenessModel (ITEM), drawing on a separate
team e￿ectiveness literature, considered a variety of team processes in more detail (Lemieux-
Charles and McGuire, 2006). Like McIntosh, Lemieux-Charles and McGuire called for further
research in speci￿c settings to validate the constructs they had described. Deneckere et al.
(2012) used the ITEM model to describe multidisciplinary teamwork quality indicators, in the
context of inpatient care pathways for the standardised treatment of low complexity conditions.
Deneckere’s group only considered measures that could be self-reported (Deneckere et al., 2011;
Deneckere et al., 2012; Deneckere et al., 2013), and left patient outcomes unexplored. In contrast,
many empirical tests of interdisciplinary medical ward interventions have described structures
and patient outcomes, but - in the absence of a conceptual model - have neglected processes
(O’Leary et al., 2016).
A full model of ITC could marry the conceptual and empirical strengths of these previ-
ous reports [￿gure 10.1]. Like the ITEM model, this model would distinguish between team
structures such as interdisciplinary meetings, which are modi￿able by unit teams, and shared
organisational structures (e.g., payment incentives and information systems), which are not.
These organisational structures help establish and in￿uence team processes; the models pro-
posed by Deneckere andMcIntosh do notmake this distinction. A novel addition to this model is
the construct of measurable team behaviours, through which self-reported team processes and
outcomes are then linked. Team behaviours like ‘sensemaking’ (making sense of the competing
tasks required by a group of patients) correlate with ITC outcomes such as unnecessary length
of stay and complications of care (Leykum et al., 2015). Incorporating team behaviours into the
model in this way mitigates the limitations of relying only on self-reported team characteristics,
with a trade-o￿ between perceived team e￿ectiveness and actual improvements in patient and
organisational outcomes (Lemieux-Charles and McGuire, 2006). Measuring team behaviours
might identify why, in some settings, there are improvements in self-reported team processes,


































Figure 10.1: A model of interdisciplinary team care e￿ectiveness
This model marries the theoretical and empirical strengths of previous work, and the understanding of ward-level QI implementation gained through this thesis. It builds on the similar, but generic, ITEM
model (Lemieux-Charles and McGuire, 2006), supplemented by empirical data speci￿c to medical ward teams. A Delphi process led by Deneckere et al. (2011) identi￿ed indicators of interdisciplinary team performance (in
structure, context and self-reported outcomes), emphasising shared goals and knowledge, leadership, teamwork climate, perceived coordination of care, and vision. These were not operationalised. McIntosh et al. (2014)
demonstrated a correlation between speci￿c organisational and team factors and self-reported ward care coordination (a single team process). Further work is investigating the e￿ects of sensemaking (Leykum et al., 2015).
This thesis has focused mostly on the ward microsystem’s ITC structures and speci￿c outcomes, through the narrative and systematic reviews (*), evaluation of PCTS (**), and investigation of patient/carer priorities (§).
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When should ward team behaviours be assessed? Observers can be assigned to dedicated
interdisciplinary meetings, to ward rounds, or to speci￿c ward locations (such as nursing sta-
tions) to observe work throughout a shift (Farley et al., 2010; O’Leary et al., 2012a; McAllister
et al., 2014; Leykum et al., 2015). A whole-shift assessment, though arduous, has some appeal:
di￿erent social rules and norms may apply during dedicated interdisciplinary meetings, which
may in￿ate any team assessment. Alternatively, behaviour in interdisciplinary team meetings
may be forced, because of the tension between the acknowledged need for communication, and
a general resistance to time spent away from direct patient care (Baxter and Brum￿tt, 2008; Nan-
carrow et al., 2012). This issue - at what points does team care matter most, and when should it
be measured - is worthy of further research. The model of ITC e￿ectiveness could then be tested
more formally, subjecting its novel constructs to expert consensus, and empirically testing the
links between the adjacent components.
10.4.2 Implications for clinical practice and policy
This thesis also suggests practical ways in which organisations and teams might immediately
improve their medical ward care delivery. Boards, managers and ward leaders could use the
intervention categories established in chapter 2 to review existing organisational safety e￿orts,
and identify new opportunities for development. QI training for junior clinicians is already
increasing (Ahmed et al., 2014; Gamble and Vaux, 2014). Local leaders will need to proactively
develop frameworks to support and sustain these juniors’ QI e￿orts, if they are to be e￿ective.
For organisations to seemeaningful improvement,managerial job plans (both for pure managers
and hybrid managers) should explicitly mandate and incentivise QI coordination. Without an
organisational mandate and backing from each institution, the improvement e￿orts of junior
sta￿ are unlikely to be sustained in the workplace; many organisations have no strategy to best
use this in￿ux of QI-trained sta￿. There should be real concern that their e￿orts might go to
waste.
At a ward level, there are opportunities to implement the team structures that represent cur-
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rent best practice [￿gure 10.1] - although improvements in patient outcomes might depend very
much on their local implementation. Existing interdisciplinary meetings and discharge-focused
board rounds can be optimisedwith amore structured approach (e.g., PCTS),with organisational
attention to sta￿ support and learning. A particular challenge for the UK is securing physician
engagement to drive forward ward improvement e￿orts, when few doctors (outside of the AAU)
have unfettered commitments to these areas. To achieve real ward excellence, physicians will
need to be released from their other commitments (outpatient clinics, procedures, etc.), at least
for speci￿c periods - or inpatient work will remain only a ‘marginal activity’ (Wachter and
Goldman, 1996). Implementing protected ‘ward blocks’ for physicians should be a local priority.
Deliberate operational redesign should accompany these sta￿ng changes: PCTS showed
how clinical sta￿ can identify the services and systems that no longer provide adequate support
for them or their patients. ‘Liberating’ sta￿ from these outdated services is an increasingly im-
portant commitment for organisations to make (Moore and Buchanan, 2013; University College
London Hospitals, 2016). This commitment may improve patient outcomes as well as inter-
disciplinary team satisfaction and e￿ectiveness, and is likely to be cost-e￿ective (Zheng et al.,
2016).
Finally, this thesis has highlighted the need for policymakers to invest in ward-level, rather
than hospital-aggregated, data sets. Comprehensive ward-level data would be directly useful for
local improvement work, and would foster a better national understanding of the resources and
sta￿ mix required for high quality care. These calculations currently rely on poor quality data
(Gri￿ths et al., 2016b). In the context of a national debate on the adequacy of healthcare funding,
policymakers might productively focus their e￿orts on national implementation of local QI
structures that support unit-level improvements. This work suggests that statistical constructs
of organisational performance are of less value, and proposals for additional organisational
‘league tables’ (Monitor, NHS Trust Development Authority, 2016) are unlikely to be the most
e￿cient way of bringing about improvement.
298 Discussion
10.5 Personal re￿ections
As a medical doctor, this period of postgraduate research has certainly made me re￿ect on my
clinical practice. I began this thesis as a believer in the hard bene￿ts of interdisciplinary team
care: indeed, I was surprised to ￿nd so little objective evidence of them. I remain convinced
that high performing interdisciplinary teams hold the key to timely, safe, cost-e￿ective medical
care. For them to ful￿l their potential, teams must be empowered by work systems that make
sense, not predispose them to error; adequate sta￿ng, not skeleton sta￿ng; smart equipment
that nudges, not overwhelms; and learning systems that build better practice, before a serious
incident. Although many of these challenges are international ones, shared by the worldwide
medical community, there are particular challenges ahead for the United Kingdom in healthcare
funding and sta￿ng. It is important that these basic tenets of a safe service are not put aside:
teams are important, but they are not everything. As I return to full-time clinical work, I take
with me the belief that we need to be much harder on our systems, and much kinder to our
people.
10.6 Concluding remarks
De￿ning and improving the performance of medical wards is a priority, not only because of the
scale of the care they deliver, but because their stock in trade – dealing with complex, increas-
ingly frail patients – is a standard bearer for the challenges facing health systems more broadly.
In this thesis, I discussed a limited selection of opportunities for medical ward improvement:
ward-level organisation of interdisciplinary team care, PCTS, alignment between QI e￿orts and
organisational priorities, and a setting-speci￿c understanding of what patients and carers hold
most important. I am hopeful that these improvement opportunities will be taken up.
To my knowledge, this thesis represents the ￿rst speci￿c compilation of academic medical
ward research from the UK. Much of the ongoing work in this ￿eld is done under the auspices of
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academic hospitalists in the US. I have learned a great deal from their experiences of delivering
quality improvement, and their systems for conducting health services research in inpatient
medicine. We in the UK must build our own clinical research capacity in this ￿eld.
The enthusiasm and dedication of the many teams who embraced HEADS-UP were in-
spiring, and one must be phlegmatic about the structural and historical barriers to making QI
converts of every department. Frontline interdisciplinary teams can change their own practice
and bring about meaningful service development, improving patients’ outcomes. The challenge
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Systematic review: search terms
A.1 Objective outcomes
(adverse event$ or adverse drug or avoidable delay$ or avoidable harm$ or bacteraemia or
bacteremia or bleeding or cardiac arrest$ or care de￿cienc$ or catheter-associated urine tract
infection$ or catheter-associated uti$ or clostridium di￿cile or critical incident$ or critical care
admission$ or critical outcome$ or day$ in hospital or death$ or delay$ or deteriorat$ or diagnos$
error$ or disabilit$ on discharge or deep vein thromb$ or delirium or di￿cile or drug error$ or
dvt$ or error$ of omission or error$ of commission or error prevention or escalation or failure
to rescue or falls or fatalit$ or hand hygiene or handwashing or hospital-acquired infection$ or
hospital-associated infection$ or healthcare-acquired infection$ or healthcare-associated infec-
tion$ or healthcare failure$ or healthcare safety or healthcare outcome$ or hospital-acquired
pneumonia$ or hospital day$ or hospital failure$ or hospital outcome$ or hospital safety or
HSMR or hypotension or hypoxia or iatrogenic or inappropriate care or infection control or
injury or injuries or intensive care admission$ or lapse$ or length$ of stay or medical com-
plication$ or medical error$ or medical failure$ or medical outcome$ or medication error$ or
methicillin-resistant staphylococc$ or mrsa or misdiagnos$ or misidenti￿cation$ or mistake$
or morbidity or mortality or move$ or near miss$ or negligen$ or never event$ or nosocomial
364 Systematic review: search terms
or patient deterioration or patient outcome$ or patient safety or performance indicator$ or pre-
ventable error$ or pulmonary emboli$ or quality indicator$ or quality of care or readmission$
or resuscitation or safe care or safety attitude$ or safety climate$ or safety culture$ or safety
practice$ or sentinel event$ or sepsis or serious untoward incident$ or service de￿cienc$ or
SHMI or slip$ or standard$ of care or suboptimal care or substandard care or thromboemboli$
or thromboprophylaxis or transfer$ or undesirable consequence$ or undesirable event$ or un-
intended injur$ or unintended harm$ or unintended consequence$ or unanticipated harm$ or
unanticipated injur$ or unexpected event$ or unexpected injur$ or unexpected consequence$ or
unexpected harm$ or unnecessary event$ or unnecessary injur$ or unnecessary consequence$
or unnecessary harm$ or waiting time$ or ward safety or ward performance).ab,ti.
A.2 Program evaluations and trials
(bar cod$ or change or checklist$ or computer-assisted or decision making or decision support
or endpoint or evaluation or expert system or feedback$ or impact or implement$ or initiative$
or intervention*1 or medical informatics or outcome measure$ or order entry or program$ or
reminder$ or trial).ab,ti.
A.3 Medical ward descriptors
(academic medical unit$ or academic teaching unit$ or acute admission$ unit$ or acute assess-
ment unit$ or acute disease management or acute medical unit$ or acute medicine or general
medicine or general medical or general medical ward$ or general medical department$ or gen-
eral medical service$ or general ward$ or hospital inpatient$ or hospital$ medicine or hospital$
unit$ or hospitalist$ or inpatient medical service$ or inpatient medical team$ or inpatient med-
ical unit$ or inpatient medicine or inpatient resident service$ or inpatient teaching service$ or
internal medical service$ or internal medicine or medical admission$ or medical assessment
unit$ or medical environment$ or medical inpatient$ or medical patient$ or medical specialt$
A.3 Medical ward descriptors 365































Figure C.1: Patient ￿ow diagram for the HEADS-UP study
Table C.1: Intention-to-treat and per protocol analyses for patient outcomes and processes of care (generalised estimating equations models)
Adjusted outcome ratio*
Outcome HEADS-UP Control Intention-to-treat Moderate ￿delity** High ￿delity***
Outcome ratio
(95% CI)
P value Outcome ratio
(95% CI)
























































*Odds ratios for binary outcomes, and incidence rate ratios for continuous outcomes. **Medium frequency brie￿ngs with high engagement. ***High frequency brie￿ngs













































































































































6410 Fannin Street 
UTPB Suite 1100 
Houston, TX 77030 
https://med.uth.edu/chqs/
Medical School 
University of Texas at Houston-Memorial Hermann 
Center for Healthcare Quality and Safety 
2FWREHU
Dear 6DP3DQQLFN
You have our permission to use any of the following Safety Attitudes Questionnaires and 
the corresponding scoring keys:  
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Short Form 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Teamwork and Safety Climate 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Ambulatory Version 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – ICU Version 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Labor and Delivery Version 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Operating Room Version 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Pharmacy Version 
Safety Climate Survey 
Please note, we do not have editable versions for any of the SAQ surveys but feel free to 
modify the surveys to meet your research endeavors.  
Respectfully, 
University of Texas at Houston-Memorial Hermann 
Center for Healthcare QualityDQG Safety Team








































PLEASE CIRCLE YOUR ROLE:    F1  / F2  / ST 1-2  / ST 3 - 8 / CONSULTANT 
ADMIN / STAFF NURSE / SENIOR NURSE / PHYSIO / OT / PHARMACIST 










The levels of staffing on this ward are 
sufficient to handle the number of patients ! ! ! ! ! ! 
I would feel safe being treated here as a 
patient ! ! ! ! ! ! 
I am encouraged by my colleagues to 
report any patient safety concerns I may 
have 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Staff frequently disregard rules or 
guidelines (e.g. hand-washing, treatment 
protocols / clinical pathways, sterile field, 
etc.) established for the wards 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
The culture on this ward makes it easy to 
learn from the errors of others ! ! ! ! ! ! 
I receive appropriate feedback about my 
performance ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Medical errors are handled appropriately 
here ! ! ! ! ! ! 
I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety on this 
ward 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
On this ward, it is difficult to discuss errors ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Hospital management does not knowingly 
compromise the safety of patients ! ! ! ! ! ! 
This institution is doing more for patient 
safety now than it did one year ago ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Leadership is driving us to be a safety-
centred institution ! ! ! ! ! ! 
My suggestions about safety would be 
acted upon if I expressed them to 
management 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
TEAMWORK CLIMATE ON THIS 









Nurse input is well received on this ward ! ! ! ! ! ! 
On this ward, it is difficult to speak up if I 
perceive a problem with patient care ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Decision-making on this ward utilises 
input from relevant staff ! ! ! ! ! ! 
The doctors and nurses here work 
together as a well-coordinated team ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Disagreements on this ward are resolved 
appropriately (i.e. not who is right, but 
what is best for the patient) 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
I am frequently unable to express 
disagreement with senior staff here (e.g. 
consultants / senior nurses) 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
It is easy for staff here to ask questions 
when there is something that they do not 
understand 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
I have the support I need from other staff 
to care for patients ! ! ! ! ! ! 
I know the first and last names of all the 
staff I worked with during my last shift ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Important issues are well communicated 
at shift changes (i.e. handovers) ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Briefing staff before the start of a shift (i.e. 
to plan for possible contingencies) is 
important for patient safety 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Briefings are common on this ward ! ! ! ! ! ! 
I am satisfied with the quality of 
collaboration that I experience with 
doctors on this ward 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
I am satisfied with the quality of 
collaboration that I experience with nurses 
on this ward 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
 
 
PLEASE NOW THINK ABOUT THE LAST DAY YOU WORKED ON THIS WARD: 
PLACE AN X IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE 
 
 
How mentally demanding was it?    





How physically demanding was it?   





How hurried or rushed was it?   





How successful were you in accomplishing 
what you needed to do? 
    




How hard did you have to work to accomplish 
what you needed to do? 
    




How insecure, discouraged, irritated, 
stressed, and annoyed were you? 
    
   Not at all                 Very much 
 
 
• How long have you been working on this ward?  0-3 months 4-6 months 6-12 months > 12 months 
 
• How many times to date have you participated in HEADS-UP morning briefings? 0 < 5  5-10    > 10 
 
• Have you reported any concerns differently as a result 
of participating in the HEADS-UP briefings?    Yes   No      Not sure    Not applicable 
 
 
Any other comments? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. 
Name   Task    Date
   Mental Demand How mentally demanding was the task?
   Physical Demand How physically demanding was the task?
   Temporal Demand How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
   Performance How successful were you in accomplishing what
you were asked to do?
   Effort How hard did you have to work to  accomplish
your level of performance?
   Frustration How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed,
and annoyed wereyou?
Figure 8.6
NASA Task Load Index
Hart and Staveland’s NASA Task Load Index (TLX) method assesses
work load on five 7-point scales. Increments of high, medium and low
estimates for each point result in 21 gradations on the scales.
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HEADS-UP: a mobile application to
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Even	if	the	news	is	bad,	you	should	be	well	
informed	
	 	 	 	 	
Your	doctor	should	explain	the	purpose	of	
your	laboratory	tests		
	 	 	 	 	
It	is	important	for	you	to	know	all	the	side	
effects	of	your	medication			
	 	 	 	 	
Information	about	your	illness	is	as	important	
to	you	as	treatment	
	 	 	 	 	
When	there	is	more	than	one	method	to	treat	
a	problem,	you	should	be	told	about	each	one	











Patient / Carer Information Sheet 
 
Patient and carer information needs on the medical ward: an interview study 
to explore perceptions of ward performance 
 
Researcher: Dr Samuel Pannick 
Supervisors: Professor Nick Sevdalis, Professor Thanos Athanasiou, Dr Susannah Long 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  Take time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
About the study 
 
Wards are encouraged to display more and more information about their performance, so 
that staff and patients can see how well they are working. We don’t know whether this 
information is useful for patients and their carers, how they feel about it, or what would make 
it more useful. This study is part of a PhD (doctorate) on medical ward care. 
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
 
You have been asked because you are currently an inpatient on this ward, or you are the 
main carer for a current patient on this ward. Staff on this ward hoped you might feel well 
enough to help us with this study today. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be 
asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason. This will not affect your care in any way. 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
 
You will be asked some questions about what makes a good ward, the information we 
display on the ward, and how you might use that information. The discussion will be taped 
and we might also take some notes. The interview will last approximately 30 minutes. We 
may also interview your main carer, if you have one, if they are also happy to tell us how 
they use ward information. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
We will try to use this study to deliver ward information to patients and carers in ways that 
they find more helpful. 
 
What are the possible downsides of taking part? 
 
                                                                                  
 
We do not anticipate any major downsides to taking part. 
 
Is taking part anonymous and confidential? 
Yes. All information gathered will be treated as confidential. If we quote your opinions at any 
point it will be done anonymously. No personally identifiable information will be used if we 
publish this research. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The findings will be published in a scientific journal. If you would like to be notified about the 
publication date and journal, please let the interviewer know, and he will be able to provide 
further information (see below). 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The NIHR Imperial Patient Safety Translational Research Centre and the Imperial College 
Healthcare Charity are organising and funding this research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The study has been reviewed and approved by Westminster Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Who can answer my questions about this study? 
You can talk to the researcher about any questions or concerns you have about this study: 
 
Dr Sam Pannick 
Email: s.pannick@imperial.ac.uk 
Phone: 0207 594 3149 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds 
for a legal action.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about 
any aspect of the way you have been treated during the course of this study then you should 
immediately inform the Investigator (Dr Sam Pannick, as above).  The normal National 
Health Service complaints mechanisms are also available to you.  If you are still not satisfied 
with the response, you may contact the Imperial AHSC Joint Research Compliance Office. 
  
                                                                                  
 
 































_______________________		 	 ________________		 	 ________________		
Your	Name		 	 	 	 	 Signature	 	 	 	 Date		
	
	
________________________	 	 	________________	 	 ________________		
Researcher	 	 	 	 Researcher	Signature		 	 	 	 Date		
 
London - Westminster Research Ethics Committee 




Telephone: 0207 104 8012 
 
26 January 2016 
 
Dr Samuel Pannick 
Clinical Research Fellow 
Imperial College London 
Room 503 





Dear Dr Pannick 
 
Study title: Patient and carer information needs on the medical ward: 
an interview study to explore perceptions of ward 
performance 
REC reference: 16/LO/0196 
IRAS project ID: 198908 
 
Thank you for your submission of 20 January 2016, responding to the Proportionate Review 
Sub-Committee’s request for changes to the documentation for the above study. 
 
The revised documentation has been reviewed and approved by the Chair. 
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the HRA website, 
together with your contact details. Publication will be no earlier than three months from the date 
of this favourable opinion letter. The expectation is that this information will be published for all 
studies that receive an ethical opinion but should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, 
wish to make a request to defer, or require further information, please contact the REC Manager 
Ms Rachel Katzenellenbogen, nrescommittee.london-westminster@nhs.net. Under very limited 
circumstances (e.g. for student research which has received an unfavourable opinion), it may 
be possible to grant an exemption to the publication of the study. 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
as revised. 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The REC favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
 
Management permission must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the start of the 
study at the site concerned. 
 
Management permission should be sought from all NHS organisations involved in the study in 
accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. Each NHS organisation must confirm 
through the signing of agreements and/or other documents that it has given permission for the 
research to proceed (except where explicitly specified otherwise).  
Guidance on applying for HRA Approval (England)/ NHS permission for research is available in 
the Integrated Research Application System, www.hra.nhs.uk or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.  
 
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
participants to research sites (“participant identification centre”), guidance should be sought from 
the R&D office on the information it requires to give permission for this activity. 
 
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in accordance with the 
procedures of the relevant host organisation. 
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of management permissions from host 
organisations.  
 
Registration of Clinical Trials 
 
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) must be registered on 
a publically accessible database. This should be before the first participant is recruited but no later 
than 6 weeks after recruitment of the first participant. 
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at the earliest 
opportunity e.g. when submitting an amendment. We will audit the registration details as part of 
the annual progress reporting process. 
  
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is registered but for 
non-clinical trials this is not currently mandatory. 
  
If a sponsor wishes to request a deferral for study registration within the required timeframe, they 
should contact hra.studyregistration@nhs.net. The expectation is that all clinical trials will be 
registered, however, in exceptional circumstances non registration may be permissible with prior 
agreement from the HRA. Guidance on where to register is provided on the HRA website. 
 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied with 
before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as applicable). 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 




The documents reviewed and approved by the Committee are: 
 
Document Version Date 
Copies of advertisement materials for research participants [Poster]  1  07 January 2016  
Covering letter on headed paper [Cover letter]  1  04 January 2016  
Evidence of Sponsor insurance or indemnity (non NHS Sponsors 
only) [Verification of insurance]  
  13 July 2014  
Interview schedules or topic guides for participants [Topic guide - 
appendix 1 of protocol]  
3  07 January 2016  
Letter from funder [Grant letter]    11 December 2014  
Letter from sponsor [Sponsorship confirmation]    08 January 2016  
Other [Regarding study registration]  1  20 January 2016  
Other [Study protocol and patient information sheet with tracked 
changes]  
3.1  19 January 2016  
Participant consent form [Participant consent form]  2.1  19 January 2016  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Participant information sheet]  2  07 January 2016  
REC Application Form [REC_Form_11012016]    11 January 2016  
Summary CV for Chief Investigator (CI) [Pannick CV]  1  08 January 2016  
Summary CV for supervisor (student research) [Athanasiou CV]  1  08 January 2016  
Summary, synopsis or diagram (flowchart) of protocol in non 
technical language [Synopsis]  
1  08 January 2016  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 




The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed guidance 
on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
x Notifying substantial amendments 
x Adding new sites and investigators 
x Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
x Progress and safety reports 
x Notifying the end of the study 
 
The HRA website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of changes 




You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National Research 
Ethics Service and the application procedure. If you wish to make your views known please use 
the feedback form available on the HRA website: 
http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/governance/quality-assurance  
 
We are pleased to welcome researchers and R & D staff at our NRES committee members’ 
training days – see details at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/  
 
16/LO/0196   Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 









Enclosures:    “After ethical review – guidance for researchers”  
 
Copy to: Ms Ruth Nicholson, Imperial College

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